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Preface
This study is an inquiry into and an interpretation of Soviet bloc 
policies with respect to certain economic activities of the United Nations, 
the response of other countries to these policies and the impact of the 
resulting interaction on the United Nations’ institutions and functions.
The focus is on the efforts of the Soviet Union and its East European allies 
to expand and "normalize" trade uith the industrially advanced countries of 
the West through the Organization’s central economic forums and the Economic 
Commission for Europe during the period from early 1953 to Nikita Khrushchev’s 
exit from office in I96U.
We have neither attempted to hang the development of East-West trade 
during this period on the peg of the United Nations, i.e. used the 
Organization’s activities simply to illustrate a recounting of the course 
of that development, nor have ue sought to reconstruct the evolution of 
those commercial relationships on the evidence provided by the United Nations' 
record. To liave done so in either case vould have surely led to a distorted 
viev of the fact that the socialist countries have used their participation 
in the United Nations to supplement policies pursued outside the 
Organization.
Throughout most of the first decade of the Organization’s operation, 
the socialist countries under Soviet leadership shoued little interest in 
the West’s emphasis on the expansion and multilateralization of trade 
through the United Nations and other international organizations. As a
ii
result, their participation in the United Nations’ trade-related activities 
vas of little significance, except vith respect to the effects of the lack 
of it. The changes in Soviet bloc policy that came to be fully felt after 
Stalin’s death vere considerably more notevorthy. Although the socialist 
countries continued to conduct trade on a bilateral basis and to 
concentrate negotiating efforts at thab level, in pursuing a more expansive 
trade programme they came to viev the United Nations from the mid-1950’s 
as more useful to their ends than before. While the ultimate objective 
of their activities vithin the Organization vas better bilateral trade ties, 
the immediate aim vas to transform the United Nations' economic vork into 
a useful instrument for improving the conditions under vhich East-West 
trade might be conducted in a way consonant vith the Soviet interpretation 
of vhat constituted the obstacles to that trade and vhat vas necessary for 
"normalizing" it. Accordingly, as ve will see, the subjects of their 
interest vere legal, institutional and atmospheric in nature.
The approach adopted by the Soviet bloc delegations in the United 
Nations vas, then, a distillation of the position taken in pressing for 
changes in East-West trade relations in bilateral negotiations, adapted 
in such a way as to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the 
Organization. As the fundamental problems confronting the expansion of 
the socialist countries’ trade vith the West remained by their ovn account 
fairly constant throughout the period, so did the approach adopted by them 
remain in its essentials unchanged in the United Nations. Accordingly, ve 
will attempt to show that whereas Soviet bloc policies in the United 
Nations offer .an additional dimension to the general study of the bloc's 
external trade relations over these years, these policies vere not 
advanced on an ad hoc basis but rather reflected a constant underlying
iii
rationale and strategy. In viev of this, ve have not considered it 
necessary to present an extensive recounting of the record of bilateral 
developments in commercial relations, nor have ve attempted to correlate the 
evolution of the multiplicity of bilateral arrangements vith the proposals 
advanced in the United Nations except vhere such particulars are of 
illustrative value or vhere they vere of such importance that they had a 
major effect on Soviet bloc policy in the Organization.
The considerable variety of national vievs among the members of 
the United Nations concerning the appropriate methods and objectives vhich 
should be pursued vithin the Organization regarding matters of international 
trade has stemmed from the fact that the relevant Charter provisions are 
both broad and vague. The Charter instructs the membership to promote 
"solutions of international economic...problems," vhile simultaneously 
identifying "full employment," "higher standards of living" and "economic... 
progress and development" as equally desirable goals. As one student of 
the Charter has observed, "No guidelines are given concerning the techniques 
vhich should be folloved in implementing these objectives, nor are priorities 
assigned amongst them." Not only has this led to a great diversity of 
competing vievs, but it also quickly led after the close of the Second World 
War to the creation of a complex institutional framework vithin vhich 
activities relating to international trade vere conducted. Within the United 
Nations system, specialized agencies vere established and others vere planned 
in the postwar period. The Economic and Social Council created its ovn 
subsidiary bodies, and both the Council and the General Assembly entertained 
debate and undertook vork programmes in this area. Thus the framework 
for our study is exceedingly complicated, and our task is not lightened by 
the absence of a definite statement of objectives and methods in the Charter
iv
against vhich the Soviet bloc's role in the evolution of the United Nations' 
functional programme in the international trade field can be measured 
and evaluated.
Here a matter of terminology needs to be clarified. The "functional" 
sphere of international organization has been characterized by Inis L.
Claude, Jr. in his Svords into Ployshares as "that part of the mass of 
organized international activities vhich relates directly to- economic, 
social, technical, and humanitarian matters....Functional activities are 
immediately and explicitly concerned vith such values as prosperity, welfare, 
social justice, and the 'good life', rather than the prevention of var and 
the elimination of national insecurity." Throughout our study, ve have 
used the terms "functional" and "functionalism" in this sense, except 
vhere "functional" obviously refers to operational concerns.
Several further matters should be mentioned. One is that vithin 
the United Nations, Soviet bloc policy was monolithicj that is, almost 
without exception, the policy positions assumed by the East European "client" 
states (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) folloved 
Moscow's lead down to the last specific. The sole exception during the 
period under consideration vas Romania's independent stand on some issues 
at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 196k, 
during vhich it sought to identify itself vith. the developing countries.
As a result, in several places ve have resorted to analyses of the Soviet 
position on certain matters vhere consideration of the positions of the 
other socialist countries vould be of only the most limited additional 
interest. This identification of viewpoints one vith another should not, 
however, be interpreted as a lack of recognition on the author's part 
that the underlying economic interests and bilateral policies of the
V
several countries m y  veil have been different and even conflicting. Our 
representation of their vievs in the United Nations simply reflects the 
fact that these differences vere not significantly apparent in those public 
sessions of the United Nations vhich have commanded our attention.
Another matter is that except in the introductory and background 
sections of the paper ve have relied almost exclusively on United Nations 
documents and sessional reports. Vie feel justified in this method 
insofar as published opinion vithin the USSR (vhere policy originated) 
concerning the role of the United Nations in improving trade relations 
as veil as the nature and objectives of Soviet bloc policy in the 
Organization’s various economic forums vas also of one mind. Consensus 
on this policy level at a given time reflected, of course, decisions 
already made concerning competing vievs on particular issues, such as the 
desired Soviet response to the emergence of the Common Market. As ve 
stated at the outset, ve are interested in the interaction of national 
policies as finalized and presented as the basis for negotiations in 
the United Nations; a discussion of the genesis of each policy in the 
decision-making apparatus of each government— or even of the Soviet Union 
alone— is beyond the scope of this study, though such discussions vould 
undoubtedly be of value in a longer thesis. A further consideration in 
this respect is the essential constancy of the Soviet bloc strategy 
for developing trade through the United Nations during the Khrushchev 
years. For our purposes ve have found it sufficient to examine the roots 
of this underlying policy rationale and the vays in vhich it vas adapted 
to fit changing circumstances.
Finally, it should be noted beforehand that ve have extensively 
utilized exact quotations to illustrate and support our analysis. In
vi
this ve liave been selective only vith regard to their trechancy of 
statement and not their uniqueness. In most instances many more similar 
quotations could have been cited instead, for indeed a hallmark of Soviet 
bloc policy statements in the United Nations vas their repetitiveness. 
This vas no less true for the delegations of other member countries.
The abundance of quotations gives the reader the opportunity to hear 
the various delegations speak on behalf of their ovn policies, and it 
also offers some guarantee that their viewpoints have not been distorted.
I am indebted to Duke University for granting an extended 
leave of absence from ray doctoral studies to pursue this line of 
research abroad, and I am grateful to the Institute of Doviet and 
East European Studies at the University of Glasgow for the opportunity 
of using its excellent facilities and to its faculty and staff vho 
provided much friendly encouragement and assistance. Above all, 
Professor Alec Move generously offered valuable guidance at crucial 
points in the preparation of the paper. He deserves credit for all its 
merits and for none of its weaknesses, vhich are the sole responsibility 
of the author. I cannot begin to express my appreciation for the 
patient understanding vhich he has shovn toward the delays, many of 
vhich vere beyond control, in the final presentation of this volume. 
Beyond this, I must acknowledge my debt to Professors W.W. Kulski, 
Kazimierz Grzybowski, Vladimir Treml and Warren berner, whose courses 
in Soviet foreign policy, international lav, economics and history at 
Duke nurtured my interest in Soviet economic diplomacy. Special mention 
should also be made of the solicitous assistance in tracking down 
documents provided by t-r. .Alisdair Sutherland, formerly vith the
vii
Mitchell Library of Glasgow. It is inconceivable that this study 
could have been completed without his help. Finally, but most 
importantly, my wife, Charlotte, has shown to me her joy of giving, 
in unselfishly supporting my work both spiritually and financially 
through the lean but loving years of our marriage. And both of us 
cannot forget the many kindnesses shown to us by countless people 
during our pleasant stay in Scotland.
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Summary
This study is an inquiry into and an interpretation of Soviet bloc 
policies with respect to certain economic activities of the United Nations, 
the response of other countries to these policies and the impact of the 
resulting interactions on the United Nations' institutions and functions.
The focus is on the efforts of the Soviet Union and its East European allies 
to expand and "normalize" trade with the industrially advanced countries of 
the West through the Organization's central economic forums and the Economic 
Commission for Europe during the period from early 1953 to Nikita 
Khrushchev's exit from office in 196 1^-.
A basic theme of the study is continuity and change in Soviet 
policy. The purpose of Chapter One is to familiarize the reader with 
important developments of the preceding postwar period which influenced and, 
expecially in the area of institutional evolution, conditioned Soviet 
trade-related policies in the United Nations after 1953 » It offers an 
introductory survey of relevant developments in Soviet foreign policy, 
East-West relations and the evolution of the Organization's activities in 
the trade field from Joseph Stalin's initial posture of aloofness and 
hostility toward American wartime plans for reordering the world trading 
system to the early signs of a major change in the Soviet attitude toward 
the United Nations' economic programme which appeared shortly before his 
death. While Soviet--and hence Soviet bloc--participation in the economic 
work of the Organization was kept at a near stultifying low in the interim, 
what happened to the United Nations and outside it set the framework for
xi
later Soviet policies. Thus the failure of wartime plans for an International 
Trade Organization (for reasons that had little enough to do directly with 
Soviet policy), the advent of the cold war and the American imposed western 
system of controls on trade with the East, the shifting of practically all 
matters of economic cooperation from the United Nations to the jurisdiction 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other essentially western 
institutions, and the United States’ use of its enormous influence and 
power for bending the Organization to Its own anti-communist purposes 
provided the themes of discrimination and subversion of the Charter which 
hallmarked the Soviet bloc's assuit on western trade policy in the United 
Nations under the post-Stalin regime.
The expansion and implementation of the new look in the Soviet 
attitude toward extra-bloc trade carried out by Stalin’s successors became 
a central feature of Nikita lüirushchev's higlily touted policy of peaceful 
coexistence of the capitalist and socialist states. The diplomatic strategy- 
developed by the socialist delegations in the United Nations as a complemen­
tary means of pressing the issue of "normalizing" East-West commercial 
relations was an adaptation of this policy. Its two main components—  
the contention that western trade controls and discriminatory practices 
constituted the most serious obstacles to such a normalization and the 
assertion that normal trade relations should and could precede a stable 
political peace--are systematically set forth and analyzed in Chapter Two. 
Contrasting western views, notably that differences between the nominally 
free-enterprise trading systems in the West and Soviet-type trading systems 
and practices in the Eastern bloc constituted a more serious hindrance to 
expansive commercial relations than controls on strategic commodities and 
that economic relations tend to follow the political lead, are also
xii
surveyed. How these conflicting concepts were carried over into United 
Nations deliberations is part of the story of the study's remaining 
chapters.
Failure to end alleged western, and especially American, policies of 
trade discrimination and restrictions through preferred bilateral channels 
outside the United Nations led to increased Soviet efforts along these lines 
within the Organization, which offered the socialist countries unique 
institutional' opportunities for pressing their policies in the name of 
fulfilling the contractual obligations of the Charter, Although they 
continued to conduct trade on a bilateral basis and to concentrate 
diplomatic efforts at that level, the immediate economic aim of their 
activities in the United Nations from the mid-1950’s was to transform the 
Organization's economic programme into a useful instrument for improving 
the conditions under which East-West trade might be conducted in a way 
consonant with the Soviet interpretation of what constituted the main 
obstacles to that trade and what was necessary for normalizing it. According­
ly, the subjects of their interest, and ours, were legal, institutional and 
atmospheric in nature.
During this period the socialist delegations sought to translate 
Soviet trade policy into United Nations resolutions designed to end their 
exclusion from international programmes for the development of trade and to 
support their criticism of bilateral western trade policies. Thus the Soviet 
Union proposed the reconsideration of an international trade organization 
within the United Nations system to displace GATT from the center stage of 
intergovernmental commercial arrangements (Chapter Four) ; the adoption of 
an all-European Agreement on Economic Cooperation and other measures by the 
ECE to supplant the European Common Market (Chapter Five),* and, later on,
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the creation of four regional trade organizations--with emphasis on the one 
for Europe--which would in time merge into the preferred general universal 
trade organization (Chapters Four and Five). The numerous draft resolutions 
embodying these basic proposals for structurally reforming world trade were 
couched in the concepts of the trade strategy of peaceful coexistence, and 
the ensuing debates reflected and highlighted the differing approaches to 
the problems of their mutual trade relations taken by the socialist countries, 
on the one side, and the leading western countries, on the other. This was 
particularly evident in the case of another idea favored by the Soviet 
bloc, that of concluding a United Nations declaration of general principles 
of economic cooperation to serve as a guide for economic relations among 
member states and as the foundation for new institutions in the trade field 
(chapter Three). For economic and political reasons, as well as for 
considerations having to do with international law, the major western 
trading states remained unconvinced of the purported merits of these
various proposals, though they wore in fact far from united in their own
attitudes toward trade with the Soviet bloc. With the sole exception of the
suggested declaration of principles, where a special ^  hoc committee of the
ECE was set up to study the question, all were abandoned for a time after 
i960. In their place the socialist countries concentrated on upgrading 
the work of the Economic Commission for Europe in order that it might 
operate as something of a ^  facto trade organization (Chapter Five).
From the beginning, the socialist delegations had sought western 
acceptance of these measures as a prerequisite for success, recognizing 
that their adoption would be of little real value if the majorities did not 
include those states whose policies they were intended to change.
Nonetheless, the convening of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
XIV
Development in the spring of 196 1^- at the behest of the less developed nations 
saw an abandonment of this caution and an attempt to enlist the now 
dominant presence of Third World countries in the United Nations in an 
effort to force the adoption of Soviet bloc policies with or without 
western concurrence (Chapter Six)’. Disregarding the main subject of the 
Conference, which was the trade factor in the problems of economic 
development in the Tliird World, the Soviet Union pressed for a broader 
economic conference to include East-West trade, resurrecting its campaign 
for an international trade organization and renewing pressures for a 
declaration of principles. In this it was not entirely unsuccessful.
Even so, it was clear by the end of the Conference that the developing 
nations cared little for the issues of East-West brade and were determined 
to use the continuing UNCTAD machinery along with their superior voting 
power to reconstruct the world economic order to their own advantage at 
the expense of both the advanced capitalist and socialist countries.
Ljith this, the trade programme pursued by the Soviet bloc in the 
United Nations over the previous decade came to a virtual end. It had 
not, however, been without its incidental benefits. Issues had been clarified, 
understanding of the problems of trade between differing systems had been 
advanced, and some progress had been achieved through the ECE in expanding 
East-West trade and defining acceptable principles for it. More 
significant still, the two sides had begun a slow process of reaching an 
effective working relationship in the ECE in tlie imporving political climate 
which followed the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Crisis of I962. And 
although this more auspicious political situation held out better prospects 
for the development of trade relations outside the United Nations, thereby 
reducing the East's incentive for turning to the Organization as a
XV
supplementary arm of foreign policy, it also held promise that the tasks 
left to the United Nations would have a greater chance of success than at 
anytime since the close of the Second World War.
XVI
CHAPTER ONE
KHRUSHCHEV’S INHERITANCE: STALIN AND UNITED NATIONS FUNCTIONALISM
The history of the United Nations has been in large measure 
a history of retreat from false hopes and of adjustment to 
the reality of a divided world.
--Senator J . William Fulbright
I. THE UNITED NATIONS FUNCTIONAL PROGRAMME: EXPECTATIONS AND PROBLEMS
Central to any study of the Soviet Union in the United Nations in
the divided world of the mid-twentieth century is the fact that American
concepts and objectives were a pervasive and dominating influence in the
establishment of the successor to the League of Nations. In particular,
the determination that a wide spectrum of economic and social activities
should be encompassed within the projected United Nations system as an
integral element of a durable peace can properly be ascribed to Secretary
Cordell Hull’s direction of the U.S. State Department's wartime preparatory
1
studies and proposals for a general international organization. The 
intellectual approach underlying these efforts constituted a radical 
departure from the philosophy of the earlier League institutions, which 
had paid only marginal attention to these mistakenly so-called "non-political"
1
See Harold Karan Jacobson, The USSR and the UN's Economic and 
Social Activities (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 
pp. U-6. (Hereafter referred to as USSR and UN.) See also Inis L. Claude, 
Jr., Swords into Plowshares; The Problems and Progress of International 
Organization, 3d ed., rev. (New York: Random House, I96U), p. 52^  
(Hereafter referred to as Swords.)
2subjects. Nonetheless, the formal success of the American inspired design 
found in the provisions of the United Nations Charter concerning economic, 
and social matters concealed a deep division of purpose among the Great 
Powers. From the start, the Soviet Union adopted an aloofness (at best) to 
the plans for endowing the Organization with competence in these areas. As 
the wartime Allied unity decomposed in the ensuing cold war, these divergent 
attitudes were adjusted on both sides of the East-West divide-with ominous 
significance for the future work of the United Nations.
The influences which sliaped the new Organization that emerged from 
the San Francisco Conference of lÿi-5 were indeed complex. Certainly much of 
the success of American policies at the founding conferences was due to the 
singular strength of the United States in world affairs at the close of the 
Second World War. However, another factor ensured a favorable reception for 
the State Department's proposals concerning the institutionalization of 
economic cooperation within the United Nations' structure. As Charles H. 
Alexandrowicz has observed, there was early on among most interested 
governments a "common agreement that world economic recovery could not be 
left to private initiative and to impersonal market forces....It was obvious 
that some intergovernmental planning had to be applied, and the only way to
1
realize it was the use of a network of International Economic Organizations." 
At the source of this shared view among leading countries outside the Soviet 
bloc was the experience of the then still recent economic and financial crises 
of the interwar period. These were time and again causally linked in 
discussions with the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939- Coupled with this 
was the recognition that the technological developments which had made
1
Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, International Economic Organizations 
(London: London Institute of World Affairs, 1952), p. 110.
3nations interdependent also necessitated the creation of mechanisms for the 
regulation of their relations on all levels.
The estahlisliment of the United Nations on a Charter whose provisions 
encompassed global political, economic, and social affairs led to expectations 
in some quarters that the Organization would establish the Infrastructure 
of an emerging world community. In emphasizing the evolving pattern of 
institutional arrangements, they maintained that the United Nations Charter, * 
"buttressed by a thickening network of technical or specialized agencies and 
international non-governmental organizations," demonstrated "the existence
1
of a nascent Gemeinschaft whose members would be increasingly tied together,"
by what has been described as "an intimacy of conduct, an interdependence of
2
welfare, and a mutuality of vulnerability." This was not, however, the view
of the founding member governments. They saw the United Nations as testifying
"not to the emergence of a modicum of community mindedness amongst the members
of the International political system, but to their continued attachment to
state sovereignty, an attachment qualified only by their reluctant recognition
of the sheer inconvenience--and often risks--of a refusal to collaborate on
3
a wide range of day-to-day matters..,."
This second, instrumentalist, view has from the outset characterized 
both western and Soviet conceptions of the United Nations system. However, 
at least during the early years of the United Nations, to the extent this 
view found currency in western policies it differed from the Soviet attitude
1
G.L. Goodwin, "The United Nations: Expectations and Experience," 
International Relations 3 (November IQTO): 729*
2
Inis L. Claude, "The United Nations, the United States and the 
Maintenance of Peace," in The United States and International Organization, 
ed. Inwrence S. Finkelstein (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 71, as quoted 
in Goodwin, p. 729*
3
Goodwin, p. l3.
il-
in its underlying assumption of the desirability of an orderly expansion of
the domain of the Organization in accordance with a broad interpretation of
the prerogatives and responsibilities set forth in the Charter. The Soviet
leadership, on the other hand, viewed the Charter as a treaty relationship
among the major powers which was to be held within a strict construction of
1
its contractual terms. This narrower conception of the Charter meant in
practice limiting or opposing any expansion of the Organization's activities
that in the opinion of the Soviet Union might dangerously encroach on its
national sovereignty.and freedom of action. The USSR accordingly met efforts
to give a broad interpretation to the Charter provisions with a countervailing
insistence on the broadest interpretation of the sovereignty of member states,
2
particularly the Great Powers.
Although the Soviet concept of national sovereignty as advocated 
within the United Nations in terms of the authority of the organization was 
developed only in the postwar years as a shield for the socialist countries 
in their position as a decreasing relative minority in the United Nations, 
Stalin's main line of defense of Soviet interests, his insistence on Great
3
Power unanimity, was everywhere in evidence by the end of the war. Thus,
in 19^5 he emphasized that the actions of the new world organization "will
be effective if the great powers which have borne the brunt of the war
against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord.
h
They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated."
1
Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude,Jr., "The Soviet Union and the United 
Nations: An Essay in Interpretation," International Organization 6 (February
1952): 3.
2
Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations. An Inquiry 
into Soviet Motives and Obje'ctives (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I962) . p.
22.
3 
.Ibid.
k
Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (New York: 
International Publishers, 19^5), p. IO6. — —  —
5This insistence reflected a determined expectation of a shared hegemony
administered through the United Nations perpetuating the wartime arrangements
under which the strongest powers "had taken many major decisions jointly and
1 .
had them imposed them on their weaker allies and on neutrals."
The view of the United Nations by the Soviet leadership as at most 
an ancillary instrument of Soviet foreign policy was matched during the first 
postwar decade by the growing tendency of the western powers, -led and urged 
on by the United States, to appropriate the Organization for their own 
purposes. This was made possible by the substantial majority support they 
commanded. If Soviet statesmen liad any illusions at the close of the war 
as to the durability of the concert of Great Powers, these were soon dispelled 
in early I9L6 by the Security Council's resolution of the question of Soviet 
troops in northern Iran in spite of steadfast Soviet opposition. The subse­
quent far-reaching disruptions in East-West relations, the events culminating 
in the United Nations' decision to intervene in Korea,and the scores of other 
contested issues within the Organization do not need repeating at length. As 
deliberations within the United Nations came to reflect the tension and rifts 
of the unfolding cold war, the predominance of the United States with its
hardening view of the United Nations as "little more than e supplementary arm
2
of western defense" contributed to a crisis of purpose inside the 
Organization. Out of this emerged what Hans J. Morgenthau termed "a new 
United Nations...a child of the 'cold war', intended to wage rather than to
1
Philip E. Mosely, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," 
International Organization I9 (1965): 666-67.
2
Goodwin, p. 7^ 5^-
b
1
terminate it." During these years, the socialist countries found themselves 
confronted by an overwhelming majority of votes on virtually every important 
issue.
The bipolar division of the United Nations, repeatedly exacerbated
and illustrated by the West's nearly automatic use of its majority and the
Soviet Union's use of the veto, not only betrayed the expectations of Soviet
statesmen but also belled the hopes many western leaders had initially
placed in the Charter for constructing a better postwar world by means of
"a democratic international procedure operating through consultation,
2
conciliation .and cooperation." By the close of the war-ridden IQtO's, the 
proclivity to approach important issues as problems to be solved by the 
"aritlimetic of power" had solidified a situation in which the prerequisites 
for concerted and purposeful action--some measure of trust and some mutuality 
of Interest--were manifestly absent in the Organization, if indeed they had 
ever been present in the first place.
The chilling effect of this overshadowing political fact was felt in 
every aspect of the United Nations' activities. In the functional sector, 
it further clouded an already unpromising beginning. During the wide-ranging 
discussions that followed the October 19^3 four-power Moscow Declaration of 
intent to create a postwar general international organization and up to the 
first session of the General Assembly in January 19^ 1-6, the Soviet attitude 
toward efforts to delineate the United Nations' competence in economic (and
1
Hans J. Morgenthau, "The United Nations and the Revision of the 
Charter," The Review of Politics l6 (January 195^ +): 15* In an interview in 
Pravda, 15 February 1951; Stalin similarly, but more extremely, observed: 
"The UNO, created as the bulwark for preserving peace, is being turned into 
an instrument of war, into a means of unleashing a new world war."
2
Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy in the United Nations,"
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science (New York) 22 (19^ -)6) : 37*
social) matters fluctuated between opposition and passive acquiescence.
The main direction of the Soviet policy in this respect was determined by
its restrictive concept of a world organization which would be almost
2
exclusively concerned with political and security issues. The USSR 
declined association with the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, whose instruments
3
were finalized at the Conference of Bretton Woods in July IQ^^u And at the 
San Francisco Conference of April 19^ i 5 the Soviet delegation largely 
refrained from the drafting of the Charter's economic and social provisions. 
Molotov set the tone of the Soviet position by excluding any reference to
U
these functional concerns in his address at the opening plenary session.
Gradually this measured reticence turned into critical and hostile
opposition. In the first year of the United Nations' operations, the Soviet
representatives showed a growing realization that Soviet interests were
involved in the Organization's economic and social deliberations and
5
accordingly sought to protect and promote these interests. Yet with 
East-West tension mounting, the Soviet Union began by the end of 19^6 to 
limit sharply its participation in functional activities, basing this 
incooperativeness on the assertion that the United Nations was becoming an 
instrument for the multilateralization of American interests. This charge 
was often leveled at the specialized agencies, as when at Lake Success in
1
See Jacobson, p. 12.
2
See Claude, Swords, p. 6l.
3
See Klaus Knorr, "The Bretton Woods Institutions in Transition, 
International Organization 2 (February 19^ 3^) : 35-36.j_
Emerson and Claude, p. l8 ,
5
See Jacobson, p. 12.
3October 19^7 the Soviet Union accused the Bretton Woods Institutions of
being "merely branches of Wall Street," alleging that the Bank in particular
■was "subordinated to political purposes -which made it the instrument of one 
1
great po-wer." In view of this stiffening attitude, Philip E. Mosely has
concluded that the evidence was that by this time the Soviet government had
decided that "it had nothing to gain by submitting any of its interests to
2
/the United Nation^ or raising its prestige in any way." During this 
period, Soviet representatives who were approached by others earnestly 
seeking agreement reportedly responded by displaying "a monotonous concern
3
to propagandize and to block rather than to make the system work." 
Nonetheless, Soviet policy continued to reflect the wartime assumption of a 
major power hegemony in expressing a "tendency to allow the United Nations 
to act effectively in questions which, in Stalin’s view, did not impinge 
directly on Soviet Interests."
II, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION
Within the functional programme, one endeavor, in particular in which 
it had been hoped the USSR would perceive a mutuality of interest with the 
West, as well as the western countries with one another, was the creation 
of an effective machinery for the multilateral expansion of international 
trade. To this end, the United States had taken the initiative before the 
end of the war in promoting the idea of an international trade organization
1
Quoted in the New York Times, lU October 19h’J, as cited in Knorr,
p. 36.
2
Mosely, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," p. 663.
3
Emerson and Claude, p. 21.
4
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9to be established on a charter of trade principles, forming specific commit­
ments with binding force on governments, and brought within the United
1
Nations system as a specialized agency. And it had been on the premise of
an impending agreement on a world trade organization that the Bretton Woods
institutions were subsequently founded as essential parts of the overall
institutional design for international economic cooperation. Accordingly,
2
the Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization advanced by 
the United States in September 19^6 as a basis of discussion was variously 
described as providing the "capstone" or "keystone" of the projected triad
3
of agencies.
Expectations for the early completion of the institutional structure
William Diebold, Jr., has observed that, "The core of the postwar 
trade policy of the United States was the ITO /international Trade 
Organizatio^, which was in many ways the fusion and the highest development 
of the main elements in the policies that had gone before, since 193^
/the date of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act/." William Diebold, Jr., 
"The End of the I.T.O.," International Finance Section, Department of 
Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University, Essays in 
International Finance, no. l6 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1952), p. 3^. See also John H. Williams, "Economic Lessons of Two World 
Wars," Foreign Affairs P6 (October 19^7): and , James M. landis,
"Restoring World Trade, " Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 
(New York) 21 (October/November 19^ -6): A^3“50»
2
For a transcript of the Suggested Charter see International 
Conciliation No. U25 (November 19^6): H37-5^3* This document was essentially 
a programmatic embodiment and ellaboration of the earlier United States’ 
Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment published 6 
December 19^5 in conjunction with the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, 
during the negotiations for which the Proposals were finalized. To avoid 
confusion with the United Nations Charter in the text, the ITO Charter 
will be italicized where possible, that is, unless it appears in a quotation 
in which it is not italicized; in such circumstance, the context should 
clearly Identify which charter is intended.
3
Thus, Clair Wilcox, as chairman of the United States delegation, 
stated at the London Conference of the Preparatory Committee for the 
International Trade Organization (October-November, 19^6): "Of the many 
tasks of economic reconstruction that remain, ours is by all odds the most 
important. Unless we bring this work to completion, the hopes of those 
builders who preceded us can never be fulfilled." Quoted in Diebold, p. U.
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were tied to optimistic assumptions not only that "after a brief period of
readjustment it would be possible for the Important trading countries to
give up their extraordinary trading restrictions and join in a general
1
attempt to develop free competitive multilateral trade again," but also
that the USSR would become an active participant in the organizational
scheme. This assumption of Soviet participation by western planners was
not, however, a naive belief in the certainty of such participation, as some
have charged claiming that contrary Soviet behavior was predictable. Instead,
it would be more accurate to observe it in light of the general assumption
in evidence at the San Francisco Conference that, at the time, "the world
had no better alternative...than to build an organization which was dependent
2
upon the possibility that great power unity would continue." Insofar as 
the objectives of the United Nations were linked to the viability of its 
economic .agencies, the assumption of Soviet cooperation in the proposed ITO 
was, therefore, a corollary of the necessary assumption of continued amity 
among the major powers upon which the United Nations Charter was predicated.
Given the operative gravity of this "necessary belief," it is not 
surprising that the authors of the plan for a world trade organization based 
their efforts on the predictions of those economists (and others) who foresaw 
in the postwar period a "reintegration" into the world economy of the Soviet 
Union and the countries under Soviet military occupation. Though there were 
no few doubters, this forecast persisted for some time in principle as a 
postulate of the American postwar trade policy pursued by the Truman 
Administration. As such, it was publicized in President Truman’s address 
to Congress introducing the Marshall Plan at the end of lÿi?, in which he
1
John Bell Condliffe, "International Trade and Economic Nationalism," 
International Conciliation No. ^76 (December I951): 555.
2
Claude, .Swords, p. 69.
11
observed that "both the report of the Sixteen Nations and the programme
submitted to Congress are based on the belief tlint over the next few years
the normal pattern of trade between Eastern and Western Europe will be
1
gradually restored." Much of this optimism among the participating 
countries can be traced to the slow realization in the West that the political 
shape and hence economic configuration of European relations liad been 
fundamentally altered by the Soviet domination of most of Eastern Europe. 
Cunnar Adler-Karlsson has pointed out that during the first two years after 
the war,
the West European governments thought, acted and planned on assumptions 
based on the interwar experiences. One of the more important of these 
was that a high volume of East-West trade was of great importance for 
the rapid recovery of the West European economies. No discussions of 
East-West trade problems were needed, and none were forthcoming.2
Even when these problems finally did surface in I9I7 during the planning for
the Marshall aid programme, tlie fact was that this newly found, awareness did
3
not change the underlying assumptions, as Truman’s presentation revealed.
In addition it was often pointed out that Article VII of the Mutual 
Aid Agreement, which proposed steps for the freeing of trade as part of the 
settlement of lend-lease obligations, provided a contractual commitment 
among its adherents to negotiate procedures for a progressive and reciprocal 
lowering of trade barriers. Thus it was argued, by extension, that the
1
Quoted in "Mercator" (pseud.), "East-West Trade: Prospects and 
Limitations," Economla inbernazionale 7 (195*0: 83*1.
2
Gunnar Adler-Karls son. Western Economic Warf a re 19^17-1967. A 
Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy, Stockholm Economic Siudies, New 
Series IX (Stockholm: Mmgvist and Wiksell, 1968), p. I57. (Hereafter 
referred to as Western Economic Warfare.)
3
Ibid., pp. 167-68.
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1
Soviet Union was obligated to participate in the preparations for the ITO.
Although the Soviet government had accepted Article VII, "its representatives
2
abroad made no secret of their suspicion of its basic aims." When the
time came to make good the wartime understanding the Soviet Union alone
failed to respond to, or possibly even to acknowledge, the American
3
invitation to discuss measures to give effect to the provision. Although
the USSR nominally acquiesced in the February 19*i-6 ECOSOC adoption of the
American draft resolution to convene a nineteen-nation Preparatory
Conference on Trade and Employment to discuss the creation of an international
trade organization, it revised its stand to one of aloof opposition by the
A
time of the first preliminary conference held the following October.
By the tirnie that the Havana Conference of Trade and Employment of 
November 19*^ 7 to March 19^8 was convened, it was apparent that Soviet public 
indifference, save for occasional pro forma criticisms, reflected Stalin’s 
choice of unilateral action over cooperation with the West as a precept of 
Soviet postwar foreign policy. Although Stalin is reported as having later 
told Secretary-General Trygve Lie that the Draft Charter for an
1
See Otto Tod Nailery, "The Significance of the Forthcoming 
World Trade Conference," International Conciliation No. ho6 (December 
19*+*0 : 751; and, William Adams Brown, Jr., The United States and the 
Restoration of World Trade. An Analysis and Appraisal of the ITO 
Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1950)j P* 98. " '
2
Brown, p. U5.
3
Herbert Feis, "The Conflict over Trade Ideologies," Foreign 
Affairs 25 (January 19*^ 7): 219-20.
U
See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, The Soviets in International 
Organizations. Changing Policy Toward the Developing Countries, 1953-1963. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196 1^), p. 16; and, Clair Wilcox,
A Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 19*-^ 9) ; P* *)0.
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International Trade Organization (signed at the conclusion of the 
1
Conference) "was a good one" and with few changes, it might well be
P
ratified...by the Soviet Union," this appears in retrospect to have been 
a display of, say, polite conversation rather than a change of policy. As 
one scholar has observed, during the years between the close of the war 
and Stalin's later réévaluation in the early 1950's of the significance of the 
United Nations for Soviet foreign affairs, the Soviet Union's emphasis on 
bilateralism in foreign trade and its concentration on its geographical 
periphery in foreign policy were "set within a structure of priorities
3
which precluded cooperation with UN economic organizations."
The extensive contemporary literature on the formal ITO negotiations 
and the subsequent American domestic debate on the ratification of the 
Charter make it amply evident that it was not generally expected that the 
Soviet Union would join the ITO in view of its undisguised lack of interest. 
But it is also clear that this did not absolve the drafters of the Charter 
and its critics from the obligation of considering the implications of 
Soviet participation, however remote it might have seemed at the time.
The Havana Charter represented the first attempt to encompass both 
private-enterprise and state-trading oriented economies within a 
multilateral convention designed to expand world trade. Alexander
1
Poland and Czechoslovakia attended the Havana Conference.
While Poland, along with Argentina, refused to sign the Final Act, 
Czechoslovakia, together with fifty-two other governments, did sign, 
though it is significant that this was before the February 19*^ 3 coup 
in Czechoslovakia.
2
Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 
p. 3l, as quoted in Rudolf Notel, "The Role of the United Nations in 
the Sphere of East-West Trade," Economla internazionale l3 (November I965); 
6*15.
3
Rubinstein, p. 13.
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1
Gershchenkron's paper, "Russia and the International Trade Organization,"
presented at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in
January 1^47, succinctly illustrated the dilemma posed by the uncertainty
of Soviet membership for advocates of a comprehensive world trade
organization which was to be based on a universally applicable code of
commercial practice. Noting the "hardly encouraging'* fact that the USSR
had by then failed to participate in the preliminary work for the ITO,
Gershchenkron nevertheless submitted that "the problem of Russia’s
reintegration into the world economy is of such stupendous moment that a
discussion of the charter on the assumption of Russian membership seems
2
justified even in default of current urgency."
In this assumption, a significant change in Soviet policy directed
toward an expansion of trade with western countries was postulated, and it
meant that careful consideration had to be given to the question of
establishing an institutional framework "within which the policies of the
/Soviet/ foreign trade monopoly would be consonant with the guiding
3
principles of the charter." These principles were to effect an expansion 
of international trade by the reduction of tariffs, the restriction of 
quantitative trade controls and the extension of most-favored-nation 
treatment among member countries of the ITO. The peculiar problems of 
creating this legal framework for the regulation of East-West commercial
1
Alexander Gershchenkron, "Russia and the International Trade 
Organization," in the "Papers and Proceedings of the 59th Annual Meeting 
of the American Economic Association (January 23-26, I947)," American 
Economic Review 37 (May 1947); 624-42. At the time, Gershchenkron was a 
member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
2
Ibid., p. 624.
3
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relations arose from the basic conflict between state trading and the
most-favored-nation clause. As Harold J. Berman has asserted, "the
principles of free multilateral trade and the policy of seeking to reduce
quantitative restrictions and discriminatory practices in international
trade, though valid for trade among market economies, are inappropriate to
1
commercial relations between communist and non-communist countries." The
difficulty for the drafters of the Charter has been described elsewhere as
that of "finding some scheme which would cause the state-trading states to
increase trade and avoid discrimination in a forni comparable to the
avoidance of discrimination and increase of trade established by adoption
2
of the most-favored-nation principle by private-enterprise states."
Unlike many other attempts at finding solutions to various problems
of the postwar international economy, efforts to subject state-trading
practices to a rule of nondiscrimination and fair commercial practice had
not been limited to the postwar period. Martin Domke and John N. Hazard in
a study of the question of state trading and the most-favored-nation clause
have detailed the series of bilateral trade agreements beginning in 192? in
which several countries attempted to introduce a workable quid pro gup
clause to be granted by the USSR in exchange for most-favored-nation 
3
concessions. Two innovations were variously applied in these agreements. 
One required the Soviet Union to purchase a fixed quantity of goods over 
a given period of time. A later undertaking that became known as the
1
Harold J. Berman, "The Legal Framework of Trade between Planned 
and Market Economies: the Soviet-American Example," Law and Contemporary 
Problems 24 (Summer 1959)= 527«
2
Martin Domke and John N. Hazard, "State Trading and the 
Most-FavoredrNation Clause," American Journal of International Law 
52 (January 1958): 59*
3
Domke and Hazard, pp. 55-63.
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"commercial considerations" clause provided that, as stated in a protocol to
the British-Soviet Commercial Agreement of 1930; "so far as relates to the
treatment accorded by each party to the trade of the other, they will be
guided in regard to the purchase and sale of goods, in regard to the
employment of shipping and in regard to all similar matters by commercial
1
and financial considerations...."
However, neither the former substitutional formula nor the latter
attempt to provide a commitment in state-trading practice, commensurate in
benefits with that of the most-favored-nation principle among nominally
private-enterprise countries proved satisfactory in practice. Although the
British became disillusioned with the operation of the most-favored-nation
clause to increase trade with the USSR and with the commercial considerations
substitute, the formula was repeated in their subsequent agreement with the
Soviet Union in 1934. Domke and Hazard have cited Georg Schwarzenberger’s
explanation of the repetition of the formula which appeared in the 1945
British Yearbook of International law as suggesting "that the British
2
draftsmen could think of nothing else." Schwarzenberger asserted that the
most-favored-nation clause
serves here as the only legal guarantee of equality of opportunity 
in trading with a state monopoly of foreign trade as it is practiced 
by the USSR. Only in this way can the object be achieved that, 'in 
considering any given transaction, regard shall be had to financial 
and commercial considerations only.'3
The British were not alone. The drafters of the Suggested Charter
1
Ibid., p. 53; and, see J.E.S. Fawcett, "State Trading and 
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1959): 3te.
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and its successive revisions prior to the Havana Conference in effect
concurred with Schwarzenberger's "counsel of despair." Initially they
adopted both substitutes for the most-favored-nation clause as developed
before the war in bilateral agreements, but while they had little difficulty
in incorporating the commercial considerations clause the problems of
finding a multilateral equivalent for the bilateral purchasing commitment
formula in the end proved insuperable. As Domine and Hazard observed, "A
global commitment scheme which would be comprehensible was finally deemed
to be impossible of conception, and the draftsmen...had to content themselves
1
with a simple expression of a desire to expand trade."
At the time, the state-trading provisions of the Suggested Charter
were the object of both constructive and carping criticism unaccompanied
2
by acceptable alternative solutions. Reflecting on this, Gershchenkron 
concluded:
Die fact that a substantial amount of time and thought has been 
devoted to the problem in recent years without production of any 
other workable solution cannot be overlooked. It suggests strongly 
that the essence of a state-trading monopoly is incompatible with 
general arrangements which ipi themselves constitute a reasonable 
guarantee for the attainment of an expanding trade on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.3
However, while recognizing that the proposed Charter's commitments relating 
to state trading would not be easily enforceable, Gershchenkron argued with
1
Domke and Hazard, p. 60.
2
See Gershchenkron, p. 641; and, John H. Williams, "international 
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perhaps interesting that in his review for the American Journal of 
International Law of Wilcox's A Charter for World Trade, Robert R. Wilson 
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draftsmen.
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Gershchenkron, p. 64l,
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the Charter’s detractors that these provisions could prove an effective
safeguard against Soviet trade discrimination. This depended, though, on
whether the Soviet Union could be convinced that membership and active
participation in the ITO in accord with the spirit of the Charter's
principles would bring such substantial benefits in its trade with
non-state-trading countries as to make it unwise "to risk loss of those real
1
advantages for the sake of short-run gains resulting from discrimination."
In this respect, the most important feature of the state-trading provisions
was seen to be Article 35 regarding consultation. He concluded that
ultimately the test of the "tentative promise" of the commercial considerations
formula and the then still favored global purchasing arrangement concept
would be in the day to day work of the TfO. Thus, while predictable
economic advantage would lead the Soviet Union to join the organization,
the USSR's subsequent purposeful participation would contribute to the
practical mitigation of the problems presented by a state-trading system.
The result would make for the integration of the Soviet Union into the world
economy, thereby laying the foundation for further peaceful economic
cooperation. It should be added that he presented this scenario with some
reservation concerning actual Soviet intentions.
In this interpretation of the practical value of the Charter,
emphasis was placed on the ITO as a mechanism for the piecemeal resolution
of problems and on the Charter as a flexible instrument important in its 
2
intent. Gershchenkron placed his expectations for the Charter's success 
in the ITO's ability to assert its authority in consultations, in mediating.
1
Ibid.
2
Clair Wilcox, "The Promise of the World Trade Charter," 
Foreign Affairs 27 (April 1949): 488.
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1
in pursuading and supervising. In this eventuality, both he and Clair
Wilcox, a leading American architect of the ITO, predicted the development
of a body of case law that would come to influence the commercial policies
of governments in accordance with the general principles of free
2
multilateral trade.
Nevertheless, the cogency of this defense of the Charter's
state-trading provisions, like the provisions themselves, rested on
assumptions concerning postwar Soviet policies that assumed expansive
East-West economic cooperation. Gershchenkron was soon to acknowledge the
hollowness of this hope. Writing in 1949; he observed that much of the
earlier speculation on the postwar pattern of Soviet trade, admittedly
including some of his own, had proved doubly wrong:
The idea that after the war the Russian economy would be readjusted 
toward a greater international economic interdependence had found 
no corroboration in post-war economic policies in Russia. Furthermore, 
the belief that increased imports during the reconstruction years 
would come mainly from the West, and particularly from the United 
States, had been likewise disproved by the actual course of events.
What was not foreseen was, first, the extent to which the Russians 
would rely on 'political' rather than commercial imports, and, second, 
the development of Russia's commercial trade proper with eastern 
European countries.3
It is obvious that these developments ran against the pattern of relations
forseen by the two main state-trading provisions considered during the
drafting of the Havana Charter. Gershchenkron described the implications
for the underlying objectives of the provisions as follows:
1
Gershchenkron, p. 64l.
2
Ibid; and see Wilcox, "The Promise of the World Trade Charter,"
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The question that stood in the foreground of discussions during the 
war and immediately thereafter was the development of an institutional 
framework within which trade between the two different economic 
systems could proceed in a smooth and mutually beneficial way.
It is probably fair to summarize the result of these discussions 
by saying that while technical difficulties undoubtedly existed 
they could have been overcome, given good will, a general atmosphere 
of confidence, and peaceful political conditions. The drafts of 
the ITO charter represented a serious attempt to free trade with 
Russia from political obstacles, and their authors doubtless assumed 
a situation of diminishing rather than growing political tensions.
For the time being at least, this general problem has been removed 
from the agenda by Russia’s refusal to be drawn into the system 
of international economic cooperation and by Russian policies of 
expansion in eastern Europe.1
The substantive question itself, however, could not be so easily 
put to rest. Events soon made it once again a topical concern of 
international trade policy, although this time the context was slightly 
altered, as we will see in the following section.
III. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
The effect of the Department of State’s announcement in December
1950 that the Havana Cliarter would not be resubmitted for ratification to
the United States Congress— an announcement which spelled the end of the
ITO-- was to make the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the
principle remaining multilateral Instrument in the field of international 
2
trade policy.
1
Gershchenkron, "Russia's Trade in the Postwar Years," p. 93.
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The Agreement had originally been negotiated on the initiative of
the United States during the Geneva meeting of the Preparatory Committee
for the International Trade Organization in mid-lÿ+T in anticipation of a
successful conclusion to the work of the up-coming Havana Conference.
Initially adhered to by twenty-three countries participating in negotiations
on tariff reductions at Geneva, the Agreement was concluded for a period
of three years. Under its auspices further tariff reductions were
negotiated at Annecy in 19^9; some trade disputes among members were settled
1
and decisions made on the application of its provisions to certain cases.
The powers of the contracting parties to the Agreement had "already been so 
extensively used" by the beginning of 1950, one observer wrote, "as to
2
make the GATT an active force in the conduct of international relations."
As it became increasingly apparent that the Havana Charter would 
fail to gain acceptance, a concerted effort was made to extend the Agreement
3
and protect the tariff concessions already negotiated. The decision of 
the Truman Administration to avoid a certain defeat in Congress over the 
n o  issue coincided with the meeting of the Contracting Parties to GATT at 
Torquay. And it was thus at Torquay that the first of many steps were taken 
to secure and expand the existing arrangements built up under GATT, 
beginning with a three-year renewal of General Agreement. The United States 
delegation played a major role in this action under executive powers in the 
area of tariff negotiations previously granted to the President by Congress 
which were subject to review at a future date.
The General Agreement had first been conceived as a kind of advance
1
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1
installment of the Havana Charter. Yet together the ITO and GATT were
designed as distinctly separate though interrelated parts of a common plan:
The Charter obligates_members of the ITO to negotiate for entry into 
the Agreement. The /tariff/ concessions contained in the Agreement 
are safeguarded by incorporating those provisions of the Charter that 
prevent resort to other methods of restriction. When the Charter 
becomes effective, the common provisions of the two instruments are 
to be administered by the ITO.2
GATT, however, was to remain outside the framework of the United Nations,
while maintaining close ties with it.. This relationship between the
General Agreement and the United Nations remains in effect today.
The selection of the provisions of the Charter for incorporation
in the Agreement was determined by the limiting guideline of including only
what was necessary to protect the value of the tariff concessions achieved
at Geneva, "mainly because the United States delegation did not have
3
congressional authority to go beyond this." This meant that GATT had no 
authority with respect to policies on full employment, restrictive business 
practices, foreign investments and commodity agreements, even though these 
matters were to have come within the jurisdiction of the ITO. Nonetheless, 
the Agreement was cautiously deemed "sufficiently liberal to constitute a
comprehensive international code of conduct in the field of commercial
4
policy." However, GATT also lacked the permanent institutional base 
provided for the ITO, as well as the binding commitments required of
1
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1
signatories of the Havana Charter.
William Diebold has pointed out that these differences were sources
of both weaknesses and strength. It is not necessary to detail here the
intricacies of the narrow path that GATT was forced to follow as a result of
the circumstances in which the ITO project collapsed. The important point
is that GATT's future in 1950 was at best precarious. As Diebold observed
in his incisive 1952 essay, "The End of the ITO":
...GATT is the ITO manque. There is a constant striving to fulfill 
the original pattern. If this striving should be satisfied, GATT 
would risk going over the same precipice as the Charter. So long 
as the striving is frustrated, GATT'6 strength is in doubt and it 
becomes the vortex of many strong and conflicting pressures. These 
pressures would exist without GATT; GATT may be able to survive them 
and to help control them, but the issue is in doubt.2
GATT surmounted these and subsequent difficulties and came to serve 
the international community in four principal ways, described by Richard N. 
Gardner in I963 as "a forum for negotiations on the reduction of tariffs 
apd other trade barriers;...a set of trade rules governing the conduct of 
trade policy;...an instrument for the interpretation of these rules and the 
adjustment of differences; and...a vehicle for developing and articulating
3
new trade policy." However, GATT provided these services to the "free 
world," as Gardner chose to call it, largely to the exclusion of 
consideration of the interests of the socialist countries, which with one 
extenuating exception, remained outside of GATT by choice.
In the first place, the General Agreement did not contain all the
1
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1
Charter provisions on state-trading practices. Thus on paper it was
somewhat less competent to deal with these matters than the ITO would have
been, while being faced with the same difficulties that confronted the
effective implementation of the Havana Charter provisions. The Agreement
did, however, include in Article XVII the principal clauses concerning
state-trading enterprises, most importantly the "commercial considerations"
formula, designed to give effect to the principle of non-discrimination in
2
their commercial trade activities.
The test of the efficacy of these provisions for integrating the 
foreign commerce of state-trading economies in the system of multilateral 
trade envisaged by the Agreement was forced upon GATT by the membership of 
Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had become a member, as one of the original 
signatories of the Agreement, prior to that country's establishment of 
virtually complete state ownership and regulation of the means of production 
in Czechoslovakia following the consolidation of communist control of the 
government in 1948. While it must be acknowledged that in general GATT 
made efforts to bring other socialist countries into association with its 
activities, it continued to treat their state-trading practices as bothersome 
exceptions to the dominant trading system embodied in the Agreement, as 
aberrations from the norm of traditional international trade theory and
3
policy. Czechoslovakia was able to maintain its membership in GATT only by 
the flexible use under the Agreement of waiver procedures, consultations
1
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and procedural interpretation. These were implemented on the basis of an
assurance given by Czechoslovakia in accordance with Article II that its
establishment of state trading did not imply an increase of protection on
1
items on which it had originally granted tariff concessions. The
practicableness of this approach to state-trading matters within GATT was,
however, shortly severely circumscribed by the refusal of several of the
more important Contracting Parties to accord Czechoslovakia non-dlscriminatory
treatment in the area of quantitative restrictions and by the withdrawal of
most-favored-nation treatment from it by the United States.
When, in 1951; Congress passed the Trade Agreements Extension Act,
it directed in Section 5 that the countries of the Soviet bloc should be
excluded from its benefits by the suspension or withdrawal from them of
American tariff concessions (as well as any other favors previously granted
2
by treaty) and the denial to them of most-favored-nation treatment.
Accordingly, the United States sought and obtained in September I95I the
sanction of the Contracting Parties to GATT for the denunciation of its
standing agreements with Czechoslovakia and release from its most-favored-
3
nation commitment to it. Although GATT survived the controversy attending
this move, the fact that the United States "by its existing restrictions
abandoned both the principle and the policy of free trade with communist 
A
countries" meant that, at least for the time being, GATT would not be able, 
or rather allowed, to serve effectively as an Instrument for the integration
1
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of socialist countries into the broader international trading system 
dominated by the western countries.
Concurrently with the action taken against Czechoslovakia, the 
United States withdrew all favors extended earlier to Bulgaria, China,
Hungary and Romania. The letter of the Act was fulfilled later in the year 
when existing agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland were renounced.
IV. THE WESTERN STRATEGIC EmARGO
In the most important book to date on western economic warfare,
Gunnar Adler-Karlsson haë identified the main motivation behind the American
policy of discrimination against Soviet bloc imports as a belief that "this
would prevent the communist nations from earning dollars with which they
1
could then buy 'strategic' goods in other western nations." The intent 
of Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 was, therefore, 
tied to the so-called strategic export embargo against the communist countries 
initiated by the United States around the turn of the year 1947/48.
Briefly, the origin of the embargo policy may be traced to actions 
taken by the U. S. Department of Commerce to utilize some remaining World 
War II export control laws in order to secure complete control over exports 
to the East. After the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia during the last 
week of February 1943, the obscurity surrounding the specific intent of the 
new export regulations issued in December and January gave way to frank 
declarations that the new requirements concerning destination controls and 
licensing for all goods bound for Europe had been adopted so that the 
Administration would know what kinds of goods were being shipped to Eastern 
Europe in order to regulate their flow. As Adler-Karlsson points out.
1
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by late 19^7 the cold war "was an established fact, mutual East-West fears
and suspicions had reached a high level, and the economic relations between
the two halves of Europe had received a heavy blow from the impossibility
1
of creating an all-European cooperation in the Marshall Plan," It was 
in this hostile climate that anti-communist sentiment in the United States 
and a determination to maintain the relative American power superiority over 
the USSR had joined to produce a policy which it was believed would help 
maintain this superiority through an embargo on certain ranges of 
commodities.
In the years following the initial decision, the export embargo
was implemented in accordance with various lists of goods which were of
allegedly "strategic" value to the Soviet bloc. In these lists, the
definition of a "strategic" commodity was apparently based on a number of
rational as well as irrational criteria which have never been fully
identified or adequately explained by the United States government. Many
of the official catch-all definitions which have been proffered over the
2
years have been simply tautological. The absence of a hard definition
provided for great elasticity in the embargo lists, making a given commodity
"strategic" by its inclusion on one list and "non-strategic" by its omission
on another. It was believed in the United States, however, that the range
of controlled commodities "had to be very wide" since "almost everything
3
could be used for military production, directly or indirectly."
The decision by Congress to include a stipulation in the Foreign
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Assistance Act of March 1948 requiring countries receiving Marshall aid to 
conform with American regulations concerning exports to the Soviet bloc led 
to the provisions in the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 
(better known as the Battle Act) that aid should— but in exceptional cases 
might not be— stopped to any country shipping proscribed goods' to "any
nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United
1
States." As long as American economic aid remained more important to the 
west Europeans than their trade with the socialist countries, a fairly wide 
measure of cooperation in the embargo policy was achieved. Still, economic 
and political considerations, as well as disputes over the definition of 
a "strategic" commodity, created trans-Atlantic frictions.
In the first place, many Europeans doubted the usefulness of the 
embargo as a means to maintaining relative power positions in the cold war, 
and it was often pointed out that the policy would tend to force the East 
European countries into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. They 
also objected when the United States demanded that the western European 
governments unilaterally break standing contracts and trade agreements with 
Soviet bloc nations. Politically, the west Europeans claafed at the 
undiplomatic manner by which the United States sought to pressure European 
cooperation. And economically they openly questioned the wisdom of 
cooperating to withhold from the Soviet bloc goods which were not conventionally 
understood as being of a strategic character, expecially in view of the 
greater importance to them of East-West trade traditionally and the benefits 
that broader trade with the Eastern bloc could bring them in terns of their 
overall balance of trade. Partly because of these differences and
1
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particularly during the early years of the trade sanctions, a considerable
quantity and diversity of commodities embargoed by the United States found
their way, legally or otherv;ise, into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
blunting the impact of the embargo policy. Section 5 of the 1951 Trade
Agreements Extension Act reflected the United States' inability to secure
1
full and effective implementation of its export regulations in Europe.
Before turning our attention to the Soviet response in the United 
Nations to the import-export policies adopted in the West, we might reflect 
for a moment on the significance of the fact that the first practical 
actions restricting American exports to the socialist countries came 
precisely at the time when the Charter for the ITO was being finalized at the 
Havana Conference on Trade and Employment.
V. THE COLD WAR AND THE FATE OF THE HAVANA CHARTER
That the cold war had a significant role in the frustration of the
ITO project has often been treated as something of a truism in the existing
literature on East-West economic relations in the United Nations. In
researching this study, we have found that many commentators in reviewing
the development of international machinery for trade cooperation over the
last quarter-century have concurred in Alvin Z. Rubinstein's terse conclusion
2
that the "proposed ITO was an early casualty of the cold war." Yet when this 
observation is not given greater specificity, as is all too often the case, 
the argument can be seriously misleading. If what is meant is that the
1
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postwar breakdown of cooperation between the Soviet Union and its wartime
western Allies shattered the original American ideal of a truly universal
trade organization, i.e. one embracing all trading nations, then there can
be little dissension on this point. However, a distinction must be made
between the fate of the original design and the fate of the Havana Charter
itself. It has been noted that Soviet membership in the ITO had not been
widely expected following its refusal to participate in the series of
Charter negotiations. Clair Wilcox, as well as other leading spokesmen
for the ITO, responded to the problem of Soviet nonadherence to the Charter
with the opinion that since the Soviet bloc accounted for only a small
fraction of world trade, the ITO could work successfully without its 
1
cooperation. Therefore, the question of the Charter* s survival seemed to
rest elsewhere, most importantly in its reception in the United States.
When the first embargo measures on trade with the socialist countries
were made public, it became apparent that the United States would be
unwilling to extend to the Soviet bloc all the trade benefits which were to
be granted automatically to every member of the ITO under the Charter. In
his personal papers, U. S, Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal recorded
that when Averell Harriman presented the new export control policy to the
Cabinet on January l6, 1948, he
pointed out that it would meet head-on with the economic section of the 
State Department who were crusading for the pattern of international 
trade agreements, reciprocal trade, etc, sponsored by Will Clayton. 
Harriman said these were desirable objectives in a more orderly world 
but were not applicable now....2
As head of the American delegation at Havana, William Clayton had been at the
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time a major force behind the United States* leading role in the ITO 
negotiations. Certainly Forrestal's recollection of the conflict of policies 
within the Administration points toward the conclusion that Washington was 
fully aware that its trade policies toward the socialist countries contra­
dicted the efforts of the drafters of the Havana Charter to free all 
international trade, and hence were at least in violation of the spirit of
1
the Charter if not also the letter of its proposed contractual commitments. 
Should it therefore be assumed that by the late IQ^O's the cold war, as 
evidenced in the American strategic embargo, had undermined the United States* 
commitment to the proposed ITO and figured prominently in its subsequent 
rejection of the Charter? We need to consider this question, for throughout 
most of the Khrushchev period one of the main issues in the United Nations'
1
This was pointed up by the experience of GATT in the area of the 
strategic embargo. In 19*-i-9 Czechoslovakia charged the United States with 
failure in carrying out its obligations under the General Agreement by 
introducing export licensing procedures and striving for cooperation with 
western Europe in this policy. The Czech representative specified that 
millions of dollars of allegedly non-military goods had been blocked from 
export by the U. S. government. The American representative responded that 
the licensing policy had been adopted for security reasons and that American 
specialists had determined that Czechoslovakia would apply the goods in 
question to military purposes. He therefore claimed that these actions were 
justifiable under the security provision of Article XXI. The crux of the 
issue, then, was not the embargo per se, but rather its scope. A majority 
of the Contracting Parties voted to uphold the United States. Adler-Karlsson, 
for one, has judged the decision to have been legally, technically correct, 
since the phrasing of Article XXI was so vague that originally it had been 
recognized that "the spirit in which Members of the Organization would 
interpret these provisions was the only guarantee against abuse." Of 
importance for us here is that the crucial security provision was also to 
be found in the Havana Charter. Indeed, the above quotation actually refers 
to the application of the clause within the anticipated ITO, as GATT was not 
an organization and had no members, strictly speaking. With its forewarning 
in mind, however, Adler-Karlsson has suggested that it may be argued with 
reason that the United States and its supporting majority by virtue of 
their decision violated the original spirit of the security provision.
See Adler-Karlsson, Chapter Seven, fn. 3*
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economic forums centered on a series of Soviet bloc proposals for reviving 
the idea of a comprehensive trade organization within the U.N. system, 
beginning with a call for ratification of the Havana Charter in 1955# Our 
findings in this section should be an aid in placing western opposition 
to these Soviet proposals in proper perspective when we again take up the 
issue of an ITO in a later chapter.
The actual facts surrounding the American decision against the ITO 
show that it would be incorrect to suppose that the state of East-West 
relations had more than a very marginal effect on the fate of the Havana 
Charter. In the first place, there is no evidence that the strategic export 
embargo affected the Truman Administration's support of the ITO. The 
adoption of the trade controls, which applied to only a very small part of 
American foreign trade, by no means meant the Administration had abandoned 
wholesale the postwar trade policy so laboriously nurtured by Clayton and 
his colleagues at the State Department. Indeed, it was almost two years 
after the limitations on Soviet bloc trade had been initiated that the 
Administration finally gave up its efforts on behalf of the Charter after 
three times failing to gain a Congressional commitment for the passage of 
an act of ratification.
In view of the fact that Congress was ultimately responsible for the 
quiet death of the Charter in 1950; we should consider whether cold war 
issues had a determining influence on its refusal to put the question of 
adherence to a vote. Again it must be pointed out that there was no 
reason at the time for believing the Soviet bloc countries (with the 
possible exception of Czechoslovakia) would ratify the Charter; there is, 
therefore, equally little reason to presume that considerations relating 
to communist membership had any essential bearing on Congressional opinion. 
Moreover, in his thoughtful essay on the causes of the collapse of the ITO
33
project, William Pietold has made it clear that despite the attractiveness of
placing the hlame on international tensions and the requirements of
rearmament as they affected trade policy, the insurmountable opposition
which by 1950 had built up in Congress and in the American business
community at large rested on a broad catalogue of concerns that had little
1
to do with the postwar rupture of East-West relations.
Had the Charter proved generally acceptable and had the Soviet 
Union at the same time expressed an intention to join the ITO, then the 
cold war conceivably might have had a more direct influence on the debate 
in the United States. For if in view of the foregoing it cannot be said 
that the Charter was in actuality a "casualty of the cold war," it can 
be concluded from the conflict of policies in the American Administration 
and from subsequent developments in GATT which we considered earlier that 
the cold war served significantly to weaken western resolve as to the 
desirability and practicability of a truly comprehensive trade organization. 
While this was of little consequence in 1950, ve will see in Chapter Four 
that the political dimensions of East-West relations acted in later years 
as a major barrier to Soviet efforts aimed at establishing a global trade 
insitiution within the United Nations.
VI. SOVIET TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO 1953:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
The particularly dismal record of the United Nations in the area of
1
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East-West trade during its first seven years reflected the extent to which 
the political tensions of the postwar world imposed severe restrictions on 
international economic cooperation. With the failure of the Havana Charter 
to gain early ratification and the politicization of the United Nations 
economic forums brought on by the quickening of the cold war, the western 
countries shifted practically all significant economic matters to purely 
western institutions, such as the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC)l to the specialized financial and monetary agencies, 
which were effectively under western control; and to GATT. In this 
deteriorating situation the socialist countries for the most part used the 
U.N.'s central economic organs (the Economic and Social Council and the 
General Assembly's Second /Economic and Financial/^ Committee) and the 
Economic Commission for Europe for criticizing western trade policies.
The first of three main forms this policy assumed was an indirect 
attack on the West through an intensification of earlier criticisms of the
specialized agencies, as well as the Havana Charter, and of the United
1
Nations itself. The second was a direct and resolute attack on the 
western trade controls system, constantly raised as the issue of 
"discrimination in international trade." The final tactic in the strategy 
was at once more constructive and comparatively more successful. While 
the central objective remained the removal of "artificial" trade restrictions, 
it focused on the establishment within the Economic Commission for Europe 
of special machinery for the promotion of East-West trade in Europe, as well 
as a proposal for a committee on economic development. Although a Committee
1
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for the Development of Trade was created in 19^ -9 on a Soviet initiative
taken the previous year, its final terms of reference and the USSR’s
abstention in voting on them represented a general reversal for the Soviets.
The two meetings of the Committee in 19^9 ended in a deadlock, with the
Soviet delegation demanding that the ECE take steps against the western
1
export licensing policy. Following this, the Soviet Union remained 
aloof from the work of the ECE’s technical committees on the" ground that 
they ignored by way of Anglo-American influence their proper tasks and 
objectives. Although in his capacity as Executive-Secretary Gunnar Myrdal
was able by "protracted efforts...to preserve the all-European character
2
of the Commission," subsequent efforts under his ministrations to revive 
purposeful consultations on East-West commercial relations failed, the 
last time being September 1952. One observer has evaluated the situation 
as follows:
The onus for the breakdown of the talks fell clearly on the Soviet 
bloc. It was apparent that the USSR and the satellites were not 
interested in increasing trade within the existing framework. The 
period closed with East-West trade at an extremely low level and 
with a complete deadlock on these questions in the Economic Commission 
for Europe. What constructive work was done by the United Nations 
concerning international trade was the result of cooperation solely 
among the non-Soviet states. Soviet abstention from these activities 
was complete.3
In mid-1951, however, there had been indications that the USSR was 
in the process of reappraising its foreign policy, beginning with a 
reconsideration of the course of the Korean crisis. In June 1951 the
1
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Soviet appeal In the United Nations for an armistice in Korea was soon
followed by tentative moves in the Organization to revive its activities
in the sphere of East-West trade. In July, Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko
informed the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe that the
Soviet Union was prepared to accept an invitation, which it had previously
rejected in May, to enter technical discussions on the possibilities of
1
expanding East-West trade relations. And although as we noted above hopes 
for these consultations proved illusory, there followed a barrage of Soviet 
proposals for increased international cooperation both within and outside 
of the United Nations, including the announcement of an International 
Economic Conference to be held in Moscow later in the year to which 
prominent western businessmen and economists were being invited. These and 
subsequent Soviet initiatives, as well as new formulas concerning 
international relations presented to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 
October 1952, have often been alluded to as evidence that prior to his 
death in 1953 Stalin had detected opportunities in the international
2
arena for a peaceful stabilization of relations with the other powers.
The motives of this "new look" have been the subject of much analysis
and speculation. In economic terms, the adjustment was likely prompted by
a detection that the USSR's "acute hostility toward the non-communist world
3
had reached a point of diminishing returns." In his earlier rejection 
of the Marshall Plan offer of a general programme of economic recovery.
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Stalin evidently had determined that the political and security dangers of
1
a common effort more than offset its likely economic advantages. His
concern over western influence in Soviet spheres of interest extended to
Eastern Europe, where Czechoslovakia and Poland had received with great
enthusiasm the United States' offer of financial assistance announced by
General Marshall in June 19^7* As a result, Czechoslovakia retracted its
official acceptance of Marshall aid and Poland declined to participate in
discussions for the realization of the Plan. Karin Kock has observed that
this was "one of the first visible signs that the cold war had penetrated
into the realm of international trade and that it threatened to divide
2
Europe into two economic blocs." The subsequent hardening of the political
divisions in Europe saw an increasing Soviet reliance on intra-bloc trade
for meeting its economic requirements,which was reinforced by, and in turn
reinforced, Soviet efforts to create a self-sufficient bloc of states in
3
Eastern Europe bound economically and politically to the USSR. This
contributed to the downward trend in East-West trade following a brief
Initial rise in 19^7 » The value of trade between western Europe and the
United States, on the one hand, and the Soviet bloc, on the other, stagnated
or, if price developments are considered, actually declined each year from
5
19^ 18 through the Korean war. Taken alone, American exports to the
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communist countries virtually disappeared by 1951, while the volume of imports
1
from the bloc more than halved over the same period. Overall, the relative
development of trade, i.e., the proportion of total world export from the
western countries tlaat went to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, slipped
from some 2 in I9A7 to approximately ij^/n in 1953, while the percentage
of imports from the bloc showed a similar decline, from a high of about 2 ^
2
in I9A8 to ij^fi in 1952 and 1953. The artificially low level of trade 
attained by the end of 1952 was also the result of the expansion and 
intensification of the western export security controls which accompanied 
the involvement of the western countries in the Korean conflict; and it was 
during this period that the United States withdrew all tariff concessions 
previously granted to Soviet bloc countries. The character of East-West 
trade at the time, therefore, reflected not only the restrictive, autarkic 
orientation of Soviet policy but also the adoption of tactics of economic 
warfare by the NATO countries (except Iceland) and Japan.
By 1951 the Soviet Union had achieved considerable success in 
consolidating its political hegemony and in forming an economic orbit in 
Eastern Europe, prompting Stalin to observe the following year that
3
"parallel world markets" existed, those of capitalism and of socialism.
In the meantime, however, it became apparent that intra-bloc shortages, 
particularly of capital goods, were hampering industrialization not only 
in the East European countries for whom the USSR had assumed the role of
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1
principal supplier, but also in the Soviet Union itself. The need for 
obtaining otherwise unavailable large quantities of goods for fulfulling 
annual requirements of the second postwar Five-Year Plan (1951-55) and, 
perhaps even more important, the necessity of keeping abreast of modern 
technology meant that the Soviet bloc could no longer forego the benefits 
of world trade and of international cooperation for the purpose of obtaining 
scientific and technological information and knowledge of western industrial 
techniques. The growth in the sheer size of their economies and the 
relatively greater importance of East-West trade for them led the socialist 
countries under Soviet orchestration to take the initiative in seeking 
increased commercial contacts with the West. Thus, the underlying economic 
motive of the trade expansion programme was the expectation of a number of 
direct economic and technological gains for the USSR and its East European 
allies.
Although the shift in trade policy was to be deeply felt in the 
United Nations, the Soviet approach to trade problems in the Organization 
remained essentially unchanged. The central objective continued to be the 
elimination of all restrictions on East-West trade which prevented the 
Soviets from buying urgently needed advanced technology and other proscribed 
"strategic" goods, including such items as heavy equipment and vehicles.
The persistent emphasis on the strategic controls, although successively 
more subtle and sophisticated, caused concern and scepticism in official 
circles in the West about the objectives of the campaign. This was due 
not only to the strategic implications involved (which actually seemed to 
worry only the Americans very much) but also to the tactics employed by the
1
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Soviet Union to deepen any real or supposed conflicts among the western 
governments on whose unity the control system depended. While the Soviets 
had good cause to believe many western Europeans opposed the strict American 
export control policy forced upon them by the Battle Act and were interested 
in narrowing the list of restricted commodities, these tactics of division 
heightened speculation about what political purposes might underlie the 
overtunes for trade and economic cooperation. Adding to this uneasiness 
and resentment were Soviet attempts to circumvent governmental channels by 
direct appeals to "honest businessmen" to trade with the East, as 
illustrated by the Moscow Economic Conference, which was eventually held 
in April 1952. Prefiguring the style which was to be used extensively in 
trade diplomacy under Khrushchev, the theme of the Conference was "peaceful 
coexistence through normalization of trade." The expectations of those 
attending of closing lucrative contracts with the Soviets did not materialize, 
"one reason being that Soviet offers of big deals often were so constructed
1
that they combined imports of ’free' goods with goods on the embargo lists." 
Others saw the Conference as a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to 
demonstrate its increased economic strength, leading a few to attempt a 
connection with Stalin's exposition in his confused Economic Problems of 
Socialism in the USSR (published in October) of the contradictions within 
the world capitalist system and the newly found economic capability of the 
USSR to prevent the western countries from achieving economic abundance and 
international stability. For these and other related reasons the western 
press at the time was replete with \jarnings of what was so often referred 
to as the Soviet "economic offensive" and "economic warfare."
1
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Despite such official and unofficial reactions as these, western 
delegations on several occasions demonstrated their willingness to discus: 
the matter of trade expansion with the socialist countries within the 
Economic Commission for Europe. The first concrete evidence of a 
fundamental shift in Soviet attitude proved to he the acceptance by the 
USSR on January 17, 1953 of a suggestion made the previous fall by the 
ECE's Executive-Secretary for another trade consultation.
It was, however, left to Nikita Khrushchev as his successor to 
undertake the implementation of the more active policy of which Stalin 
had been the progenitor, '^ nd although Stalin had initiated a more 
constructive approach to collaboration on economic matters within the 
United Nations, it was only after his death that the Organization 
received a substantial upgrading in Soviet estimations of its potential 
value as an instrument of foreign economic policy.
CHAPTER T'/70
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, TRADE, AND THE UNITED NATIONS
The upgrading of the United Nations' functional programme in the
estimation of Soviet policy makers during the post-Stalinist period is
perhaps best illustrated by Molotov's speech on the occasion of the tenth
anniversary of the signing of the Charter in 1955* In contrast to his
singleminded interest in the security aspects of the proposed Organization
at the San Francisco Conference a decade earlier, he now divided his
attention between certain directly security oriented issues before the
United Nations and several problems of a functional character, among which
was: "removal of any discrimination hampering the development of wide-scale
1
economic cooperation in international trade." Accordingly he observed:
The United Nations is facing new tasks. The time is ripe...to 
consider the question of calling a world economic conference to 
facilitate the development of international trade. Only an 
authoritative international center like the United Nations would 
be capable of coping with the task of convening such a conference.... 
All this goes to show that the work of the United Nations and 
its practical activities require a great deal of improvement.
The experience accumulated through the years will, oT course, 
prove valuable. Even more important is the growing realization 
of the need to raise to a higher level the activity of the 
United Nations as a whole in order that the activity may be in 
full conformity with the noble purposes and principles of the
1
UN, Secretariat, Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the 
United Nations Charter, San Francisco, 1955: Proceedings of the 
Commemorative Meetings (UN Document ST/GG/6: Sales No.: 1955, I. 26), 
pp. 103-15. Also cited in Jacobson, p. 266.
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organization. The United, Nations can and should play an outstanding 
part in the efforts to cement peace.1
We will consider the proposal for a world economic conference more
fully at a later point. Meanwhile we should observe that Molotov's emphasis
on the United Nations' potential for taking effective action against trade
discrimination coincided with long developing conditions within the
Organization which likely led the Soviets to view its functional programme
2
as being more useful to their own ends than had been anticipated in I9A5.
Most importantly, the functional programme had not detracted from the 
Organization's political activities, as the Soviets had initially feared 
it might; and for various reasons (notably the western countries' 
concentration of their economic and financial interests in other 
institutions as well as the opposition of the developing countries to 
American attempts to direct the United Nations* economic activities as 
part of the anti-communist campaign) the Organization's economic forums had 
not slipped into an exclusively western orientation.
One Soviet specialist, weighing the advantages of bringing issues
before the United Nations, stated in 1955:
Despite all the shortcomings of its work...UNO brings a number of 
positive features into international relations. It facilitates to a 
certain extent the establishment and development of ties and intercourse 
between states and in this way provides some prerequisites for an 
extension of international cooperation in various fields--political, 
economic, social and others. The consideration of numerous international 
problems by UN bodies contributes to the clarification of the views of 
various states on this or that issue, brings the most important 
international questions to the notice of a broad public and helps to 
mobilize the progressive forces of various social groups for the 
preservation and consolidation of peace and for the peaceful settlement 
of outstanding international issues.3
1
New York Times, 23 June 1955*
2
See Jacobson, p. 271.
3
A. Vorobyov, "The Tenth .Anniversary of the United Nations 
Organization," International Affairs (Moscow) No. 6 (June 1955); AA.
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Tills statement places the United Nations in proper perspective in the over-all 
framework of Soviet foreign policy. It was clearly the manners rather than 
the goals of the Soviet leadership that had changed with the policy of more 
active participation in the United Nations’ functional activities, for the 
Organization continued to have only ancillary importance for the USSR as an 
adjunct to the promotion of its foreign policy objectives on the bilateral 
level. As the above quotation indicates, however, this importance should 
not be underestimated.
In their efforts to gain flexibility and greater breadth of action, 
the Soviet leadership dramatically increased the pace of the campaign for a 
relaxation in external affairs by taking a series of steps in 1955 to 
release Soviet foreign policy from the immurement in which it had been 
languishing under Stalin’s postwar policies. Among these initiatives 
were the treaty establishing Austrian independence, the overtures to 
President Tito of Yugoslavia, the Geneva Conference, the agreement on 
diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic, negotiations for 
a peace settlement with Japan, and the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to 
India, Burma and Afghanistan. The new look on the diplomatic front was 
reflected in a more vigorous and imaginative foreign economic policy.
This period saw the beginning of the Soviet effort to exert influence in 
the Third World through aid and trade as well as a stepping-up of Soviet 
proposals for increased economic contact with the leading western 
industrial states. Molotov’s suggestion of an economic conference was 
indicative of this new policy.
While these diplomatic and economic initiatives had evidently been 
prompted by a pragmatic assessment of Soviet achievements and failures, they 
were given a substantive foundation in Khrushchev's declaration on the
ÎJ5
occasion of the Twentieth Party Congress of the fundamental concepts on 
which Soviet policy was based ; the principle of the peaceful coexistence 
of the socialist and capitalist systems as reinterpreted by him, the
1
non-inevitability of war, and the existence of various paths to socialism.
In the United Nations as well, Soviet inspired draft resolutions on 
economic matters were formulated in terms of and promoted in the name of 
peaceful coexistence. Thus, even though peaceful coexistence'is not the 
main subject of our study, we would be remiss if we were to forego an 
examination of the significance of the concept of coexistence as conceived 
and utilized in Soviet policy making during the decade of Khrushchev's 
leadership. Moreover, the research entailed in preparing this study has 
convinced the author that an understanding of the interpretation of the
concept as articulated by the Soviet leadership at the time enables one to
gain important insights into the form and substance of Soviet foreign economic 
policy in the United Nations during these years, for in elaborating what they 
termed the"policy of peaceful coexistence" in the press and elsewhere, Soviet 
policy makers publicized in clear if guarded terms the framework in which 
they sought and, most importantly, thought it was possible to attain better 
commercial relations with the West. It was this evaluation of what could
and should be done in the international trade field and how to go about
it that underpinned the positions adopted by the socialist countries in 
the United Nations with a view to expanding East-West trade.
1
Pravda, 15 February 1956.
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PART I: THE SOVIET APPROACH
A. The Policy of Peaceful Coexistence: The Political Imperative
Among Soviet policy makers, who have since soon after the October
Revolution been by their own later-day accounts the most persistently
active advocates of its adoption in international affairs, "peaceful
coexistence" has proved to be both a fitfully mercurial concept and an
even more unpredictable policy assertedly based on the imperatives of
that concept. Under Khrushchev, peaceful coexistence took on particular
meaning that is to be attributed to his revision of the traditional
doctrinaire Soviet theories of interstate relations and the international 
1
class struggle. Accordingly, for our purposes it is sufficient to 
concentrate mainly on his own elaborations of this concept. We feel 
justified in this narrow selection of source materials, moreover, since 
throughout this period official Soviet pronouncements on the subject as
1
Supporting this evaluation is B. Ponomarev's I960 article in Pravda 
restating the thesis of peaceful coexistence as developed under Khrushchev.
At the time, Ponomarev distinguished five "new propositions" concerning 
"coexistence" verified at the Twentieth (1956) and Twenty-first (1959) Party 
Congresses. These dealt with the enhanced importance of peaceful coexistence 
in Soviet foreign policy in the contemporary period, the non-inevitability of 
war, disarmament, competition between capitalisin and socialism and the class 
struggle in conditions of coexistence. Justifying these purported 
innovations advanced by Khrushchev at the two Congresses, Ponomarev wrote 
(italics added); "All these important conclusions are the result of creative 
Marxism-Leninism. Marx, Engels and Lenin...stressed that their teaching 
was not dogma but a guide to action, that it was necessary to develop it 
in accordance with changes in social life. Taking into account... changes 
l±n the international situation/ and approaching Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
creatively, the 20th and 21st Party Congresses outlined the paths of 
historical development of society in the conditions of the existence of a 
world socialist system, the paths of strengthening socialism and destroying 
imperialism. "Peaceful Coexistence Is A Vital Necessity," Pravda, 12 August 
i960, pp. 2-3, as translated in The Current Digest of the Ooviet Press 12, 
no. 32 (September I962): 3-A. (Hereafter referred to as CDS?.)
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well as the statements concerning coexistence made by Soviet bloc delegates
in the United Nations conformed with Khrushchev’s views. Because we are
interested in the policy aspects of the concept, the article that appeared
under Khrushchev's name in the January 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs
entitled "On Peaceful Coexistence" is of particular interest to our study,
for it was intended to communicate to influential western readers the
essential features of the Soviet proposal for the establishment of "normal"
1
■economic and political relations under conditions of peaceful coexistence.
Khrushchev's theoretical innovations stemmed from his evaluation of
the implications of the nuclear fact in contemporary world affairs. On
the practical policy level, the wellspring of his argumient for peaceful
coexistence outlined in Foreign Affairs is the assertion that the alternative
open to countries with differing systems in the contemporary world is
"either war— and war in the rocket and H-bomb age is fraught with the most
2
dire consequences for all nations--or peaceful coexistence." The idea
that war can be excluded "from the life of /global^ society even before
the full victory of socialism in the world, while capitalism still remains
3
in part of the world " is a most important consideration in the Soviet 
proposition of peaceful coexistence as a policy in the post-Stalin ema.
1
Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," Foreign Affairs 
33 (October 1959): l-l3.
2
Ibid., p. 1.
3
Ponomarev, p. *-1.
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"The new alignment of international forces which has developed since the 
Second World War," Khrushchev wrote, "offers ground for the assertion that
2
a new world war is no longer a fatal inevitability, that it can be averted." 
In view of the fact that war is not, of course, necessarily waged with 
the mutual consent of all involved, and since, therefore, unilateral action 
aimed at its prevention by the "new alignment of international forces" led 
by the Soviet Union is, though helpful, not sufficient, peaceful coexistence 
is offered by the Soviets as a universally valid policy to be pursued by
3
all countries in accordance with its cardinal precepts. These were 
listed in an official Soviet textbook on international law as being:
1
The "new alignment" said to be upholding the cause of peace 
was defined more comprehensively in the 1957 "Declaration of the Conference 
of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries" 
as consisting of the "camp of socialist states, headed by the Soviet 
Union; the peace-loving states of Asia and Africa...forming, together with 
the socialist countries, a large peace zone; the international liberation 
movement of the peoples of the colonies and semicolonies; the mass peace 
movements of the peoples; the peoples of the European countries who have 
proclaimed neutrality, the peoples of Latin America and the masses in 
the imperialist countries themselves, offering determined resistance to 
the plans for a new war." Pravda, 22 November 1957, pp. 1-2, as translated 
in CDSP 9., no. A? (l January 1953): A.
2
Khrushchev, p. 7* Therefore, as an active ingredient in the 
coexistence foimula, the noninevitability of war was said to be of recent 
origin, introduced under Khrushchev formally at the Twentieth Party Congress 
in a "fundamentally different appraisal" of the question of war and peace 
from that given by Stalin in his Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. 
Ye.A. Korovin, G.I. Kozhevnikov, and G.P. Zadorozhny, "Peaceful Coexistence 
and International Law," Izvestla, l3 April I962, p. 5, as translated in 
CDSP lA, no. 15 (9 May I962) : 3T See also Ponomarev, pp. 3-h-. And "Speech 
by Comrade A.I. Mikoyan," Pravda, 1 February 1959, pp. 3-9, as translated in 
CDSP 11, no. 9 (1 April 1959): 57- 
3
See, for example, "Replies to Questions by A.E. (sic) Johann,
West German Writer and Journalist, September 20, 1953," Pravda, 2A September 
1953; included in Nikita S. Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition 
with Capitalism (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., I96O), pp. 652-55. 
(Hereafter ref erred to as Victory).
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mutual respect for territorial Integrity and sovereignty, non-agression, 
non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual advantage.l
It is, however, important to understand that as presented by Khrushchev
peaceful coexistence does not owe its provenance to the prospect of war
between opposing systems that arose with the October Revolution but it
2
derives moment from it. As it applies to East-West relations, the 
concept of peaceful coexistence defines the optimum character of relations 
among states having different economic and social systems, taking into 
account the quality of the underlying competition and rivalry inherent in 
the basic relationship between the two groups of countries. VJhile it is 
therefore value-oriented, it is also said to be factual in the sense of 
encompassing those relations between socialist and capitalist states which
3
reflect the basic principles of coexistence. The threat of nuclear war
is important in that it points up the necessity of holding the line on
those aspects of East-West relations potentially making for war by inducing
all states to "undertake the mutual obligation" to refrain from acts
A
disallowed under the principles of peaceful coexistence. In this
1
F.I. Kozhevnikov, ed., International law: A Textbook for Use in Law 
Schools, as quoted in Edward McWhinney, "'Peaceful Coexistence' and Soviet- 
Western International Law," American Journal of International law 56 
(October I962): 95A. (Hereafter referred to as "Peaceful Coexistence.")
2
Soviet commentators trace peaceful coexistence to Lenin's 
"Concluding Speech Following the Discussion of the Report on Peace" of 
October 26 (November 3) I917 in which he stated: "We reject all clauses 
on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing 
provisions for good-neighborly relations and all economic agreements; 
we cannot reject these." V.I. Lenin, Selected Works in Three Volumes 
(New York: International Publishers, I967), 2; A65. Despite the fact that 
Lenin stated this in reference to the nascent Soviet state's efforts to 
extricate itself from the First World War, these commentators have 
treated it as a declaration of principle, not as a statement of tactics.
3
See the excellent discussion of the meaning of peaceful 
coexistence by Evgeny M. Chossudovsky, "ECE and Coexistence," Coexistence
A (1967): 151-53.
A
Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. 3.
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strategy, the principles play the role of a restraining influence in
setting forth that which is censurable in the conduct of foreign policy.
Indeed, this is the substance of the connotation commonly given to the
term peaceful coexistence, at least in English, that implies, as John
Hazard has pointed out, a "condition in which essentially hostile forces
1
are required by circumstances to refrain from fighting."
Khrushchev, however, rejoined those critics of the policy of peaceful
coexistence who, like Hazard, interpreted the Soviet position as one
advocating an armed truce by maintaining that peaceful coexistence "does
not at all rule out cooperation between countries, but on the contrary
implies it," as he observed in the introduction to the American edition
2
of For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism. He laid the
groundwork for this position at least as early as the Twentieth Party
Congress in 1956 at which he declared:
We believe that countries with differing social systems can do more 
than exist side by side. It is necessary to proceed further, to 
improve relations, strengthen confidence among countries and cooperate. 
The historic significance of the famous five principles [of peaceful 
coexistence/... is that in today’s circumstances they provide the best 
form of relations among countries with different social systems.3
Developing this theme further, Khrushchev declared in his report to
the Supreme Soviet in October 1959:
The question now at hand is not whether or not there should be 
peaceful coexistence. It exists and will continue to exist, 
unless we want the lunancy of a nuclear-missle war. The point
1
See McWhinney, p. 953j also John N. Hazard, "Coexistence Law 
Bows Out," American Journal of International Law 59 (January I965): 59-60. 
2
Khrushchev, Victory, p. viii.
3
"Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party Congress.--Report by Comrade M.S. 
Khrushchev," Pravda, 15 February 1956, pp. 1-11, as translated in 
CDSP 8, no. A“ (7 March 1956): 10.
51
is to coexist on an intelligent basis.
We want to see... conditions being created for cooperation among 
peoples. This cooperation should be predicated on the principle tliat 
each people chooses for itself and borrows from its neighbor what it 
itself deems necessary, without any dictation. Only then will 
coexistence be truly peaceful and good-neighborly.
To be sure, such coexistence among states with differing social 
systems presupposes that they must make mutual concessions in the 
interest of peace. One may say that this calls for a realistic 
approach, a level-headed appraisal of the actual state of things, 
mutual understanding and consideration of each other's interests.
This is a principled and at the same time flexible posture in the 
struggle for the preservation of peace.1
These same points were also made in his Foreign Affairs article which
appeared that month. While he again called for mutual concessions to
secure the conditions of peaceful coexistence— especially with respect to
the question of disarmament and the "German problem"--he made it clear that
the Soviet government was not acting from a position of weakness but from
one of military and economic strength which ensured the protection of its
own vital national Interests. And pursuing his own sober advice concerning a
realistic recognition of each other's national interests, he wrote that
although the principle of peaceful coexistence "does not at all demand that
one or another state abandon the system and ideology adopted by it,"
the "problems of ideological struggle" should not be confused with the
2
"question of relations between states." Accordingly, a central theme
1
"On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet 
Union.— Report by Comrade W.S. Khrushchev at the Third Session of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet October 31, 1959," Pravda and Izvestia, 31 October 1959, 
pp. 1-3, as translated in CDSP 11, no. AA (2 December 1959): 3-^ !. See also 
"Visit in India by N.A. Bulganin and M.S. Khrushchev.--Speech by,W.S. 
Khrushchev," Pravda and Izvestia, 26 November 1955, pp. 1-2, as translated 
in CDSP 7, no. "Ai'3 (ll January 1956): 3»
2
Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. A. Because of these 
considerations, western legal scholars and United Nations delegates tended 
to prefer the General Assembly's formula "friendly relations and cooperation 
among states" to the term peaceful coexistence. However Chossudovsky, for 
example, has countered the substitution of cooperation for coexistence by
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of the article was that peaceful coexistence could succeed only if both 
the capitalist and socialist states were to approach the resolution of 
outstanding problems between them by taking into account the legitimate 
national interests of all sides rather than overlooking them for the sake 
of ideology.
B. Trade and Peaceful Coexistence
Khrushchev emphasized this downgrading of ideological concerns in
a lengthy excursus on the necessity of developing trade which precedes
the concluding remarks of his Foreign Affairs article:
It is readily seen that the policy of peaceful coexistence receives a 
firm foundation only with increase in extensive and absolutely 
unrestricted international trade....
If the principle of peaceful coexistence is to be adhered to, not in
words but in deeds, it is perfectly obvious that no ideological
differences should be an obstacle to the development and exchange of 
everything produced by human genius in the sphere of peaceful branches 
of material production.1
It was a point which he had made earlier in an interview with the American
Journal of Commerce: "Political dislike of this or that system is a bad
maintaining that"only the concept of coexistence denotes one of the major 
characteristics of our epoch, i.e. the presence, side by side, of two groups 
of industrial countries with different systems of political, economic, and 
social organization and, in their turn, forming part of the capitalist and 
socialist world systems respectively." In addition to its unambiguous 
reference to the existence of two systems, peaceful coexistence is said to 
be uniquely preferable insofar as the reality of competition between systems 
is not implicit in the term cooperation. At this level, competition refers 
to the "ideological struggle" which makes up the underlying constant reality 
of relations between the socialist and capitalist systems. It is rooted in 
the belief nourishing the concept of coexistence at its core that the 
opposite ideology will ultimately be defeated. Therefore, while inter­
governmental relations might even be friendly and cooperative, they are at 
bottom unalterably competitive. Chossudovsky, p. 152, fn. 2. See also
G. Frantsov, "What Lies behind the Catch Phrase 'Ideological Disarmament,'" 
Kommunlst, no. 13, September I962, pp. IIO-II9.
1
Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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counsellor. In business it can only cause harm."
It is apparent that the development of trade and generally broader
economic contacts between capitalist and socialist countries was to play
an important role in the process of over-all "normalization" of relations
mandated under the principle of peaceful coexistence. Anastas Mikoyan
had previously, at the Twentieth Party Congress, uncompromisingly affirmed
trade as the sine qua non of peaceful coexistence (italics original):
It is our firm conviction that lasting peaceful coexistence is 
inconceivable without trade, which offers a good basis for it 
even after the formation of the two world markets. The existence 
of these markets, socialist and capitalist, far from precluding, 
presupposes developed mutually advantageous trade between all 
countries.2
It is also interesting to note the sporadic inclusion of "economic
cooperation" in Soviet commentaries as one of the cardinal Five Principles
(as they were often termed) on which relations between states should be
constructed, further testifying to the importance of trade in the Soviet
3
scenario for peaceful coexistence.
1. The Question of Artificial Barriers to East-West Trade
The role of trade as the touchstone of coexistence reflects the 
historical perspective in which the Soviets viewed postwar western 
trading policies with the Soviet bloc as in the main the product of hostile
1
"Interview Given to Eric Bidder, Owner and Publisher of Journal 
of Commerce, and Its Editor Heinz Luedicke, March 22, 1953," in Klirushchev, 
Victory, p. 216.
2
Quoted In M. Afonin, "A True Path to International Cooperation," 
International Affairs (Moscow) no. 5 (May 1956): 37*
3
See, for example, "Speech at Grand Kremlin Palace Reception in 
Honor of hist Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," p. 725; 
and "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union to the 20th Party Congress.--Report by Comrade U.S. Khrushchev,"
Pravda, 15 February 1956, pp. 1-11, as translated in CDSP 3, no. A 
(7 March 1956): 9-
and malevolent political intent. What Khrushchev alluded to in stating
in his 1959 article, "if both sides want to improve relations, all barriers
1
in international trade must be removed," was the western system of export
controls and American import policies in particular, including credit
and exchange controls. These so-called "artificial barriers" (which were
most often grouped under the single heading of international trade
discrimination) were, according to Soviet sources, established' to "poison the
international atmosphere and provide grist for the mill of the enemies of 
2
peace," and specifically to "impede the growth of the economic potential 
of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and slow down their
3
technological progress." Despite some tempering of these measures and
growing disaffection among leading west European nations with Washington's
guidelines for the conduct of trade with the Soviet bloc countries that
began to have effect with the waning of the Korean crisis, the Soviets did
not relax their campaign against continuing controls and unequal treatment
said to be used by the West "in order to keep the world in a state of tension,
i-i
to trouble the waters and to fish in them...." At least publicly, as in 
the United Nations, for them the most important question of trade was the 
elimination of these restrictions and discriminatory practices rather than 
the development of those areas of economic relations left largely unimpeded
1
Klirushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. 17.
2
"Some Aspects of International Situation: Speech at Conference
of Front-Rank Agricultural Workers of Byelorussian Republic, January 22, 
1958," in lüarushchev, Victory, p. 62.
. 3
"Barriers to Soviet-American Trade Must be Eliminated,"
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta (21 January I961), as translated in CDSP 13, no. 6 
(3 March I961): 36.
A
"Some Aspects of International Situation," p. 63.
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by artificial barriers. This is not, however, to say they did not take 
pragmatic advantage of existing opportunities for expanding trade, as can 
be seen in the upswing in East-West trade beginning in mid-1953*
a. The Development of East-West Trade, 1953"6A
Figured in millions of dollars, exports from western to Eastern 
Europe increased in the latter half of 1953 33*^v over the first half of 
the year and imports from the East rose 32.6^ at the same time. The steady 
rise in the volume and significance of East-West trade over the next ten 
years (i.e., through the last year included in this study) is illustrated 
in the following table covering all western exports to and imports from the 
Soviet bloc.
Table 2-1. Some Important Statistics on Western Trade with the Soviet Bloc, 
1952-6^1.1 (in millions dollars)
Soviet Bloc as Volume with Of which American American
percent of Eastern trade with trade with
total world Europe and Eastern Europe USSR from
Year trade USSR and USSR 1958
Western Exports
1952 1.6 1,165.7 1
1953 1.5 1,101.A 2
I95A 1.9 1,A72.7 6
1955 2.1 1 ,770.6 7
1956 2.3 2,126.5 11
1957 2.6 2,58A.1 36
195-3 2.8 2,6A7.0 113 3
1959 2.9 3,003.2 89 7
i960 3.3 3,738.A 19A 33
1961 3.5 A,198.2 133 )i3
1962 3.6 A,A70.9 125 15
1963 3.5 A,736.3 167 20
I96A 3.7 5,729.0 3A0 1*^ 5
1
Computations derived from Adler-Karlsson, Table lA-2, p. 15^ 1; 
Table l^i-lO, p. 167; and Table 10-1, p. 100. As elsewhere in this study, 
the Soviet bloc is defined as excluding China and other non-European 
convnunist countries.
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Western Imports (same headings)
1952 1.5 1 ,262.9 67
1953 1.5 1 ,169.7 A 6
195A 1.3 l,'+55.9 A 9
1955 2.2 1 ,933.0 66
1956 2.3 2,305.6 73
1957 2.A 2,562.1 66
1953 2.7 2,736.0 63 17
1959 2.3 3 ,039.5 33 29
i960 3.0 3 ,661.0 3)|. 23
1961 3.)i- '+,225.6 35 23
1962 - 3.5 '+,630.5 32 16
1963 3.6 5,255.0 35 20
196)1. 3.5 5.71''.7 102 20
East-
It is against 
-West trade that w
this background of the actual progress made 
10 should view Soviet-led efforts within the
in expanding 
United
Nations directed towards improving trade relations. More than the trade 
statistics themselves, however, we are Interested in the conditions under 
which these commercial relations evolved as a basis for analyzing and 
understanding the approach to trade problems pursued by the Soviets in the 
United Nations’ economic forums and the linking of this approach to the 
policy of peaceful coexistence.
b. Contributing Factors to the Development of Trade
The reasons for the change in 1953/5^ have been extensively 
analyzed in the existing literature, and here we will take notice of only 
some of the more Important economic and political factors involved. Even 
before the dramatic political events of 1955 there were indications that 
Stalin’s heirs would not only continue the tentative moves toward relaxing 
international tensions begun before his death in March 1953, but were also 
intent upon developing a more moderate and hence more versatile posture 
vis-a-vis the West. For their part the western countries, too, hoped to 
ease relations with the East, and the negotiated truce reached in Korea in 
July 1953 (together with the armistice in Indochina achieved the following
5Î
year) "contributed, significantly to the willingness of western political
1
leaders to improve also commercial relations with the communists." The
growing stability of relations in Europe as well had a long-term salutory
effect on East-West trade. This was in part due to a gradual realization
in the West of the necessity of coming to terms with the realities of the
postwar division of Europe.
The irreversibility of the political consequences of the Second
World War was underscored by the USSR's explosion of an airborne hydrogen
device in .August 1953* One rather immediate effect of this demonstration
of near parity in modern weaponry technique, which heralded the Soviet-
American nuclear stalemate, was again to call into question the value of
2
the strategic embargo on East-West trade as it was then applied. Western 
Europeans who had long been critical of the policy had for some time been 
unfavorably comparing the objectives of the embargo advanced by the 
Americans with its actual economic, military and political effects; and 
its apparent failure to achieve significant results in the crucial field 
of nuclear power bolstered their efforts to curtail it. On the economic 
side of the argument for liberalizing western trade policies, persistent 
Soviet offers for increases especially in certain embargoed goods grew in 
appeal with economic recession in western Europe. And combined with this 
also, the end of the Marshall assistance programme in 1953 weakened the 
inter-governmental cohesion underlying the strict western control system 
which had been enforced by the Battle Act's threat of withdrawal of American
1
Adler-Karlsson, p. 3A.
2
As before, we will rely on Adler-Karlsson's study with respect to 
the matter of the strategic export embargo. Much of the following is 
accordingly based on his Chapter Eight, "Reasons for the Crumbling of the 
Policy," and Chapter Nine, "The Withering Away of the Cocom Embargo after 
1953."
aid.
In 195^ 4 and then again in 1953 the leading vest European trading
nations pressured the United States into a negotiated dovnvard revision of
the existing embargo lists in operation among the NATO countries and Japan.
The first major revision involved the downgrading or decontrolling of some
250 of the previously items which had been included on the control
lists. Possibly as a concession to American policy, however,-it was
agreed that the remaining items were to be subject to more rigorous
implementation measures. Still, the effect of the revision was to bring
the embargo policy more closely into line with the European opinion that
the lists "should be short, well defined and strictly enforced" and that
the strategic controls should not constitute a virtual economic blockade
1
of the communist countries. Though there were some minor list revisions 
over the next three years, the second major revision came in 1953 when
again at the insistence of west European governments the lists of embargoed
2
coiTimodities were further reduced by from one-third to one-half in length.
The remaining controlled goods reflected still nearer agreement on those
items which the Europeans "judged to be of direct strategic value, and
where they recognized that a Western technological monopoly, temporary
3
superiority, or lead time would give some strategic advantage." The 
determination of which goods fitted these criteria was, as in the case of 
the 195^ revision, partly affected by evidence of the progress achieved by
the USSR in technological, industrial and scientific areas. The launching
of the first Sputnik in 1957 had perhaps an even greater impact on western
1
Adler-Karlsson, pp. 92 and 93*
2
Ibid., p. 97.
3
Ibid.', p. 96.
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opinion here than had the explosion of the Soviet hydrogen boTnh in 1953,
for as Adler-Karlsson has concluded, it appeared that Soviet advances had
been the greatest in those sectors which had been the primary targets of
1
the embargo system. »
The 1958 revision had other effects on the system, not the least
of which was the decision that the export policy should thereafter be
subjected to yearly review and alteration based on a close watch on
developments in the Soviet bloc. By I96U, the multilaterally agreed-to
list was described by the American Administration as comprising "somewhere
2
around 10 percent of the total items that move in international trade." 
However, despite the successes of the European governments in freeing 
East-West trade, points of conflict with the United States over the 
remaining controls continued to make themselves felt throughout the rest 
of the period under examination, and aftem^ards.
At each step in the "withering away" of the western embargo after 
1953 the United States had sought in negotiations with its allies the 
barest minimum in changes in the export control system. The 1953 revision 
was especially irritating, and the Administration reported to Congress 
that it had only "reluctantly approved" the changes pressed upon it by the 
Europeans, probably because not to have done so would have had even more 
severe consequences. In view of the fact that after 1958 a great many more 
previously listed goods would be available to the socialist countries in 
west European markets--some through resale from the US^-- the Department of 
Commerce announced that the export controls in force in the United States 
would be significantly changed; yet it was also declared that the unilateral
1
Ibid.
2
Statement by C. Douglas Dillon, cited by Adler-Karlsson, p. 98,
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controls maintained by the Government would still be more comprehensive
than those agreed to multilaterally. The Administration's restrictive
attitude was exemplified by President Eisenhower's unencouraging reply to
Khrushchev's June 1953 letter proposing expanding trade in non-military
1
goods between their two countries. And again in 1959, this time in
response to trade proposals made by Mikoyan on his trip to the United
States during which he criticized the strategic embargo, the Under-Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs, C. Douglas Dillon, delivered a strongly
worded speech in New Orleans in January which left no doubt about the
United States' lack of interest in putting trade relations with the East
2
on a more normal footing. Although President Kennedy attempted, 
unsuccessfully, in I961 to get Congress to modify the Battle Act so as to 
gain greater flexibility in foreign policy, nothing of much importance 
happened in the area of East-West trade until the big wheat deal of 1963-64 
seemed to indicate the beginning of a change in American attitudes. The 
severity of American policy and controls in contrast with those pursued by 
all other non-communist countries was reflected in the actual development 
of U.S. trade with the East to 1964, as illustrated in the statistical 
table on pages 55-56.
c . The Starting Point for an Interpretation of Soviet Bloc Trade Policy
in the United Nations under Khrushchev
Commenting on the relatively improved political climate in Europe 
and the gradual though steady increase of East-West trade after 1953, 
Gunnar Myrdal has suggested:
1
See Harold J, Berman, "A Reappraisal of US-USSR Trade Policy,' 
Havard Business Review (July/August 1964): 146-4?.
2
The New York Times, 23 January 1959*
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There is clearly a mutual causal relationship between these two 
developments: the improved political relations have led to a
rise in trade between the countries in the two blocs, while the 
increased trade, to some extent, has tended to lessen political 
tension further. Without a doubt, this sort of circular causation 
with cumulative effects is what we have experienced in recent 
years. It /l^/...my main hypothesis...,however, that in this 
process political developments have played the leading role 
while, on the whole, the development of trade has been more of a 
response to the political changes.1
This is a striking conclusion, both in its simplicity and reasonableness
when applied to the facts.
Without specifically referring to Myrdal as the originator of 
this analytical perspective, Adler-Karlsson (to whom we are therefore once 
again indebted) has provided an example of its application to the activities 
of the United Nations in the area of East-West trade in commenting on 
the significance of the first trade consultations held in the spring of
1953 and 1954 under the auspices of the Executive-Secretary of the Economic
2
Commission for Europe. According to him, the success of these consultations
(which we will refer to again in Chapter Five) made up "one of the most
important explanatory factors behind the timing of the turn of the trade
3
development between Eastern and Western Europe...." The consultations did 
not, however, create the opportunities for the bilateral commercial agreements 
concluded following the talks,* rather, they facilitated the development of 
trade relations by taking advantage of already existing international 
conditions conducive to this end by bringing interested parties from both
1
Gunnar Myrdal, "Political Factors Affecting East-West Trade in 
Europe," Co-existence 5 (1963): l43*
2
It is of interest to not that the Executive-Secretary at the time 
was, incidentally, Gunnar Myrdal and that Adler-Karlsson had Myrdal’s 
advice and cooperation in the preparation of his book. This perhaps accounts 
for the incorporation of Myrdal’s interpretation of events in the 
description of the ECE trade consultations.
3
Adler-Karlsson, p. 65.
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sides together in a setting which led to constructive discussions on matters
pertaining to the revival of East-West trade. The conclusion reached hy
Adler-Karlsson is that the significance of the consultations was "first that
they helped East-West trade to expand as far as was possible inside the
given political limitations, and secondly...that they may have helped to
decrease the extent [of the chilling effect on trade/ of these political
limitations...without changing the actual political limitations” on 
1
East-West trade. With respect to the second benefit in particular, he 
suggests that the consultations may have directly affected the 1954 revision 
of the strategic embargo lists, by "whetting the appetite" of the west 
Europeans through increasing their knowledge about the possibilities for 
large orders and profits and about what kinds of coimnodities might be 
worthwhile removing from the control lists. Implicit in this, however, is 
the fact that while on the one hand some improvement in political relations 
had contributed to the revision, on the other remaining political difficulties 
persisted to act as a brake on the freeing of trade from western controls.
The annual trade consultations, which became a permanent fixture in 
the ECE'8 operations, have continued to have an important and positive 
effect on the development of East-West trade. Yet for most of the first 
post-Stalinist decade the degree of cooperation and level of results 
achieved in the ECE consultations were elsewhere unmatched--nor even 
approached— in the various U.N. bodies concerned with the issues of East-West 
trade. The blame for this must be assessed against both the socialist and 
the western countries. Nonetheless, it is our firm conviction, based on the 
research for this study, that much of the responsibility for the 
unproductiveness of the plenary sessions of the ECE, the ECOSOC and the
1
Ibid., p. 86,
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General Assembly (as well as their subsidiary committee meetings) rests 
with the policies pursued by the Soviet bloc, however much the opposite 
intention was meant. At the beginning of the chapter we noted the opinion 
expressed in the authoritative Soviet journal International Affairs that 
the value of bringing problems before the United Nations Igiy in the 
clarification of conflicting views, in the exposure of issues to an 
international public, and in the somewhat hazy notion of mobilizing 
"progressive forces...for the preservation and consolidation of peace and 
for the peaceful settlement of outstanding international issues." In other 
words, as we pointed out, the U.N. forums were to serve Soviet foreign 
policy where bilateral efforts were unable to secure the desired results.
The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries accordingly reacted to 
discriminatory western export and import policies which impeded the 
development of trade on the level of bilateral negotiations by using the 
Organization’s economic forums for pressing for the complete "normalization" 
of East-West trade, that is, for the removal of all "artificial"--politically 
motivated--barriers. However, by concentrating on what they saw to be the 
political dimensions of the trade problem, which they maintained were the 
only important obstacles to EQst-West trade, the socialist delegations 
virtually neglected other aspects of the problem which might have benefitted 
from examination in the United Nations. Quite possibly, progress in these 
other areas could have led to an even greater expansion of trade within 
existing political limitations while further diminishing the impact of 
those limitations on trade relations.
In this respect, then, Soviet bloc policy in the United Nations sought 
in effect to push East-West economic relations beyond the limitations 
imposed.by political circumstances. We do not mean, of course, that the 
policy was that simple, and that there were not other, perhaps even conflicting.
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motives behind their avowed single-minded interest in economic cooperation. 
However, we do believe this to be a useful perspective from which to 
examine their stated intentions. The diplomatic form which this effort 
took was characterized by the insistence on normalizing trade within the 
framework of the policy of peaceful coexistence, the outstanding feature 
of which was the assertion that the crucial relationship between trade 
and peace, i.e. between economic and political relations, was-exactly 
the reverse of that later described by Myrdal as in fact determining the 
nature of evolving East-West relations in the postwar world.
2. Soviet Trade Diplomacy and Peaceful Coexistence*
a. The Objective: The "Normalization of Trade Relations"
During the period under consideration Soviet specialists and their 
colleagues in Eastern Europe assumed that, since the postwar depression 
(in contrast with its potential) in East-West trade could be attributed 
to "historical and political rather than economic factors," political action, 
such as the removal of export-import controls, "would be sufficient to
¥r
A Note to the Reader: We feel the reader should be made aware of the
fact that in this section we will discuss general Soviet trade policy 
towards the West mainly by using the Soviet-American debate as an example. 
There are several good reasons for doing this. In the first place, trade 
with the United States was especially important to the Soviets because of 
the potential size of the American market, the technological advantages 
to be gained from Soviet-American trade, the effect of American policies 
on the rest of the West, and so on. Secondly, Soviet trade relations with 
the United States remained, in a worse state than with any other major 
western trading nation. Accordingly, the Soviet literature is particularly 
rich in references to the problems of this trade relationship. A third 
reason is that even though the difficulties between these two countries were 
in several respects more exaggerated than those between the USSR and the other 
western countries, the approach adopted towards the United States on the issue 
of normalizing trade relations was no different substance from that taken 
towards the rest of the West, as we will see in later chapters when we 
consider particular manifestations of this approach in the policies pursued by 
the Soviet bloc in the United Nations. Thus another advantage is that of 
convenience without, we trust, oversimplification.
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1
bring about an expansion in the volume of trade." This is the key to what 
the Soviets meant in calling for the normalization of East-West trade 
relations.
.Although the USSR continued to experience trade difficulties with
other leading western trading nations of the sort attributed to political
restraints, Soviet spokesmen tended to concentrate criticism on the United
States as the initiator and main perpetuator of the western Controls system
and, by the late 1950’s, the only Great Power with which the Soviet Union
did not have a trade agreement establishing the general principles of
trade and forming the basis for the regulation of commerce and payments.
The roots of these disorders were properly traced to the American decision
in the late 19^0*s to Initiate a policy of export controls and to the
unilateral abrogation by the United States in 1951 of the Commercial Relations
Agreement with the USSR proclaimed under the power of executive agreement
2
by Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 6, 1937.»
Under Khrushchev, Soviet analysts continued to view the Agreement as 
a good one, "providing a legal basis for normal trade between the two
3
countries." A.nd in his message of June 2, 195^, to President Eisenhower 
outlining proposals for Soviet-American trade, Khrushchev referred to the 
absence of a trade agreement with the United States and stressed that "the 
necessary contractual and legal basis must be created in order to initiate
1
See A.K. Cairncross, "Trade between Countries with Different 
Economic and Social Systems," International Social Science Journal 12, 
no. 2 (i960): 255.
2
Agreement between the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Executive Agreement Series no. 105 
(Washington, D .C .: United States Government Printing Office, 1937),
pp. 1-8.
3
"Speech by Comrade A.I. Mikoyan," Pravda, 1 February 1959, 
pp. 3-9, as translated in CDSP 11, no. 9 (l April 1959): 59.
66
1
trade between the USSR and the USA, Later, commenting on Khrushchev's
proposals, Mikoyan contended with the demurring Department of State that:
Our proposals for restoring normal conditions in Soviet—American 
trade, that is, the conditions antedating the 'cold war,' contemplate 
nothing exceptional or different from the conditions which obtain in 
our trade with other capitalist countries - Britain, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Sweden etc,
These countries and many others have mutual most-favored-nation 
arrangements with the Soviet Union.2
This conspicuous reference to the 1937 Agreement, which granted mutual
unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment between the
contracting parties, demonstrates one instance of what was meant by the
Soviet call for "restoration" or "establishment" of "normal trade
relations." It was not so much a particular target for the actual growth
rate of commercial exchanges or a certain percentage of total American
trade going to the East as it was the réintroduction of the most-favored-
nation standard in Soviet-American trade through the renegotiation of a
trade agreement.
In the opinion of Soviet economists, only the removal of obstacles 
to East-West trade and subsequent long-term trade agreements based on the 
most-favored nation principle could create the basis for the steady
1
"Message of June 2, 1953, from Chairman of USSR Council of 
Ministers U.S. Khrushchev to US President D. Eisenhower," Pravda and 
Izvestia, 6 June 1953, p. 3, as translated in CDSP 10, no. 23 (T6 June 
1953): 8.
2
"Speech by Comrade A.I. Mikoyan, " p. 60. Cf., "Development of 
Trade Relations between the USSR and the USA.--Pravda Correspondent 
Interviews USSR Minister of Foreign Trade U.S. Patolichev," Pravda, 
l8 February 1959, PP* 4-5, as translated in CDSP 11, nos, 6-7 (l3 March 
1959)' 12. While the issue of most-favored-nation treatment was 
particularly acute between the USSR and the USA, it should be noted 
that the Soviets had differences with other western states over the same 
issue, not the least of these being the disputes which arose over the 
Soviet trade relationship with the member countries of the Common Market 
and EFTA.
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expansion of international trade and give a constant stimulus to the growth
of national economies. American affirmations that the selective export
regulations and discriminatory import policies had not had an appreciably
detrimental effect on Soviet-American trade were contested during this
period. The official Soviet rebuttle to American minimization of the
economic repercussions of their policies was comprehensively outlined in
a Pravda interview with Foreign Trade Minister W.S. Patolichev concerning
the January 1959 address by U.S. Under-Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon
1
on Soviet-American trade relations. Patolichev ridiculed Dillon's 
assertion of the United States' Interest in expanding East-West trade by 
contrasting it with his expressed opposition to an agreement granting the 
USSR most-favored-nation status and his defense of restrictive American 
trade practices with the East. The Trade Minister observed further, and it 
is worth quoting at length:
Mr. Dillon tries to assert that the high tariffs and import bans on 
a number of Soviet goods have had little effect on Soviet exports to 
the USA. This is far from true. Take, for example, the 1946-1950 
five-year plan, which preceded the United State's abrogation of the 
trade agreement. During these years the goods which are now subject 
to high tariffs or which cannot be imported into the USA represented 
approximately 65^ of our total exports to the USA..
As for the restrictions on US exports to the Soviet Union, Mr. Dillon 
deliberately ignores the fact that in addition to direct bans on exports 
to the USSR American firms are required to obtain individual licenses 
on many goods, although exports of these goods are not officially 
banned. By this procedure American officials in fact set up a ban 
on these goods.
For example, our organization negotiated with several US firms about 
placing orders for chemical equipment and plants. The firms agreed 
to accept the orders but stated that_they had to obtain permission 
for this from the State Department /actually the Department of 
Connnerce/ This was a long time ago, but the State Department has 
neither refused nor given permission. As is obvious, this is the 
form of refusal which the State Department elected to use.
1
See p. 60 supra.
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The fact that a psychologically unfavorable atmosphere has been 
created in the USA regarding firms which want to trade with us is no 
small factor. One cannot but see that life itself confirms the 
need for removing these obstacles so as to clear the way for mutually 
advantageous trade between our countries.1
The Soviets argued that the lifting of all such barriers to trade
would not only Improve mutual relations but would also be to the considerable
economic advantage of both sides. In this respect, they often cited the
requirements of the USSR's ambitious economic programme, which the new
Party Programme described in I961 as the plan for creating "the material
and technical basis of communism within two decades." Khrushchev's
discussion at the Twenty-First Party Congress of the control figures for
the development of the national economy during 1959-1965 pointed to some
of the tasks involved in this effort:
At the present level of socialist production we are still unable 
to create the full abundance of material goods and cultural benefits 
necessary to satisfy the growing requirement of our people, necessary 
for their full development. But communism is impossible without this. 
Consequently, it is necessary first of all to develop the productive 
forces further and to increase the production of goods....
Creation of the material and technical base of communism presumes 
first of all, a highly developed, modern industry, complete 
electrification of the country, scientific and technical progress in 
all branches of industry and agriculture, complex mechanization and 
automation of all productive processes, maximum utilization of new 
power sources..., new synthetics and other materials, a higher... 
technical level of all the working people, further improvement in the 
organization of production, and higher labor productivity.2
The relationship between this domestic plan and Soviet trading policy was
illustrated by Khrushchev in a West German interview:
p. 13.
1
"Development of Trade Relations between the USSR and the USA,"
"Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union: On Control Figures for Development of the USSR National Economy
in 1959-1965•“"Report by Comrade U.S. lüirushchev," Pravda, 23 January 
1959, pp. 2-10, as translated in CDSP 11, no. 5 ( H  March 1959): 13-14,
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As is known, the Soviet Union is currently carrying out a large 
program for increasing the production of consumer goods, including 
a considerable expansion of the production of synthetic materials, 
fibers, plastics, and artificial leathers and furs and products 
made from them. To speed up the fulfillment of this program, the 
Soviet Union could make heavy purchases of equipment in the FRG.
Here we are counting on the industry of the FRG offering us 
equipment that accords with the present-day level of technology 
and offering it at acceptable prices. The FRG could also 
participate in the development of this branch of Soviet industry 
by sending its specialists to work at Soviet enterprises as consultants, 
by selling licenses and by other suitable means. An expansion of 
trade between the USSR and the FRG...is also possible in other 
branches of industry.1
Similarly, in his June 1953 letter to Eisenhower, Khrushchev observed
that even though the Soviet Union "possesses all the means and resources
itself to carry out this program successfully....the Soviet government,
in order to accelerate its fulfillment, might make large purchases of the
2
necessary equipment and materials in the USA." To add strength to such
overtures the Soviets often professed a belief in the desireability of
an "international division of labor not only among countries in the world
socialist system, but also among socialist and all other countries,
3
including the western powers," as Mikoyan once put it.
Regardless of their true conviction concerning the theory of 
comparative advantage as understood in the West, Soviet spokesmen 
clearly sought to influence western businessmen to see in the USSR a 
vast and receptive market for much needed western goods which would be
1
"Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers U.S. Khrushchev's 
Replies to the Questions of West German Writer and Journalist A.J. Johann," 
Pravda, 2h September 1953, p. 1, as translated in CDSP 10, no. 33 
(29 October 1953): 11.
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"Message of June 2, 1953, from Chairman of USSR Council of 
Ministers N.S. Khrushchev to US President D. Eisenhower," Pravda and 
Izvestia, 6 June 1953, p. 3, as translated in CDSP 10, no. 23 (T6 June
1953): 3.
3
"Speech by Comrade A.I. Mikoyan," p. 60.
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1
free from domestic competition. The idea was to generate corporate
pressure on western governments to loosen restrictions on trade with the
2
USSR, with a view to the eventual abolition of all export controls. The 
progressive reduction of the strategic export control lists after 1953
3
demonstrates tliat this strategy was not without its successes. In 
speaking directly to western business circles and affirming-the advantages 
of each trade partner being able to buy what it needs and is- easier for 
the other to produce, the Soviets argued that existing discriminatory 
policies were harmful "first and foremost" to the countries pursuing them. 
They also played upon two points of west European dissension from the harsh 
trade restraints originally dictated by the United States, which to varying
1
See, for example, "Interview Given to Eric Bidder, Owner and 
Publisher of Journal of Commerce, and Its Editor Heinz Luedicke, March 22, 
1953," in Khrushchev, Victory, pp. 219-22. Apparently Kirushehev believed 
Americans were hesitant to trade with the USSR because of a misunderstanding 
about what the Soviets meant by "peaceful economic competition between 
systems," and sought to clarify the noncompetitiveness of their mutual trade 
relations. See, for instance, "Some Questions Concerning International 
Situation: From Speech at Reception of Graduates of Military Academies, 
November l4, 1953,'* in Khrushchev, Victory, p. 756.
2
This was implicit in a dinner conversation Khrushchev had with 
American businessmen in Washington September 24, 1Q59, during which he 
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"For Mutually Profitable Trade on Basis of Equality and without 
Discrimination," Pravda and Izvestia, 27 September 1959, pp. 1-2, as 
translated in CDSP 11, no. 39 (26 October 1959): 10-12.
3
While it was most successful in Europe, it did not fail to have 
an impact in the United States as well. Mikoyan publicly took delight 
in former President Harry Truman's concern "lest American financiers and 
businessmen 'who are so strongly influenced by a possible source of new 
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the nation's interests and the security of the country as a whole.' /Truman/ 
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House.'" "Speech by Comrade A.I. Mikoyan," p. 58
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degrees continued to plague western cooperation in the strategic embargo
throughout the period. On the one hand, it was questioned whether "strategic
goods" constituted a realistically definable category. On this point
Khrushchev once expressed the opinion that the criteria on which the lists
were based were entirely subjective and that even butter might also
1
conceivably be included among strategic goods. This struck a responsive
note with those Europeans who, though they agreed that some commodities
were of an undeniably strategic nature, desired a sharper definition and
shortening of the lists. On the other hand, in spite of their quite obvious
interest in importing western technology, the Soviets asserted that the
USSR’s defense industry was as advanced as any in the West and, therefore,
"the arguments that for security reasons ’strategic’ goods must not be
2
sold to the Soviet Union are completely groundless." Like the Europeans, 
they pointed to the Soviet nuclear force and (at least for a while) 
superiority in missile technology as evidence of the irrationality of 
the lists.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Soviets were not unattentive
to the West’s concern over the export of obviously strategic goods to the
Soviet bloc and were cautious in explaining their demands for the lifting
of all trade restrictions where these demands touched directly upon such
items. Even Khrushchev tacitly acknowledged as legitimate a government’s
right to protect its national interests in this area of trade, stating,
3
"If you don’t want to, don’t sell us guns, aircraft and ships...."
1
"N.S. Khrushchev Interview--With E. Pickering, Editor in Chief of 
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And Mikoyan deemed it advisable to assure the U.S. State Department that
"we do not need /your/ weapons and have no intention of buying either
weapons or other strategic goods....In our proposals to expand Soviet-
American trade, we are taMng of trade in commodities for peaceful 
1
consumption." Yet, compare this with Khrushchev’s answer to the question
put to him by the American journalist Eric Bidder, "How would national
security requirements have to be handled to satisfy Soviet Interests, and
what would your attitude be toward the reservation we might feel should
be made on national security grounds?";
In asking this question, you apparently proceed from the assumption 
that to ensure the interests of "national security" the existing 
restrictions on trade between the capitalist and socialist countries 
should to some extent be preserved. At the same time, you seem to be 
in favor of developing East-West trade. These are clearly incompatible 
positions, for the complete and comprehensive development of trade does 
not permit of any discriminatory restrictions or bans.2
In the same interview Khrushchev summed up this confusing policy;
Whatever you do not want to buy, don’t buy; whatever you do not want 
to sell, don't sell. But let us exercise the same right: to buy
what we need and to sell what we can.3
This injunction, giving scope to conflicts of interest, could hardly
be reassuring to those with whom it was argued a formal suspension of all
trade restrictions would not be to the disadvantage of their national
security interests.
b. The Strategy: The Substantive Approach Underlying Soviet Trade Diplomacy
in the United Nations
In the preceding sub-section we noted that the Soviets believed 
that the noriTializatlon of commercial relations depended on political action
1
"Speech by Comrade A.I. Mikoyan," p. 60.
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in the West to remove the "artificial" barriers to East-West trade. The 
principle reason why this was not forthcoming was singled out by Soviet 
Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev in a Pravda interview in February 1959 
on the problems of normalizing trade with the United States. He alleged 
that,
up to now our proposals on economic matters have run up against 
the American government’s unwillingness to normalize trade relations, 
and the political motives behind its approach have not'been concealed. 
To justify this negative approach American statesmen often resort to 
a variety of fictions in an effort to place the guilt for the abnormal 
state of affairs on the_Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Mr. Dillon’s 
speech in New Orleans /January, 1959/ made in this spirit. 1
In further developing his criticism, Patolichev characterized the abrogation
of the 1937 Trade Agreement and subsequent American trade policy as
dictated by the United States* general "cold war policy" which was, he
indicated, maliciously concocted in response to an alleged but"mythical
’Communist threat.’" Therefore, in attributing the current state of
Soviet-American trade to historical political factors, the Trade Minister
placed the onus at the doorstep of the United States, while failing to
discern any responsibility on the part of the USSR either for the genesis
or for the propagation of the state of affairs giving rise to western
trade policies. In fairness, such misrepresentations were a common
occurrence on both sides of the dispute.
Although he observed that in his speech Dillon found "it necessary 
to explain the delay in the State Department’s reply to the Soviet 
government’s trade proposals by referring to the sharpening of international 
tension," Patolichev, like Kirushchev, relegated such considerations to 
groundless and unconscionable cold warmongering, intimidation, and
1
"Development of Trade Relations between the USSR and the USA," 
p. 12. Italics added.
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1
ideological differences which should have no bearing on trade matters.
Yet it was not a question of political dislike, of ideological conflict
alone. While poor political relations contributing to abnormal trade
relations in part may be due to what might justifiably be called ideological
considerations, other Soviet spokesmen laid responsibility to conflicts of
outright national interests in interstate relations as well. Nevertheless,
they have advocated the same forthright separation of these 'issues from
trade matters as that proposed by Patolichev. Mikoyan is a good example.
Also referring to Dillon's "reference to political developments in various
parts of the world," he observed perhaps more candidly than Patolichev
that, "Mr. Dillon's explanation is enough to show that where trade is
concerned the American government is not guided by business considerations,
but links these questions with specific disputed international political
problems which arise." He contended that this approach unnecessarily
confounded trade relations;
If the American side did not link trade questions with current 
international political issues such as the Par Ernst and Berlin-- 
after all, neither Berlin nor the Far East can be traded--both sides, 
after studying the ideas expressed in my meeting with Mr, Dillon, 
might use this meeting as the point of departure in preparing a 
mutually acceptable basis for Soviet-American trade.3
Thus, the proposed solution to the problem of eliminating trade 
restrictions and discriminatory practices, of normalizing trade relations, 
boiled down to a question of political will; it was a matter of political 
willingness to isolate Ideological differences from interstate relations 
and from trad.e in particular, 'as Patolichev indicated; and, it was a
1
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"Speech by Comrade A.I. Mikoyan," p. 59*
3
Ibid., p. 60.
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matter of political willingness to separate international disputes
from trade relations, as Mikoyan stated. The detection of an "unwillingness"
on the part of the United States, however, stemmed from a recognition of
the very real influence of very real ideological and political considerations
on trade relations. Yet, in pressing for the normalization of trade,
reversion to the concept of a lack of political will avoided rather than
faced the crucial question of the actual role of political factors in the
progressive development of economic relations. The attitude adopted
by the Soviets can only be regarded as a tacit refusal to come to grips
with the political exigencies of the international situation affecting
the development of East-West trade. Instead, the proposal was for, in
effect, a unilateral, surgical removal of these issues by the United States
and its western allies from their consideration of economic ties with the
socialist countries. The point is that political detente, of whatever
limited degree, was not proffered as the answer to the problem of poor
trade relations. The fruits of detente were sought without the negotiation
of detente. This position led to the kind of non sequitur in policy
statements that appeared in the January 1953 "Soviet Government Proposals
on Question of Reducing International Tension:"
Increased economic ^ ties among states would create favorable grounds for 
the establishment of genuine confidence among them, thus creating the 
necessary conditions for improving political relations. No one can 
deny the indisputable fact that the severance of normal economic ties 
between many countries is a product of the "cold war" and of the 
establishment of two opposing military groupings. It follows that it 
is impossible to speak seriously of liquidating the^^cold war" and 
reducing tension In International relations without eliminating the 
abnormal situation which has developed in international trade.1
At the bottom of this position lay the fact that despite ever present
1
"Soviet Government Proposals on Questions of Reducing International 
Tension," Pravda, 10 January 1953, pp. 3-4, as translated in CDSP 10, no. 2 
(19 January 1953): 23.
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declarations from both sides of willingness to make "reasonable" concessions,
there existed during this period a level of political accord insufficient
to support as a matter of course a radical programme of adjustements in
East-West trade relations such as that proposed from the Soviet side. As
a result, the Soviets extended the prospect of an Improved and stable
international political regime to the West within the conceptual framework
of peaceful coexistence as an incentive coupled with other incentives of
a commercial nature for reaching agreement on normal trade relations. Such
an agreement, it was postulated, would be the first step in the realization
of the promises of peaceful coexistence. Thus, it was In adopting this
policy--which we will call the trade strategy of peaceful coexistence--
that Khrushchev wrote in his 1959 article:
the policy of peaceful coexistence receives a firm foundation only with 
increase in extensive and absolutely unrestricted international trade... 
It can be said without fear of exaggeration that there is no good basis 
for improvement of relations between our countries other than 
development of international trade....Only on this basis can 
international life develop normally.1
This statement carried a twofold message. On the one hand, it gave
notice of the Soviets’ unwillingness to dissociate the question of economic
relations from that of improving political relations. As the authoritative
Tass statement of August 1959 concerning American reluctance to take
positive action to normalize East-West trade observed:
It is up to the United States to expand or not to expand trade with the 
Soviet Union....But lately the frequent utterances of United States 
statesmen in favor of improving relations with the Soviet Union and 
professing a desire to improve the international situation, statements 
that, needless to say, should only be welcomed, can in no way be 
reconciled with the latest State Department declaration against 
development of trade with the Soviet Union.2
1
Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," pp. 15-16 and 17.
2
"Words and Deeds of US State Department.--Tass Statement," Pravda, 
12 July 1959> p. 5; as translated in CDSP 11, no. 23 (12 August 1959): 30.
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But, on the other hand, Khrushchev was also restating the Soviet position
that the normalization of trade was not necessarily dependent on a prior
Improvement of interstate relations. Indeed, the main line of Soviet
argument taken during this period (and which still commands respect within
the USSR today, although its importance has been diminished with the
attenuation of East-West tensions) was that an important causal relation
existed between trade and peace in that order. Thus the question of
implementing measures to expand international trade ties was included as
a leading agenda item in the 1953 Soviet proposal for a conference of
heads of governments to consider the major issues of the cold war. In the
statement supporting its inclusion, trade was given specified significance
beyond its immediate commercial advantages: Pravda asserted that the
development of East-West trade
would also facilitate the development of broad exchanges and peaceful 
competition among countries in the realm of scientific ideas, 
technological progress and the organization of production processes. 
Increased economic ties among states would create favorable grounds 
for the establistmient of genuine confidence among them, thus creating 
the necessary conditions for improving political relations.1
This approach did not, however, ignore the more general influence 
of politics on trade, for it was based on the assumption that a necessary 
causal relation between subjective political attitudes and development 
of trade did in fact exist. It is evident in the Foreign Affairs article 
and elsewhere that lüarushchev believed that a desire to attain certain 
political goals could influence western trade policy with the East, and 
that Indeed the development of economic relations depended on a perception 
by western governments that their political interests vis-a-vis the 
socialist countries were tied to the status of East-West commercial relations.
1
"Soviet Government Proposals on Questions of Reducing International 
Tension," p. 23.
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In view of this, the Soviet position that trade promotes peace cannot be
simplistically interpreted as a profession of faith in the traditional
Marxist analytical concept in which the cliaracter of political relations
is said to be determined by the configuration of economic relationships.
Instead, it should be understood as a strategy for the promotion of trade
based on an evaluation of national interests. Thus the concept of trade
as the necessary basis for the development of stable political relations was
in actuality an assertion in an other-wise unpropitious political climate
that trade relations should be normalized as a syabol of intentions, of a
desire to form bebter political relations, "Trade," Karushchev stated in
his inimitable style,
is the litmus paper. It shows the state of relations between states.
It shows whether or not they want to live in peace. You do not want 
to trade with us. But why? This gives us pause and puts us on the 
alert. Evidently your intentions are bad. After all, I can't tell 
our people that you are for peace but do not want to have trade with 
us, even in lousy herring. If I did that the Soviet people would tell 
me that I was a simpleton and they obviously needed a new premier.
But I won't tell the Soviet people that.l
PART II: WESTERN RESPONSES
Unlike opinion in the Soviet bloc at the time, official opinion in 
the West about "whether," "why" and "how" trade might be normalized was 
not so nearly uniform. We need only to remember the tensions between the 
United States and its European partners over the strategic embargo to see 
this. Then, too, another factor which complicates analysis is that the 
process of trade policy formulation in the western countries. Involving the 
interplay of diverse viewpoints within each government and among influential
1
"For Mutually Profitable Trade on Basis of Equality and without 
Discrimination," Pravda and Izvestia, 27 September 1959; pp. 1-2, as 
translated in CDSP 11, no. 39 (28 October 1959): 10-12.
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sectors in the countries at large, are more accessible to the scrutiny of 
the researcher than is the case with the communist countries. Still, despite 
the problems of contrasting trade policies among the members of the western 
alliance, there was sufficient common ground to enable the western group of 
countries, through caucusing, to present a fairly close-knit posture on the 
issues of East-West trade in the United Nations, where they evidently 
preferred the advantages of a united front in dealing with the Soviet bloc 
to the risks of airing their differences in full view of the rest of the 
world. Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to indicate the broad 
dimensions of those attitudes and responses in the West to the problems of
East-West trade which were reflected, as we will see in subsequent chapters,
in the conflict of policies between the western and socialist countries in 
the United Nations’ economic forums.
A. To the Diplomatic Trade Strategy of Peaceful Coexistence
Before directing our attention to the differences in approach to 
the problems of improving trade relations, we might first consider the 
effectiveness in the West of the Soviet argument for normalizing trade as 
part of the broader policy proposal of peaceful coexistence.
The idea that trade should be normalized in the interest of peace
formed the mainspring of the position taken by the socialist delegations
in advancing trade-related proposals in the United Nations during the period
under consideration. This inducement was not new, as it had had before then
a long history on the Soviet diplomatic front. Yet, as Peter D.J. Wiles has
observed, even though the Soviets have always maintained that economic rela-
1
tions promote peace, they have never explained in detail why this is so.
1
Peter D.J. Wiles, "Trade and Peace," Studies in Comparative 
Communism, 2, nos.(July/October I969): 138. See also Chapter Eighteen
30
Instead, to all appearances, the truth of the proposition has been taken to 
].
be axiomatic. In the absence of a convincing explanation of why commerce
between countries would help them to get along peaceably together, it is
evident that this argument for trade is no more tlian a simple a priori
statement that, "We all know trade has these political ramifications,*
therefore let's normalize our trade relations and expand commerce." In
terms of Soviet trade policy with the West, it seems quite simply to be a
catch-all argument, plugged into the proposal for peaceful coexistence and
designed to appeal to whatever sympathies exist in the West for the general
proposition that trade makes for peace.
The Eoviets had good reason to believe that this concept might find
a responsive audience in the West, where it had been a part of the continuing
debate on the nature of international economics that had begun with the first
studies on political economy undertaken in the late eighteenth and early
2
nineteenth centures. In the mid-twentieth century, it was not unusual to
find influential western spokesmen also affirming its truth in pressing for
better economic relations with the East. For example, on February 25, 1954,
Prime Minister Winston Churchill informed Parliament of his government's
decision to seek a negotiated revision of the strategic embargo, prefacing
his announcement with the following;
There is one agency, at any rate, which everyone can see, through 
which helpful contacts and associations can be developed. The more 
trade there is through the Iron Curtain...the better still will be the
of the same title in his Communist International Economics (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, I969); PP* 524-57.
1
An excellent example is the way in which Klarushchev introduced the 
trade-related section of his Foreign Affairs article: "Ib readily seen
that the policy of peaceful coexistence receives a firm foundation only with 
increase in...international trade." "On Peaceful Coexistence," p. I5. Italics 
added.
2
See Wiles' article in Studies in Comparative Communism, pp. 104-109.
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chances of our living together in increasing comfort.
When there is so much prosperity for everybody round the corner and 
vitliln our reach, it cannot do anything but good to interchange 
merchandise and services on an increasing scale. ' The more the two 
great divisions of the world mingle in the healthy and fertile activities 
of commerce the greater is the counterpoise to purely military 
calculation. Other thoughts take up their place in the minds of men.l
Churchill went on, however, to show that this renewed interest in East-West
trade had followed the political lead:
I do not suggest that at the present time there should 'be any traffic 
in military equipment, including certain machine tools such as those 
capable only or mainly of making weapons and heavy weapons. But 
substantial relaxation of the regulations affecting manufactured goods, 
raw material, and shipping,--which, it must be remembered, were made 
three or four years ago in circumstances which we can all feel were 
different from those which now prevail--a substantial relaxation would 
undoubtedly be beneficial in its proper setting, bearing in mind the 
military and other arguments adduced.
Thus economic relations were to be extended to fill the vacuum created, by
improved political relations, while it was in turn hoped that these follow-up
measures would have a salutory. effect on the political climate. This was,
indeed, what happened, as Myrdal later pointed out witli reference to the
evolution of East-West trade in general.
Still, many of the core political problems existing between the two 
sides were left unaffected by all this and continued to act as a restraint 
on the further freeing of trade. Churchill had made it clear that there were 
serious political limitations on the extent to which trade might be
1
Hansard, Vol. 524, pp. 581 ff., as quoted in Adler-Karlsson, p. 91. 
It is of passing Interest that Khrushchev once similarly stated: "Good trade
always leads to an improvement in relations. It is also necessary for 
strengthening peace: He who is thinking about trade does not think about
war." "N.S. Kirushchev Interviewed by Correspondent of French Newspaper 
Le Figaro," Pravda .and Izvestia, 27 March 1958, pp. 1-2, as translated in 
CDSP 10, no. Ij (T May 1953) : 23. And again in I962, this time to American 
journalists : "It has been that way since ancient times: If states trade
with each other and seek to develop their trade, they don't fight each other 
but live in peace. 'T'rade and war are mutually exclusive." "Comrade N.S. 
Klirushchev' s Interview with a Group of American Journalists, July 13, I962," 
Pravda, l3 July I962, pp. 1-2, as translated in CDSP 1^ !, no. 29 (15 August
1962): 3.
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normalized in indicating what types of goods would not be exempted from
the control lists, "bearing in mind the military and other arguments adduced."
Such restraint in trade was in the final analysis unacceptable to the Soviets
1
in principle, as Klirushchev often pointed out to westerners.
Khrushchev based his argument for the necessity of normalizing
trade as a condition for coexistence on the contention that the alternative
prospects for the contemporary world were two only: either nuclear war or
2
peaceful coexistence. However, what the "peace" of peaceful coexistence 
meant was defined in 1957 by Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitry Shepilov as 
"a struggle--a political struggle, an economic struggle, an ideological
3
struggle." This peace, then, was not the antithesis of war: as one
western scholar evaluating the Soviet concept of coexistence concluded,
"If peace is therefore a struggle, it differs from war not by its objectives
4
but by the means used," In constructing his harsh dichotomy, Khrushchev 
failed to acknowledge the possibility that the leading western governments 
were committed, to another kind of peace, a third alternative as it were to 
the choice between nuclear war and an acceptance of the Soviet view of the 
world under a regime of peaceful coexistence. Western literature of the 
period, as well as the actual course of events, clearly showed that the 
shape of the peace which Khrushchev envisaged and for which trade was to be
1
See, for example, "For Mutually Profitable Trade," p. 12;*'N.S, 
Khrushchev Interview with Newspaper Chain Director W.R. Hearst," Pravda and 
Izvestia, 29 November 1957; pp. 1-2, as translated in CDSP 9, no. 46 
(25 December 1957): l4; and the statement to Eric Ridder quoted on p. 72 
supra.
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"On Peaceful Coexistence," p. 1.
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"Questions of International Situation and Foreign Policy of the 
Soviet Union.--Report by USSR Foreign Minister Shepilov," Pravda, 13 February 
1957; pp. 3-5; as translated in CDSP 9, no. 11 (24 April 1957); 5.
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Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet
Foreign Policy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959); P* 131.
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normalized did not reflect even an elemental consensus uith the West on the
structure of a desirable peace vjhich ould be expected to guide the actions
of the socialist and ivestern countries toward some form of agreed arrangement
1
on both political and economic matters. Despite wliatever inclinations 
existed in the West for supporting trade as a peace promoting agent, the 
widespread perception that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence was 
merely an updated version of the "cold war" meant that peace as defined 
in Moscow, could not be a convincing argument for trade, as western 
delegates in the United Nations often pointed out to their socialist 
colleagues.
B. To the Soviet Prescription for "Normalizing" Trade
Without referring to the question of a causal relation between trade
and peace, some western observers, who recognized the symbolic significance
of restrictive western policies, thought it practical that if a
re-examination of certain western, and particularly American, attitudes
toward trade with the Soviet Union "would have, in Soviet eyes, a significance
which would really be helpful in relaxing international tensions, then the
suggestion is one that should not be lightly dismissed," as George P. Kennan
2
concluded in his own reply in Foreign Affairs to Khrushchev's article.
However, even though Kennan thought that the West might take advantage of 
the Soviet position, he took exception to it, maintaining that "from the 
Western standpoint" one might suppose that "the virtues of increased
1 .
See Kulski’s study cited above; George F. Kennan, "Peaceful 
Coexistence. A Western View," Foreign A.ffairs 33, no. 2 (January I960) : 
I7I-I9O; and Philip E. Mosely, "The Meanings of Coexistence," Foreign Affairs 
Ul, no. 1 (October I962): 36-46.
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Kennan, p. 187.
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international trade would of necessity be confined to the direct benefits
1
such trade might bring to the economies of respective p a r t n e r s I t  was 
perhaps in anticipation of such criticism that the Soviet spokesmen also 
stated their case for normalized trade relations on the grounds of 
commercial advantage. Nonetheless, it was recognized in the West that any 
review of western trade policy would have to take into consideration the 
economic and political problems presented by the system and'practice of 
state trading in the socialist countries.
The problems most often identified in western discussions as 
imposing obstacles to extensive East-West trade relations, in addition to 
questions about the commodity composition of that trade, can be roughly 
divided into two categories for our purposes. Those comprising the first 
category have concerned the problems of adjustment between the Soviet system 
of foreign trade and that of the advanced industrial countries of the West, 
problems which would exist regardless of differences in political aims and 
Interests. In contrast to the arguments advanced by economists in the 
socialist countries that the depressed condition of East-West trade was the 
result of obstructive western trade policies, western economists tended to 
affirm that a far more important brake on the development of easier and 
expansive trade relations were those difficulties caused by the differences 
in trading systems, including the socialist countries' preference for 
bilateralism, and the problems thereby created with respect to the concepts 
of most-favored-nation treatment and reciprocity enshrined in western 
commercial policy. In discussions within the United Nations during this
1
Ibid., p. 135.
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period, the representatives of the leading western trading nations continued 
to concentrate, as had their counterparts during the drafting sessions of 
the Havana Charter before them, on the issue of developing an adequate legal 
framework--a commercial code--for trade between nominally free-enterprise and 
state trading countries. They were also inclined to stress the opinion 
that the low volume of trade had its origin in the devotion of the socialist 
countries to planning and their preoccupation with domestic'requirements 
without.similar regard for the development of exports.
The other category has consisted of those problems arising from the 
fact that differences in political objectives do exist, issues which have 
had particular importance in western policy-making because of the governmental 
monopoly of foreign trade in the socialist countries and the potential 
of that trade for use in the pursuit of political interests. Part of the 
problems in this grouping concern the difficulties caused by the with-holding 
of important economic data largely for political and security reasons and 
by the restrictions imposed on business relations for much the same 
reasons. The more controversial issues in this category, however, have been 
due to western uncertainty concerning the relative influence of commercial 
and political considerations in the foreign trade policies of the Soviet 
bloc countries, the USSR in particular. Much of the debate on this question 
has stemmed from disagreement about the way in which "political" factors 
should be defined and could be identified. During the period under 
consideration, some insisted simply, and slmplistically, that all foreign 
economic transactions were conducted by the Soviets with certain overriding
1
Berman, pp. 501-502.
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political aims of economic warfare in mind.^ Others disagreed, arguing
that efforts should he made to determine only those areas where political
motives were directly involved, when elementary economic logic could not
2
explain a particular trade policy. This more reasoned perspective did 
not, however, rest on the untenable proposition that Soviet trading 
activities which were explainable by economic considerations were wholly 
divorced from politics, for it was obvious that in many instances these 
transactions were modified by political considerations, such as in the
3
choice of trade partners.
Many western observers who warned against the possible political, 
as well as economic, dangers of developing "too close trade entanglements 
with the East" were, nevertheless, quick to counsel against overreaction 
to suspected unfriendly political motives in Soviet economic policy. Detect­
ing signs of greater appreciation on the part of Soviet planners of both 
the economic and constructive political advantages of trade, they pointed
to the immediate prospects for incrementally increasing East-West
4
commercial relations. Optimism was guarded, howeA^-er, because persistent 
autarkical undertones in Soviet trade overtures raised doubts about the 
bloc's dedication to the general principle of comparative advantage and
1
See, for example, Robert Loring Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare 
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the importance they attached to a more rational international division 
1
of labor.
In his New Orleans speech of January 1959, which was heavily 
criticized in the Soviet press, Under-Secretary of State Dillon reflected 
some of the above problems in a five-point programme which he outlined for 
the Soviet Union to follow if it were serious about expanding trade;
1. A settlement of outstanding Soviet ^Lend-Lease/ debts.
2. Permit greater access by American companies to producing and 
consuming units in the Soviet Union.
3. Making clear its intentions with respect to specific goods that it 
intends to buy and sell over a period of years.
4. Assurance to foreigners of genuine protection from private industrial 
property rights and authors' rights,
5. Firmer adherence to business principles, instead of turning trade 
off and on, 'as Soviet leaders so frequently do in the interest 
of political expendiency.'2
Despite his assertion that Soviet foreign economic policies "are geared to
its main goal of world domination," Dillon expressed his government's
readiness to increase co)nmercial exchanges with the USSR, disputing the
Soviet accusation that very few, unimportant goods were licensed for export
to the socialist countries and maintaining that "'the only thing the Soviet
Union needs to do if it really wishes to expand its trade with us is, quite
3
simply, to begin trading.'"
This viewpoint was in a sense the central issue in the East-West trade 
debate in the United Nations during these years. On the one hand, it 
concerned questions of fact; "Could the communist countries increase
1
For a discussion of "comparative advantage" versus "comparative 
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1
their trade with the West if they wished to? If not, what stops them?"
On the other, in seeking answers, it highlighted the differences in .
approach to the task of establishing the basis for expansive trade relations.
Western specialists, economists and negotiators alike, paid only passing
attention to the issue of artificial barriers, maintaining that the low
volume of trade had its causes in systemic and political factors antedating
the Second World War, but which had perhaps intensified in the postwar
2
years due to the low level of international confidence and trust.
Spokesmen for the socialist countries tended to dismiss the western
countries' concentration of the problems presented by differing trading
systems as "mere sophistry," as one U.N. delegate once put it. Instead
they persisted in the view that western trade controls formed the main
obstacle to trade and to the development of trust and confidence between the
two groups of states. As in the policy of coexistence generally, any
\
adjustments that had to be made were the sole responsibility of the West;
in particular, the question of improved trade depended entirely on whether
the western countries took steps to abolish discrimination in trade with
the Soviet bloc. For them, this was not a subject for negotiation, but
rather the question of western political will.
The perspective in which American policy-makers viewed this approach
was well illustrated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a news
conference held the same day as Dillon's address; in it he stated, and
it is worth quoting at length:
I have seen nothing so far which leads me to feel that there is a 
genuine desire to end the cold war. There is a very strong desire to
1
Cairncross, p. 259-
2
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delude us into thinking the pold war is ended. There are a series of 
proposals made ostensibly to help end the cold war which would, in fact, 
play greatly into the hands of the proponents, the prosecutors of the 
cold war.
Take this matter of trade. Mr. Mikoyan, on the last day here [of his 
recent visit to America/...,came in to see Under-Secretary Dillon.
He made certain requests, almost demands, of a very far-reaching 
character. They would eliminate all political controls over our trade 
with the Soviet Union so they could acquire strategic goods from us
of their own pick and choosing. We would give most-favored-nation
treatment to all their goods despite the fact that they operate under 
an entirely different system of economy....We would open in favor of 
them very large credits so that they could buy what they wanted here 
on a credit basis, and eliminate the provisions of the Johnson Act 
so as to permit them to continue in default upon their obligations to
us while still getting credits. Now tliat is what we were supposed to do.
Of course, on the other side they keep every particle of foreign trade 
absolutely under the strictest kind of political control. Nobody buys 
anything or sells anything in the way of foreign trade unless it is 
decided from a political standpoint that that is to the advantage of 
the Uoviet Union.
So we would be expected to renounce all political controls, to 
extend large credits and so forth, while they would keep their trade 
under the tightest kind of political control, j'^nd they have often 
said that from their standpoint they look upon trade as more 
important from a political standpoint than they do from the commercial 
standpoint.
Now I don't think that kind of a proposition is really designed to 
end the cold war. I can see that it would give the Soviet Union a very 
considerable advantage in prosecuting the cold war.1
Certainly not many western officials, particularly outside the
United States, would have taken so rigid a position or stood by his 
2
analysis. However, this passage does reflect the general indisposition 
sliared by other western governments to settling the trade issue according to
1
From the State Department's transcript of Secretary of State Dulles' 
news conference of 27 January 1959* The New York Times , 2-3 January 1959;
P* 6.
2
Indeed, later Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Anthony M. Solomon, reflecting in 19^7 on the earlier attitudes of the 
United States government, observed: "The Cold War has had a greater adverse 
impact on United States trade than that of other free world countries.... 
These /other/ countries have a greater incentive than we to seek trade where
90
the ground rules laid down by the So\âets. It is in this light that the 
work of the United Nations' economic bodies during this period takes on 
particular importance, for the socialist countries sought to take 
advantage of the peculiar opportunities afforded by the Organization's 
functional programme to press their campaign for major changes in the 
international trade field.
they can. They have not been inclined to let the political emotions of 
the Cold War interfere with trade, which is so vital to their well-being." 
Anthony M. Solomon, "The Revival of Trade between the 'Communist Bloc' 
and the West," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 372 (July Ï 967): I06. ' '
CHAPTER THREE
TOWARDS A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Perhaps the most straightforward example of the application of the
trade policy of peaceful coexistence in the United Nations during this
period was the attempt by the Soviet bloc to induce the membership to
agree upon a set of general principles to guide countries in their
economic relations. In the absence of a universal trade organization
within the framework of the United Nations to promote the development
of commercial contacts, the socialist countries tended to treat existing
United Nations economic bodies collectively as something of a substitute
1
trade organization. The position adopted by the Soviet bloc from the
mid-1950's was that not only had the United Nations failed to avail itself
of opportunities to promote trade relations but also had stood by as the
western states, under American direction, consolidated their policies
2
of economic restrictions and discrimination. Thus, a Pravda editorial 
of 1955 asserted that the shortcomings in the work of the United Nations 
until then had been due to the fact that a "number of states, primarily 
the United States, ha Am embarked on the path of violating the Charter's
1
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basic principles, rejecting the idea of the peaceful coexistence of 
1
states...." Asserting that states should make use of international
machinery to advance economic cooperation, the socialist countries
proposed that the United Nations should encourage the adoption of both
national and international measures for the removal of barriers to the
2
development of trade and economic relations. Specifically, it was 
argued that the "serious economic difficulties of the present'time 
could be eliminated only by the application of the principles of
3
peaceful coexistence." And, to this end, the socialist countries 
endeavored to keep before the Organization's economic forums the question 
of adopting a declaration embodying principles for economic cooperation 
which would, it was alleged, reflect these cardinal precepts.
This is an important point, for throughout discussions on economic 
matters Soviet bloc delegates maintained that there was no discrepancy 
between the principles embodied in the. Charter and those of peaceful 
coexistence. Thus, the same Pravda editorialist asserted that the "U.N. 
Charter is based on firm recognition of the principle of coexistence and 
peaceful cooperation between states with different economic and social
4
systems." At times it was rather more disingenuously stated that the
1
"Principles of U..N, Charter Are Immutable I " Pravda, 26 June 1955; 
p. 1, as translated in CDSP J, no. 26 (10 August 1955) : 1^ ^. Also see:
"On International Themes: Principles and Practice," Izvestia, 26 June 1957; 
p. 1, as translated in CDSP 9; no. 26 (7 August 19577: 18.
2
E.g., see: UN, General .Assembly, Second Committee, Official 
Records (llth Session), p. 275*
3
Ibid.
i|.
"Principles of U.N. Charter Are Immutable," p. l4.
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1
principles of coexistence themselves stemmed from the Charter. Accordingly,
the socialist countries could proclaim an identity of purpose underlying
the United Nations economic programme and the trade policy of peaceful
coexistence. In particular, socialist representatives supported their
proposals for economic cooperation on the basis of Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter, which they maintained defined a "duty to cooperate" encumbent
2
upon all member states. Therefore, whereas Stalin's strict -construction 
of the Charter as a treaty relationship had been used to restrain the 
Organization's functional activities, his successors sought to expand 
its work in the promotion of trade and economic cooperation through an 
equally strict interpretation of relevant provisions.
I. THE 1957 ROMANIAN DRAFT RESOLUriON
The initiative on a statement of economic-related principles met with 
sustained opposition from both western as well as many less developed 
countries until the early 1960's. In the interval, debate centered on a 
Romanian draft resolution proposing a declaration of certain specified 
principles that was submitted to the Second (Economic and Financial)
1
E.g., see: "N.S. Khrushchev Interviewed by I. McDonald,
Foreign Editor of the British Newspaper The Times," Pravda and Izvestia, 
16 February 1956, pp. 1-2, as translated in CDSP 10, no. 7 (23 March
1956): 17.
2
N. Sharygin, "Talks on International Economic Cooperation," 
International Affairs (Moscow) no. 11 (November 1957): 93.
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1
Committee of the General Assembly during its twelfth session in 1957*
As introduced by the Romanian delegate, the draft was "designed to
improve international economic cooperation and create an atmosphere
2
favorable to the solution of world economic problems." His Soviet 
colleague explained that such a declaration was needed because international 
trade
was not yet carried on under normal conditions such as would enable 
the countries of the world to conduct their trade in accordance 
with the principles of good will, equality and mutual benefit, 
and thus strengthen mutual confidence and peaceful relations 
between States. Trade was still being used as an instrument of 
political pressure, as a pawn in the game of politics.3
One of the basic criticisms directed by other delegations at the
proposals, accordingly, was that its list of principles, whatever their
outward appearance, reflected a selection of essentially political rather
than economic precepts, designed to treat problems of economic relations
4
solely on a political level. This was, as we have seen in Chapter Two,
1
UN Document a/c. 2/l. 330. The original text of the draft resolution 
is not available in published United Nations documents. However, the report 
of the Second Committee (UN Document, A/3740, p. lO) states that under this 
draft resolution, "the General Assembly would consider that international 
economic relations should be based upon; (l) mutual respect for the 
economic independence of each State; (2) complete respect for the sovereign 
right of each State to dispose of its natural wealth and resources; (3) the 
observance, in international economic relations, of equality, equivalent 
exchanges and mutual advantages; (4) the granting of economic aid and 
technical assistance to the under-developed countries, free of any conditions 
which might impair the economic and political independence of these countries; 
(5) the maintenance of exchanges of experience and of wide contacts in the 
economic, scientific and technical fields."
2
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(12th Session), p. 12.
3
Ibid., p. 36.
4
E.g. Ibid., p. 72 (Mexico). (Unless it is clear in the text, the 
country of the delegation to whose speech attention is drawn will hereafter 
be placed in parentheses after the reference to save time and confusion 
should the reader wish to check the source.)
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a correct perception of the Soviet bloc's approach, which rested on the
assumption that obstacles to normal trade relations were political in nature
and, therefore, subject to remedial political action alone. It was, however,
because of the inauspicious political climate for such action, that the
socialist countries turned to the idea of a declaration of principles "to
1
regulate international economic cooperation." By claiming to have derived
the principles proffered for incorporation from the Charter itself as well
as from statements of principle embodied in previous United Nations
resolutions, the socialist countries were in effect attempting to move the
2
western countries to the defensive. This was underscored by the Ukrainian
representative who asserted that "the acceptance of a declaration embodying
those principles would be a new and important step towards their
implementation and would contribute...to the eradication of discriminatory
policies, such as those pursued by the USA, despite its professed adherence
3
to the principles enunciated in the draft." In this respect, the position 
of the socialist states was that, as one Polish commentator later wrote, 
"recommendations that are formally promulgated by an organization are imbued 
with the organization's prestige, and thus attain a certain political and
4
moral significance from collective 'legitimization.It was apparently 
presumed that a declaration of general principles of the type proposed by 
Romania could be of significant advantage as a focal point for criticizing
1
Ibid., p. 127 (Romania).
2
E.g., Ibid., p. 72 (USSR).
3
Ibid., p. 77.
4
Wojciech Morawiecki, "Institutional and Political Conditions of 
Participation of Socialist States in International Organizations: A Polish 
View," International Organization 22 (Spring 1963): 499*
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western economic policies and mobilizing opinion in order to direct the 
practical work of the United Nations into channels promoting the policy 
objectives of the Soviet bloc members.
The most trenchant criticism of the Romanian draft resolution was 
directed at the basic conceptions underpinning the Soviet bloc’s trade 
strategy. In the debate on the proposal, the Mexican representative 
articulated the views of a number of other delegations in replying to the 
socialist countries. It was his opinion that the objectives of the United 
Nations in any area of interest could be realized "only if there was
1
concordance of opinions and a reconciling of the interests" of all members.
In effect, a declaration of principles could not promote harmony where it
did not already exist. Exactly the reverse could be the result, he affirmed,
for if "a declaration of economic principles were hastily drawn up by a
single delegation the effect would simply be to provoke an interminable
2
discussion which would sow the seeds of discord...." As another delegate
put it, the concern was that a partisan declaration would take on "a
3
tendentious character unacceptable to the other delegations."
The fact that the principles mentioned in the draft were drawn from 
previous United Nations sources was not held to be sufficient justification 
for codifying them for the purpose expressed by the socialist countries.
The Mexican delegation insisted that a proper course of action would be 
first to establish whether the principles referred to in earlier formal 
recommendations represented "permanent rather than the merely transitory
X
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(l2th Session), p. 71.
2
Ibid., p. 72.
3
Ibid., p. 127 (Panama).
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interests of the Member States." To this end, a preliminary study of all
the economic activities of the United Nations should be conducted "to
determine whether there were areas of agreement that reflected common 
1
principles."
This pragmatic test of the real value of economic principles was also
often referred to in western responses to Soviet proposals for codifying
2
the cardinal principles of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the Mexican 
representative reflected another common criticism of the Soviet appeal to 
general principles in iTiaintaining that the principles recommended in the 
Romanian draft, while not in themselves unacceptable, were in need of 
clearer and more precise definition to be of any practical significance.
There was also some question among western delegations as to the candor of 
assertions by socialist spokesmen that their governments had historically 
supported in practice the principles they were now advocating.
While a number of countries expressed interest in the general idea 
of a declaration of principles, the leading western trading nations affirmed 
that only an extensive code of commercial relations could be an effective 
instrument for the development of trade cooperation. Although this 
reflected a fundamental difference in approach to the issue of expanding 
economic relations, it was employed at this time as an argument against 
diverting the Organization's work away from allegedly more productive, 
practical activities. The American delegation pointed out that the 
negotiations culminating in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
had been exceedingly arduous; and in that case principles had been
1
Ibid., pp. 71-72.
2
See: McWhinney, "Peaceful Coexistence," p. 9^2.
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formulated in a particular context with regard to a particular purpose. 
Hence, "to draw up a declaration of principles concerning all the aspects 
of economic relations among all countries...would he an even longer and
1
more difficult task.,./perhaps/ without producing any appreciable results."
Yet any further formulation or more detailed interpretation of general
principles short of that would, it was said, "limit the flexibility of
the economic bodies of the United Nations" and would "predetermine the
2
course of their future development,"
Accordingly, the main criticism of the Romanian proposal advanced by
western and several developing countries alike centered on the contention
that disagreements on international economic issues were more properly
handled through detailed and extensive negotiations amorgthe concerned
3
parties than by a general statement of principles. These countries tended 
to respond to Soviet bloc exhortations for such a declaration with the 
assertion that insofar as general principles were at all relevant to the 
Organization’s work in the economic field, it was sufficient to respect 
those principles as already stated in diffuse United Nations' documents.
It was most important to focus on specific issues with an "essentially 
low-level, empirically-based approach" to problem-solving, and with any 
further elaboration of general principles "to be derived only inductively 
from these actual cases and their concrete resolution," as Edward McUhinney 
advised in reference to how the West should respond to the basic approach of
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(12th Session), p. 72 (USt).
2
Opinion included in UN Document E/3396, para. 9 (e), 
"Principles of International Economic Cooperation: Report by the 
Secretary-General."
3
Ibid., para. 9 (f).
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peaceful coexistence. As one delegate put it, it was this devotion to
problem-solving on a practical work-a-day basis that would yeild the mutual
understanding and agreement which were the prerequisites for progress in
2
interstate economic cooperation. Responding to this criticism, the 
socialist countries took the position, expressed by the Bulgarian representa­
tive, that "the restatement of basic principles... could only serve to
3
facilitate and expedite the examination of specific problems-."
In view of the opposition which his draft resolution had encountered,
the Romanian delegate eventually withdrew it and became a cosponsor of a
Mexican proposal calling upon the Secretary-General to collect and
collate information concerning principles of economic cooperation from
past resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
4
Council. Even though this assured that the question of a statement of 
principles would be raised again, the failure of the Romanian proposal 
represented an important set-back for the approach to economic and trade 
matters embodied in the policy of peaceful coexistence.
The compendium requested under the joint resolution was transmitted 
to member states in August, 1956. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was 
instructed by the General Assembly to solicit the views of governments 
on the desirability of formulating in the light of the compendium a 
"statement of the economic objectives of the United Nations and of the
1
See: Edward McV/hinney, "Changing International Law Method 
and Objectives in the Era of the Soviet-Western Detente," American Journal 
of International Law 59 (January I965): 2.
2
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(12 th Session), p. 'jk (Brazil).
3
Ibid. (Bulgaria).
i|-
UN Document A/c. 2/L. 337; which was subsequently adopted as 
General Assembly Resolution 1157 (XII); 26 November 1957.
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means of international cooperation that might serve to attain those 
1
objectives," In June, I96O, the Secretary-General submitted to the
2
Economic and Social Council at its request an analytical and comparative
3
summary of all replies sent to him by governments on the question.
II. THE i960 SOVIET DRAFT DECLARATION
A concerted effort along the lines of the 1957 Romanian draft
resolution was made again in the fall of I96O when the USSR submitted a
"Draft Declaration on International Economic Cooperation" at the fifteenth
4
session of the General Assembly. The text of the draft was divided 
between provisions relating to economic cooperation and a set of basic 
rules governing assistance to the less developed countries. The first 
section, which is of immediate interest to our study, listed various 
general principles as well as certain measures for their implementation:
The States Members of the United Nations which have signed this 
Declaration, starting from the premise that war as a means of settling 
international political, economic and other problems must be banished 
from the life of nations, declare their determination to join their 
efforts in seeking ways and means of ensuring the peaceful coexistence 
of States with different social systems in conformity with the United 
Nations Charter.
The States signatories to the Declaration, being agreed that peaceful 
coexistence and peaceful competition presuppose a general expansion 
of economic, cultural and other ties among various countries irrespective 
of their social systems and that economic co-operation among nations in 
turn creates a good basis for improving political relations among States 
and consolidating peace and mutual trust.
Jointly declare that:
24.
1
General Assembly Resolution 1321 C (XIIl), 12 December 1958*
2
ECOSOC Resolution 727 B (XXVIIl), 27 July 1959.
3
UN Document E/3396, 6 June I960, referred to above, Fnn. 23 and
4
UN Document A/c . 2/L. 466.
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1. The interests of economic and social progress in the world 
require the strengthening and development of economic relations 
among States irrespective of differences in their social and economic 
systems;
2. Economic competition among countries with different social 
systems should not lead to the economic isolation of some countries 
or to economic warfare;
3. Economic and trade relations among countries should he founded 
on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and non-interference 
in internal affairs;
4. Countries should adhere to the principle of the most-favoured­
nation treatment in their mutual trade relations;
5* Barriers and artificial discriminatory restrictions in 
international trade should be gradually removed with a view to 
creating the most favourable conditions for the exchanges of goods 
and services among nations;
6. The formation of sub-regional economic organizations and 
alignments should not prejudice the interests of third countries.
In his elaboration of this proposal, the Soviet representative made
it clear that is was, as the text indicated, full-scale attempt to fuse
the policy of peaceful coexistence, as elucidated by Khrushchev, with the
objectives of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter in order to
utilize the Organization’s functional programme for promoting East-West
trade and economic relations in an unfavorable political climate. He stated
at the time, as reported in the summary record:
The recent deterioration in political and economic relations had 
underlined the urgent need for the adoption of such a declaration 
by the United Nations, which, since it was required under the Charter 
to promote economic and social cooperation, could hardly ignore the 
policy of economic discrimination, restriction and embargo practiced 
by some Members against others. A solemn undertaking by Member States 
to abide strictly by certain standards in international economic 
intercourse would help to normalize economic relations, promote economic 
cooperation and eliminate mistrust and unfair competition between States. 
It would also enable the United Nations to settle certain disputes and 
to counter unilateral actions that were at variance with the provisions 
of the Charter.1
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(15th Session), p. I78.
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In this respect, the initial paragraphs of the draft declaration are of
particular significance. Alluding to these, the representative of the
Soviet Union stated concisely the supposed direct link between the
objectives of the United Nations and of peaceful coexistence: "The
signatory States would solemnly declare, first and foremost, that in
accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter they were
determined to unite their efforts to ensure the peaceful nature of the
coexistence and economic competition of States with different social 
1
systems." This encapsulation of the Soviet approach to economic cooperation
through the United Nations was elaborated extensively during the sessions
of the Economic and Social Council from 1961 through I963, to which the
General Assembly had in I96O transferred consideration of the Soviet 
. 2 
proposal.
According to Soviet spokesmen, the draft declaration differed 
significantly from earlier United Nation’s resolutions embodying economic 
principles, in that the present draft was designed to establish a charter of 
principles, open to signatories and closely following the form of such 
instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Children. One Soviet bloc representative described the 
difference between a "declaration" of this sort and a "resolution" as 
follows: "Although formulated in more general terms, the declaration
would be a solemn undertaking which, together with more specific resolutions
1
Ibid., p. 11.
2
An especially lucid presentation of the question of codifying 
principles in the context of the central concepts of coexistence and 
competition is to be found in V.G. Solodovnikov’s address on behalf of the 
Soviet delegation in ECOSOC in April, I963: UN, ECOSOC , Official Records 
(35th Session), pp. 77-73.
103
on the subject, could serve as a guide for the development of international
1
economic relations." As a formal declaration, then, the statement of
principles would accordingly establish a set of "rules of conduct" in economic 
2
affairs; and the Soviet delegation even went so far as to speak, of its
.proposal in terms of a "codification of legal principles," creating the
3
foundation for the development of international economic cooperation.
The principles slated for inclusion in the declaration, moreover, were 
not intended to be entirely a restatement of the Charter's principles or of 
those promulgated in previous United Nations resolutions as had been the 
express intent of the 1957 Romanian draft resolution. Because certain 
conditions in international economic relations had occured since the 
adoption of the Charter, such as the rise to prominence of the socialist 
group of states and the emergence of the less developed countries with 
their particular economic problems, it was asserted that not all of these
h
principles were still suitable. Accordingly, the stated purpose of the 
declaration was to expand these principles and adapt them to present economic 
realities; as one representative put it, the declaration would provide the 
"authentic interpretation of the general principles embodied in the Charter."
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(15th Session), p. 186 (Hungary).
2
It was so described by the Polish delegation during the continuing 
debate on the question in 1962, as recorded in: UN, ECOSOC, Official Records 
(33rd Session), p. 32.
3
Ibid., p. 93* For other similar descriptions, see: UN, ECOSOC,
Official Records (35th Session), pp. 77-73 (USSR).
E.g.. UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records
(15th Session), p. 183 (Romania); UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (31st Session),
p. 23 (USSR); UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 73 (USSR).
5
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (31st Session), p. 23 (Poland).
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In addition, it would also incorporate, as the Soviet delegate stated, "a
number of new and completely original provisions which the United Nations
1
had not yet proclaimed." Although a distinction was not specifically
made, it appears that he had the clauses referring to the less developed
countries in mind.
Essentially this meant that alleged so-called "objective"
requirements of current economic relations rather than the actual state of
those relations were to be the guide to the formulation of principles. This
attitude toward the task was made apparent in a speech by one spokesman from
the Soviet bloc: "The draft declaration," he asserted, "required...a critical
appraisal of the state of present-day international economic relations and
recommended that international economic cooperation should be based on
principles that for some might require a departure from the economic policies
and practices they had followed for generations." This, he added, "was
essential if full meaning was to be given to the United Nations Charter and
if the United Nations was really to be an instrument for bringing the
2
nations closer together," In further maintaining that the Council should 
"concern itself with the existing conflict in world economic relations," the 
speaker again underlined the position that the principles of the declaration 
should be prescriptive, rather than merely descriptive of the norms found 
in the actual conduct of international economic intercourse. In the most 
revealing though perhaps unintentional comment on his government's approach 
to the resolution of the economic problems, the Soviet representative 
stated in answer to a critic that it was not communism "but good will that
1
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 93*
2
Ibid., p. 82 (Poland).
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the Soviet Union was trying to impose as the basis for cooperation in trade 
1
relations."
Whereas a preponderance of the less developed countries looked with
favor upon the general idea of this new Soviet initiative, western delegations
tended to oppose or criticize it on the same grounds, mutatis mutandis,
2
as they had the Romanian draft. The arguments advanced by these delegations, 
therefore, clustered around two basic contentions: (a) there was no clear 
case for restating a selection of general principles of international 
cooperation, particularly in the form of a declaration; and (b) in lieu 
of an adequate commercial code applicable to commercial relations between 
states having different trading systems, it would be difficult if not 
impossible to draft a text of principles of precise meaning acceptable to 
all countries. Moreover, it was asserted that the couching of the draft 
declaration in terms of peaceful coexistence and competition vitiated the 
avowed constructive intent of the proposal.
During the years of debate over the draft declaration, the French 
delegation proved to be the most ardent opponent of the use of the terms 
peaceful coexistence and competition by the socialist countries in 
advancing proposals for the development of economic cooperation, French 
spokesmen described the socialists’ concept of peaceful coexistence as a
3
hostile doctrine. Possibly most objectionable was the initial statement 
in the Soviet draft declaration that "peaceful coexistence and competition 
among States presupposes a general expansion and development of cooperation
1
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (31st Session), p. 31» Italics added.
2
See: UN Document E/3396.
3
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (31st Session), p. 27; and,
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 33,
io6
in the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields among
1
different countries, irrespective of their social systems." For, whereas
one French delegate observed that peaceful cooperation in an agreeable sense
was to be found in Article 1 (3) of the Charter, he maintained that the
"introduction of a new principle /"peaceful competition// emphasizing the
differences between the political and social systems of various countries
2
might appreciably reduce the area of international cooperation." By 
injecting the ideas of peaceful coexistence into the proposed declaration,
the Soviet Union was said to have expressed the Charter objective of
3
economic cooperation in a "new and unwonted form." As the American 
representative summed it up, this Soviet formulation re-emphasized the fact
that the Soviet Union had a different conception of the nature of economic
l i -
problems from that which prevailed in the West.
On a directly related topic, the western countries, as well as many
less developed countries, simply flatly disputed the accuracy of the second
preambular paragraph which held that economic cooperation among nations
"in turn creates a good basis for improving political relations among states
5
and consolidating peace and mutual trust." The development of trade
6
relations, they observed, had not always produced these results. Several 
delegations also rejected this concept insofar as it implied, in context.
1
UN Document E/3467. This contains the text of the updated Soviet 
Draft Declaration submitted 3 April 1961.
2
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 83*
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., p. 97-
UN Document E/3^67.
6
E.g., UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 'jh (USA).
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that the development of economic cooperation was not dependent on the
1
prior settlement of political differences.
It was similarly argued as before with reference to the Romanian
proposal that international economic cooperation did not depend on general
principles so much as on intentions. Commenting on the stated purpose of
the declaration to alter trading practices to conform with the asserted
imperatives of peaceful coexistence and the United Nations Chhrter, one
western delegate affirmed:
Article 1 (3) of the Charter referred to the efforts Member States were 
required to make in order to solve international problems of an economic 
character through international cooperation, but it left them free to 
meet those requirements unilaterally, through their national policies, 
or collectively, through their participation in the organizations 
concerned with economic cooperation. The most important factors were
the spirit displayed by each Member State and a common concept of
cooperation.2
Tied to this, moreover, was the Vest's insistence on reaching agreement 
on a code of commercial practice as the prerequisite to the development 
of economic relations and to the formulations oi* a set of general principles;
for if such a declaration of principles were not based on such a code,
it was asserted, the misunderstandings it would likely create could very
3
well defeat its own ends..
Accordingly, in the absence of a universally acceptable code, the 
western delegations as well as many among the less developed countries 
continued to express a predilection for the negotiation and gradual
1
E.g., UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 23 (Italy).
2
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 79 (France). 
Article 1 lists the "purposes of the United Nations; and paragraph 3 
states that one of these is: "To achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic... character...."
3
E.g., UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 33
(France).
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1
resolution of economic problems on a subject-by-subject basis. . In the 
end, hoyever, the western countries, faced yith a growing interest among 
the less developed countries in defining the position of the United Nations 
on international economic matters, agreed in I962 to participate in the 
drafting of a resolution, but not a declaration, setting forth principles
of economic cooperation, "provided that it was constructive and fair to
P
all States," as the American delegate observed. Consequently, the
Council established a working group of twelve members to consider the question
3
of a declaration and to formulate a mutally acceptable text. The ad hoc
group reported to the thirty-fifth session of the Council in I963 that
it had arrived at agreement on a few of the principles under consideration
h
but had also experienced substantial difficulty on a number of others.
At that session, however, the work of the group became the subject of a 
dispute over its relationship to the then forthcoming United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which was eventually convened 
in the spring of 196 1^-. The Soviet delegate in the Council cited 
Khrushchev’s contention to the effect that the Conference "would be a forum 
where principles of trade could be established." During the discussion 
concerning UNCTAD in the General Assembly in the fall of I963, the Soviet 
representative accordingly declared that it was his government's belief 
that the ad hoc group had "paved the way for discussion of the matter at
1
See UN Document e/339^^ para. 9 (i).
P
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (33rd Session), p. 7)4.
3
ECOSOC Resolution 3?5 (XXXIIl), lO April I96P.
)|-
UN Document E/3725.
5
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (35th Session), p. 77.
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UNCTAD, at which it should he possible to reach final agreement on all
1
principles of the declaration." Thus he concluded that the working
group should expedite its deliberations so that it could contribute to
the work of the Conference. A number of western delegations, however,
took a different position, maintaining that further elaboration of
principles should await the results of UNCTAD; moreover, they alleged that
the Soviet position was an attempt to prejudge the outcome of' the
Conference and could, if accepted, prove a serious hinderance to its 
2
work. These viewpoints remained unreconciled, although the Economic
and Social Council resolved to draw the attention of the Preparatory
3
Committee for UNCTAD to the work of the a_d hoc working group. The 
results of the Conference in this area will be examined in Chapter Six.
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(iSth Session), pp. 353-5^.
2
See the debate within the ad hoc Working Group summarized in 
its report of 25 February I963, UN Document E/3725.
3
ECOSOC Resolution 939, (XXXV), 11 April I963.
CHAPTER FOUR 
TOWARDS GLOBAL MACHINERY FOR TRADE COOPERATION
As the socialist countries came to take an increasingly active 
interest in the work of the United Nations in the economic field, it is 
not suprising that they insisted on certain changes being made, since 
the work programme developed in preceding years had been shaped largely 
without the participation of the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union’s concern 
with the removal of artificial obstacles to the development of East-West 
trade led it from the outset of the post-Stalinist period to seek 
resolutions on the elimination of trade discrimination and to press for 
consideration of new institutional machinery for the promotion of 
international trade. Short of that, it sought to make the existing economic 
forums of the Organization the locus of international discussions on trade 
matters.
An idea of the multiformity of this diplomatic offensive can be 
gathered from the major policy address delivered by the Soviet representative 
in the Assembly’s Second Committee in 1957* In addition to giving full 
support to the Romanian draft resolution on a statement of principles of 
International economic cooperation (see Chapter Three), Mr. Arkadev expressed 
his government's interest in arranging consultations within the Organization 
among economic experts to ascertain the possibility of expanding economic 
cooperation. Moreover, he emphasized the need to convene an international
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economic conference and suggested that a second conference should he called
to consider the problems of economic development in the Third World, in
addition to upgrading the work of the United Nations in this area. He drew
attention also to the desirability of adopting resolutions on the
normalization of trade relations and gave his delegation’s support to a
current Czechoslovakian proposal for developing regional and inter-regional
economic cooperation. His most important remarks, from an institutional
standpoint, centered on the necessity of establishing a universal trade
1
organization within the United. Nations system. Although at that session 
of the General Assembly the socialist delegations did not incorporate all 
of these positions in specific draft resolutions, it was clear that a 
definite move had been made to take the initiative in trade and other 
economic matters away from the West and to solicit the support of the less 
developed countries in this endeavor.
I. THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCES
The idea of holding an international conference on economic problems
was first advanced by the USSR in the United Nations during ECOSOC's
2
eighteenth session in August 1Q5^. While the proposal specified a 
"world conference of government experts" for the purpose of formulating
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(l2th Session), pp. 36-33.
2
UN Document E/AC. 6/l. 61^ i . Although one of the two formal 
decisions reached during the 1952 Moscow Economic Conference had been to 
ask the United Nations to convene an intergovernmental conference on world 
trade, no specific recommendation to this effect was submitted in the 
Organization. The vote at the Conference may have been simply a move to 
stave off criticism that the Moscow meeting was designed to pre-empt the 
United Nations.in the trade field. In support of this conclusion, see: 
A.K. Cairncross, "The Moscow Economic Conference," Soviet Studies h 
(October 1952): 115-16.
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recommendations for expansion of trade, other suggestions from the socialist
countries in subsequent years proposed conferences or "consultations"
of non-government economists either in conjunction with or as an alternative
to a conference of government-level personnel. The scope of discussion
topics for these meetings also varied, ranging from strictly trade to
1
scientific, technical and other economic matters. Nevertheless, none of 
these proposals ever received majority support in either the General 
Assembly or the ECOSOC. They were either withdrawn in the face of resolute 
opposition or amended in such a way as to keep the question before the 
United Nations.
Among these varied suggestions, the question of holding a major world
economic conference drew the most attention. In support of this long-standing
proposal, the socialist countries argued that the existing work of the
United Nations on economic matters was "fragmentary" and, as one Polish
delegate stated, "did not include general measures for solving world
2
economic problems as a whole." A specially convened conference, they
maintained, could better undertake an inclusive study of the various problems
requiring solution. Thus, responding to western criticism that a single
conference would be ineffective, Soviet bloc delegates asserted that it
would "be able to lay down a general scheme of coordination" as well as
3
the "general lines of future International action." Accordingly, rather 
than following an extensive agenda in a short space of time, the conference
1
See, for example, UN Documents A/C. 2/L. 2^7; A/C. 2/L. 232; 
A/c. 2/L. 319; E/AC. 6/L. 139; E/AC. 6/L. 195; A/c. 2/L. 332; and 
E/AC. 6/L. 217.
2
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(llth Session), p. 270.
3
Ibid.; also see Ibid., p. 203 (Poland).
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would merely seek to draw "general conclusions from the existing economic
situation" and report on them to the United Nations, Speaking to this
point, the Soviet representative in the Assembly’s Second Committee in 1957
put the socialist countries’ interest in clear perspective;
At the proposed...conference, participating States would deal with 
a whole range of problems....They would, in particular, examine 
existing measures of discrimination. The latter were weapons 
used in the cold war and their abolition would do much to insure 
the peaceful coexistence of States with differing social systems 
and to strengthen international confidence. Only an international 
conference could deal with those complex problems and pave the 
way for their solution.l
As in the case of the proposed statement of principles of economic 
cooperation, this approach led many western delegations to charge that the 
socialist countries were intent on exacerbating political tensions. At the 
bottom of this reply lay the differences of opinion over the nature of the 
obstacles to the development of East-West trade. Western spokesmen who 
addressed the issue of western controls on trade with the Soviet bloc 
readily acknowledged the political character of these restrictions. However, 
they insisted that the policy affected only a small and diminishing number 
of those items which had entered into East-West trade before it was imposed. 
But they also persisted in attributing the controls to a lack of 
international confidence. Accordingly, they warned that a conference devoted 
solely to this matter not only would neglect the more important, systemic 
problems of East-West trade, but also would fail in its narrower objective 
if the issue of controls were discussed without first improving the 
political climate in which they had been adopted. The response of the ■ 
socialist countries was, equally predictably, that the solution of economic 
problems would hasten détente, and that progress could and should be made in 
the economic field first.
1
Ibid., p. 270 (UBSH).
llU
II, THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION
The main line of western opposition to the Soviet bloc's policy
offensive centered on the Soviet-led campaign for the creation of an
international trade organization. This issue was the focal point of the
socialist countries' efforts toward institutional reform. Because the
question was often linked with that of a trade conference, whose task it
would be, in part, to review institutional arrangements, most western and
a number of Third World delegations tended to subsume their evaluation of
the conference proposals within broader responses to the issue of a
1
comprehensive United Nations trade organization.
During the twentieth session of the Economic and Social Council in
1955, the Soviet representative startled delegates with a draft resolution
calling upon the Council to encourage member states to ratify the Havana
Charter of the International Trade Organization, and to request the
Secretary-General "to take appropriate steps for calling the first regular
2
session of that Organization." Anticipating the surprise generated by this
volte face, he stated:
It might be wondered why the Soviet Union had not attended the 
Havana Conference. The reason was that at that time the Soviet 
Union Government had considered that the aims of the Havana 
Charter could best be achieved through bilateral relations .
Since then, the conditions for international trade had radically 
changed and it had become plain that international machinery was 
required to restore it to a healthy condition.3
The following year, however, the Soviets dropped all references to the
1
See, for example, UN Document A/35^  ^5, P* 1; and UN, General 
Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records (l2th Session), p. 79 
(Bulgaria).
2
UN Document e/L. 678,
3
Ibid.
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Charter and proposed Instead the formation of an aU hoc committee "to work
out proposals for setting up an international organization for trade 
1
cooperation," It thus seems likely, in retrospect, that the support given
the Havana scheme in 1955 may be explained by its timing.
The initial Soviet proposal came at a time when the leading western
trading nations were undertaking measures to improve upon the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, In light of the fact that the General
Agreement had been originally intended as a temporary expedient until the
ratification of the Havana Charter, it was recognized soon after the collapse
of the ITO project that in order for GATT to discharge its functions in
promoting freer trade, steps whould have to be taken to strengthen its
2
position in the international trading system. Delegations from the
Contracting Parties met at Geneva in 195^ 1- and agreed upon.a major revision
of GATT's terms, with a view to*its acceptance as a permanent agreement. A
separate instrument for the creation of an international Organization for
Trade Cooperation (OTC) was prepared to serve as the institutional and
3
administrative foundation for the revised GATT. Article II (6) of the 
OTC Agreement provided that the organization could be brought into 
relationship with the United Nations as one of the specialized agencies 
referred to in Article 57 of the United Nations Charter. The review of GATT 
was completed in March, 1955, and the two enabling instruments were submitted 
to the Contracting Parties for ratification.
The lengthy negotiations on the OTC proposal and the revision of the 
General Agreement coincided with the first concerted moves by the Soviet-led
1
UN Document e /L. 73*
2
See Condliffe, p. 501.
3
See: George Bronz, "An International Trade Organization: The
Second Attempt," Harvard Law Review 69 (January 1956) :  ^1-40-82.
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bloc in the United Nations to turn the attention of the Organization to the 
promotion of East-West trade. The fact that the following year the Soviets 
withdrew their support for the Charter may be taken as an indication that 
the decision to promote the idea of a United Nations trade organization--and 
hence the Havana Charter--had been taken suddenly in response to the 
developments in GATT. Why they chose initially to support the Havana Charter 
in opposition to the OTC Agreement remains a matter for speculation. The 
one thing that is certain is that the Soviet draft resolution recommending 
ratification did not reflect an actual commitment to the Havana design. 
However, we should note right away that once the proposal had been made, the 
question of establishing a new trade institution remained high among the 
priorities of Soviet trade policy in the U.N. until the mid-lQôO's. It is 
also important that in subsequent discussions in the United Nations the 
Soviets made clear that their main Interest in such an organization was 
its potential for normalizing and expanding East-West trade. With this in 
mind, it does not seem unreasonable to conjecture that Soviet policy makers 
were ready in principle in 1955 to support a new institutional project, but 
had not defined a position on the subject. Perhaps they believed that the 
failure of the original postwar ITO project had effectively sealed for some 
time to come the issue of international machinery for trade cooperation. 
Conceivably, they had not anticipated the outcome of the 195^-55 GATT 
neogitations, particularly the decision to put GATT on an organizational 
footing. Even if they had followed the debates surrounding the review 
and revision of the General Agreement, it is quite possible that they were 
surprised by the apparent success of the American Administration in securing 
an agreement on insitutional matters which went a long way towards placating 
Congressional opposition while preserving a great deal of the structure 
embodied in the Havana Charter and meeting most of the demands of the other
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Contracting Parties. In any respect, the successful conclusion of the
Geneva discussions confronted Soviet policy with the prospect of a more
formidable western-dominated commercial "club" than was the case with the
existing GATT arrangements. Ratification of the OTC Agreement would make
any efforts to transform the United Nations into a vital factor in
international trade immeasurably more difficult; and a strengthened,
institutionalized GATT would be a strong magnet for attracting those countries
which had previously hesitated in accepting the General Agreement, It was,
in fact, in response to a campaign launched in the United Nations by the
leading western trading countries promoting International acceptance of the
revised Agreement and the proposed OTC as the central organization in the
trade field that the Soviets proposed resurrecting the Havana Charter.
By the opening session of the General Assembly in 1955, early
ratification of the OTC Agreement must have seemed likely, if not certain.
Faced with a virtual fait accompli, the socialist countries' first response
was to reject the OTC plan (for reasons to be considered shortly) and to
argue that the United Nations should not entertain draft resolutions
encouraging ratification of the GATT agreements. Positive action on any
such resolution, they warned, would set a "dangerous precedent" of
sanctioning the affairs of organizations outside the purview of the United
1
Nations and in alleged conflict with the principles of the U.N. Charter. 
However, they obviously understood that such parliamentary maneuvers would 
have little effect unless they were backed by a substantial counter-proposal. 
Viewed in the context of this urgent situation, the réintroduction of the 
issue of the Havana Charter may be seen as a stopgap measure until such time
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records
(12th Session), p. 112 (USSR).
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as a more satisfactory plan could be formulated. That the Charter itself was
a dead letter was of little direct Importance. Rather, by raising the issue
again it was perhaps thought possible to stir up interest in the general
idea of a broader approach to world trade problems than that embodied in
GATT, while at the same time lending support to those countries which were
critical of or not fully satisfied with the new GATT arrangements. Possibly
the Soviets felt that by coming out in support of the Charter', which they
had originally shunned, they could demonstrate unequivocally their changed
position on trade cooperation, especially in view of the close kinship
between the new Geneva agreements and the earlier Havana scheme* Despite
these important similarities, however, there were also important differences.
By contrasting GATT with the Charter, the Soviets were able to emphasize
those differences which they mintained were deficiencies in the GATT
1
system (such as its estrangement from the United Nations and its allegedly 
restricted membership and domination by the West), while also pointing out 
clearly how far the leading western countries had backed down from their 
own original conceptions of what was needed for the realization of the 
economic objectives of the United Nations Charter.
Dramatic as it was, the Soviet move failed to achieve any concrete 
results. Yet the real significance of the Soviet draft resolution was 
that it represented a determined, unmistakable attempt to reverse the trend 
toward the exclusion of the socialist countries from intergovernmental 
programmes for the development of trade. Students of U.N. history have since 
treated it as a watershed in the evolution of the Organization's economic 
activities, marking the 1955 resolution as the starting point of all
1
Publicly, the socialist countries doubted that the OTC would be 
brought within the United Nations system as a specialized agency as provided 
for in Article II of the OTC Agreement.
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subsequent efforts to recapture for the United Nations the authority in 
economic affairs which had been intended for it in the U.N. Charter, but 
which it had lost (or in time would lose) to other institutions and groupings.
By 1956, the OTC plan was already experiencing some of the difficulties 
that would eventually lead to its retraction, as the result of changing 
western attitudes that had little enough to do with Soviet policy. But the 
socialist countries had gained a respite, and time to pursue an altogether 
different kind of international trade organization.
Even though the issue remained before the United Nations for almost
a decade, it was not until the 1964 Geneva Conference on Trade and Development
that the socialist countries offered any detailed description of what they
believed the insitutional and functional design of a new international
trade organization should be. The circumstances in which this later design 
1
was put forward caution against interpreting Soviet bloc policy over 
preceding years in its light. Because of this, and in view of the fact that 
the lack of specificity in the earlier institutional proposals played an 
important role in their reception in the United Nations, we will' examine 
the relevant developments in the Soviet position only in the order in which 
they occurred.
Once the proposal for ratification of the Havana Charter had outlived 
its usefulness, the socialist countries sought only a broad commitment from 
the membership on the need for international trade machinery within the 
framework of the United Nations. They contended that concrete proposals 
could be left for consideration at a specially convened conference to study, 
inter alia, the question of new machinery and, perhaps, to undertake
1
See Chapter Six.
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1
preparatory negotiations for the creation of a trade organization. Initially
2
it was suggested that a world economic conference could consider the matter; 
when this proposal met with strong opposition, a conference of experts having
3
many of the same responsibilities was suggested as an alternative. Sceptical 
of both, a number of western delegations maintained that if the socialist 
countries had any "constructive proposals" to offer, they should be 
presented within the regular meetings of the United Nations' economic organs; 
the ECOSOC, they argued, should consider calling a special conference only
■ 4
when specific proposals of merit had been submitted to it. In the absence
of agreement on this point, discussion focused on the preliminary question
of the adequacy of the existing framework of international machinery for
trade cooperation. Particular attention was given, to GATT and the proposed
OTC in recognition not only of the topical interest in the planned reform of
GATT, but also of the fact that the over-all record of the United Nations
system in the field of trade could not be evaluated without giving
consideration to the accomplishments of GATT, which, while remaining outside
the system, had been designed to contribute to the objectives of the United 
5
Nations Charter.
The key issue in discussions of the suitability of the OTC was the 
membership requirement of adherence to the General Agreement. Article II of 
OTC Agreement stipulated;
1
E.g., UN General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(12th Session), p. 107 (Hungary).
2
UN Document A/C. 2/1. 232.
3
E.g., UN Document A/C. 2/1. 332.
4
E.g., UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(llth Session), pp. 281-82 (New Zealand).
5
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121
The Members of the Organization shall be the Contracting Parties 
to the General Agreement. Governments which become or cease to 
be Contracting Parties to the General Agreement shall become or cease 
to be Members of the Organization. The Organization may, by a 
two-thirds majority of the votes cast, invite governments which are 
not or which cease to be Contracting Parties to the General 
Agreement to participate in such activities of the Organization 
and on such terms as it shall decide; provided that in no case 
shall such participation involve the right to vote or to be counted 
in determining the fulfilment of the relevant voting requirements 
when the Organization is exercising any function relating directly 
to the General Agreement.
The socialist countries, on the other hand, declared that any adequate trade
organization would have to be as universal as possible, have no restrictive
1
admission conditions, and assure equal participation for all members. As
one delegate asserted, the practical question of whether a new organization
should be created or existing institutions further developed "should be
subservient to the principle involved, namely, the character of the 
2
organization." In reply, the French representative summed up the West's
position in stating:
Principles such as that of universality were not the prerogative of
any one group; they were common ground* Two attitudes to those
principles were conceivable: one favoring sweeping measures, the
other anxious to promote slow but sure progress.3
Thus, while professing interest in increasing commercial relations with the
Soviet bloc, the western countries avowed that their differences were not
of goals, but of methods. Although on the surface the debate was over the
membership requirements set forth in the OTC Agreement, this in turn focused
attention of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade itself and highlighted
the basic differences of approach between the two groups of countries to the
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(I2th Session), p. Ill (Bulgaria).
2
Ibid., p. 107 (Hungary).
3
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"normalization" of their trade relations.
The representatives of the more important western trading countries
argued their side of the institutional controversy from the basic position
that the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international
organizations (specifically GATT and the proposed OTC) provided an adequate
framework for the discussion of all problems relating to trade. It was
their opinion that, as one delegate put it, "What was lacking'was not
organizations, but willingness on the part of the States which participated
1
in them to take effective action." The best way of achieving the Charter's
goals was, therefore, held to be by working within existing institutions,
intensifying and coordinating their activities, and not by creating
additional, superfluous machinery that would weaken these bodies and burden
the United Nations’ resources. As the United States delegate remarked in
the Assembly's Second Committee in 1957, this opinion "in no way signified a
belief that everything was for the best in the best of all possible worlds."
It meant, rather, that "the persistence of problems did not necessarily mean
2
that such machinery was ineffective or should be supplemented."
Making a case for the OTC, the western countries attributed GATT's 
proven effectiveness in lowering the obstacles to trade among its members 
to the fact that all member states, with the extenuating exception of 
Czechoslovakia, subscribed in principle "to the trading practices inherent
in a free world market," observed GATT's commercial code and were obliged to
3
adopt certain measures at the national level. It was for this reason that
1
Ibid., p. 232 (USA).
2
Ibid., p. 233.
3
Ibid., p. 107 (Australia); and UN, General Assembly, 
Second Committee, Official Records (l4th Session), p. 273 (USA).
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the General Agreement would remain the basis of the new trade organization
which had been planned by its Contracting Parties, but which would be open
to all states willing to conduct their trade in a manner compatible with
GATT. On the other hand, in considering the very broadly defined
characteristics of the kind of trade organization proposed by the socialist
countries, proponents of the OTC project pointed out that the Soviet bloc
delegates had spoken only of the general principles of international trade
which they thought should govern the work of such an organization and had
made no reference to any contractual obligations that its members should 
1
assume. The principles to which they referred were in fact the same trade 
related principles which during this period the socialist countries were 
proposing in the General Assembly for codification in a statement on the 
normative bases for economic cooperation. And since these principles were 
intended to bring pressure to bear on what the socialist countries 
determined to be politically motivated western trade controls, it appears 
that what they had in mind in advocating a world trade organization was an 
international forum in which to carry on a sustained dialogue for attaining 
an essentially political solution to trade problems. Consequently, western 
delegates tended to argue that it would be unrealistic to discard the fruit 
of GATT's years of patient efforts for something entirely new and less 
likely to be effective.
The Soviet bloc's position on unconditional membership was criticized 
as being unreasonable, since it was not unusual for a specialized organization, 
such as the OTC in the trade field, to set precise rules of entry, as had 
several of the United Nations specialized agencies. The socialist countries.
1
See, for instance, UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, 
Official Records (l3th Session), p. 222 (Ukrainian, SSR).
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however, contended that the OTC would he inherently discriminatory towards
countries having a state-trading system, for the rules governing ascession to
the General Agreement itself were unsatisfactory and unacceptable to them.
Full membership in the OTC would, they concluded, in reality be restricted
to countries oriented toward a particular trading system and, therefore,
"could not serve the interests of the world economy or help to solve
1
outstanding...economic problems." Furthermore, they rejected out of hand 
the provisions in Article II providing for participation in the OTC by 
countries which were not contracting parties to the General Agreement. In 
addition to the principle open access, their position reflected concern 
with institutional safeguards as well as, perhaps, the matter of prestige 
connected with the issue of equality of membership.
Time and again western spokesmen denied with generalized assurances 
that the OTC Agreement had been formulated with an express intention of 
excluding any country or group of countries. In more candid moments, 
however, some delegates did agree with their socialist colleagues that the 
requirements for membership in effect made it unlikely that state-trading 
countries could under existing conditions become full members of the OTC.
The main barrier was seen to be the conflict of trade philosophies and 
trading practices. Consequently it was maintained that GATT would be 
weakened by the admission of the major trading states of the Soviet bloc as 
full members. Western delegates repeatedly affirmed their governments* 
commitment to the replacement of bilateral commercial arrangements--the 
practice of the socialist countries— with multilateral arrangements such as 
those provided for in GATT and held that even bilateral agreements which did
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(llth Session), p. 277 (Ukrainian, SSR).
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not require a strict balancing of trade were clearly discriminatory, and
therefore undesirable. Moreover, they argued that the countries of the
Soviet bloc subjected their foreign trade to special procedures which
severely limited them in either multilaterally or bilaterally mitigating
many obstacles to improvement of trade with extra-bloc countries. Any new
trade organization, they asserted, would be of very little practical
utility in effecting significant change in commercial relations as long
as those differences persisted unreconciled by a workable commercial code.
Thus it was stated that GATT and the OTC "could not be rapidly replaced by
other machinery which would impose no obligations on members and would permit
all types of countries to participate easily and automatically," as the
1
socialist countries demanded. Yet some of the more outspoken delegates
expressed the conviction that although their countries were interested in
finding a solution to the problem, the prospects for such a solution were
not good. The difficulties encountered in drawing up the state trading
provisions of the Havana Charter were often referred to as a case in point.
As a result, a number of western delegations took a fairly rigid stance on
how a reconciliation could be achieved, placing responsibility for this
state of affairs solely on the trading practices of the socialist countries.
The United States, in particular, endorsed the position that because
the nature of the economic structures of [the socialis;^GOuntries 
required them to engage in centrally-directed trade, it was to be 
hoped that a modification of those structures would enable those 
countries to participate in international trade in a true world 
market. On the other hand, the establishment of a new organization 
would not in any way accelerate that development.2
1
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This idea of structural adjustment was in direct contrast to the 
Soviet approach to the problems of East-West trade. It contravened 
Khrushchev’s basic contention that the development of interstate relations 
under peaceful coexistence required recognition by the West of the existence 
of two contrasting economic and social systems in the contemporary world. 
This led one Soviet bloc delegate to observe;
The statement had been m d e  that a single world trade Organization 
was impossible because of the different trading systems of the two 
world blocs. It was true that the trading systems of the socialist 
countries had created a dilemma for the capitalist countries, but 
that dilemma could not be resolved by ignoring it. The Western 
countries must therefore make an effort to readjust their thinking 
on the matter, and to recognize that the organization of trade in 
the socialist countries was an internal matter not subject to outside 
interference, just as the socialist States took into account, in 
their dealings with Western countries, the effects of the capitalist 
system and the unpredictable market fluctuations to which it gave rise. 
It was unrealistic to expect the socialist countries to clrange a 
trading system which ensured them a degree of stability that could 
hardly be obtained under other systems.1
And, finally, the statement by the American delegate contrasted with the
socialist countries’ assertion that their growing economic strength would
eventually allow them to participate in multilateral trading arrangements
if international institutions providing for equality of all participants
were first established. It was on these two points that the debate on
2
Institutional machinery deadlocked.
The rigidity of the western position on the problems arising from 
differing trading systems as they affected institutional questions seems 
attributable in large measure to the continuing strains in East-West relations 
during the latter half of the 1950’s. This is, of course a matter of
Ibid., pp. 276-77 (Czechoslovakia). 
Ibid., p. 276.
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interpretation. The degree to which political affairs might influence the 
task of reconciling Soviet-type trading practices with those of the 
industrialized West through an effective commercial code of principles and 
procedures had been a subject of considerable academic and practical 
interest at the time of the postwar try at the United Nations Trade 
Organization. V/hat was written about it then provides a useful perspective 
from which to view the debate of subsequent years, which was (as the western 
delegates showed) essentially a continuation of the earlier discussions but 
which received almost no wider public exposure at the time.
The western contention in the later debates that there were 
exceptionally tough problems involved in finding exact verbal formulations 
which would guarantee the principles of most-favored-nation treatment and 
reciprocity in East-West trade can hardly be disputed. Looking for 
historical perspective, we might once again refer to William Diebold's 1952 
monograph On the end of the ITO. At the time, Diebold objected to the then 
current tendency to overemphasize the world political crisis as the central 
challenge to international trade policy. He asserted that, independent of 
issues of rearmament and cold war, the basic problem still persisted of 
whether the liberal trade principles embodied in the Havana Charter could 
be applied in the contemporary world: "Although political tension had
increased the economic difficulties of many countries and has made some 
postwar adjustments more difficult than they would have been in a less 
threatening world, cold war cannot be considered the primary cause of some 
major difficulties that plagued the drafters and negotiators of the Charter
1
and that would have continued to plague the ITO if it had been established." 
As an important example of wliat he had in mind, Diebold singled out the
1
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difficulties encountered in formulating the Charter* s state-trading provisions.
However, some observers during that earlier period maintained that 
given improved political circumstances, the problems of formulating 
principles and procedures applicable to trade between the differing systems 
would have been less difficult. For instance, Calvin B. Hoover wrote in
1946:
At the moment not much progress is being made in working' out a 
solution of this problem as it applies directly to international 
economic relations between Russia and the Western Powers, not 
because of the inherent technical difficulties but largely 
because of existing international political tension....Once 
the problems of international politics are in course of solution 
such problems of technique are not likely to offer insuperable 
barriers to expanding world trade.1
The above quotation actually enfolds two optimistic assessments. On the one
hand. Hoover apparently believed that the systemic problems need not be
considered inherently insolvable. On the other hand, he indicated that
however difficult those problems might prove to be, they might well lose
much of their importance as obstacles to Fast-West trade under better
political conditions. It is indeed interesting that the following year
Herbert Feis, a former advisor on international economic affairs in the United
States Department of State and then recent Special Advisor to the Secretary
of War, expressed the political requisites for an adaptable approach in
concluding an article for Foreign Affairs with the following suggestive
(though questionably official) offer: "...if, and this is the decisive
if— the USSR will make it possible to believe that its trade policies are not
directed to secure political domination or social revolution, we will not
2
frustrate compromise by inflexible economic conceptions." This brings to
1
Hoover, pp. 224-25 and 226-2?.
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mind Alexandr Gershchenkron’s argument, also advanced in 194?, for the 
practical value of the Havana ITO in influencing Soviet trade practices 
through the organization's work-a-day activities. The reader might recall 
■that Gershchenkron agreed that the state-trading provisions of the Charter 
were on paper less than ideal. Yet he proposed that the continuous act 
of conducting trade relations through the medium of the ITO in a spirit of 
cooperation would alter the significance of those provisions from that of 
providing the only available formulation of contractually binding restraints 
on inimical Soviet trade practices ^  that of providing positive guidelines 
for the general conduct of Soviet trade with nonstate-trading countries in 
confoimiity with the objectives of the Charter. The potential merit of the 
argument rested accordingly on the order of Soviet priorities— the essentially 
political decision of whether it wished to enter the ITO and benefit from it-- 
and not on the capacity of the state-trading provisions, as they existed or 
might be altered, to provide an intellectually satisfying and comprehensive 
legal code.
Soviet indifference to the ITO, the eventual lapsing of the Havana 
Charter and the intensification of the political and economic cold war 
disposed of all such expectations for reaching a pragmatic settlement of the 
systemic obstacles to full and easy participation by the socialist states in 
international arrangements for the promotion of trade with nonstate-trading 
countries. At the same time, the economic conceptions embodied in the 
Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade assumed most noticeably 
in U.N. debates a particular doctrinarism in the worsening political climate 
that might have been avoidable under other circumstances. Even with the 
moderation in the cold war towards the mid-1950's and the increased interest
1
See Chapter One, section II.
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especially in western Europe in Soviet bloc trade, subsequent Soviet-led 
efforts to revive support for an international trade organization were met 
with insistent counter-arguments emphasizing the primacy of the very real 
difficulties in drawing up a comprehensive code for commercial relations, 
but difficulties which by and large owed their prominence and, to a degree, 
intractability to a low level of international political confidence.
III. THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS
During the twenty-eighth session of the Economic and Social Council
in 1959 the socialist countries varied their position on the issue of a
global trade organization. During the annual discussion of the general
economic situation the Soviet delegation advocated the establishment of
four regional trade organizations, one each for Europe, Asia, Africa and
Latin America. The Soviet representative drew attention to the recent
proposal submitted by the USSR in the Economic CoiTanission for Europe
earlier tliat year regarding the creation of an all-European trade
organization. (At the time a final decision on it had been postponed pending
1
further study in accordance with ECE Resolution I (XIV). ) In explaining
this new concept, he suggested that the functions of the proposed regional
trade organizations would be to
promote trade within their respective regions, explore the possibilities 
of expanding trade between regions, give advice on trade policy, provide 
for settlements between members and so forth. They could promote the 
development of economic cooperation and international division of labor... 
and could also facilitate the conclusion of long-term trade agreements... .2
1
5 May 1959» For a summary of discussion on the proposal, see: 
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (23th Session), Supplement No. 3, "Economic 
Commission for Europe: Annual Report," p. 2?. (Hereafter "Economic 
Commission for Europe: Annual Report" will be referred to as the "ECE: 
Annual Report" in all such notations.)
2
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He made it clear, however, that the basic institutional objective had not
changed, contending that the "establisTnment of regional trade organizations
would pave the way for the subsequent creation of a world trade 
1
organization." The proposal was later submitted to the Second Committee 
of the General Assembly in a draft resolution offered by Bulgaria, Czecho­
slovakia and Poland. In addition to proposing that the Assembly support the 
creation of the four regional organizations, the resolution also called
upon the member countries to declare themselves in favor of a "single
2
universal" trade body.
Prom their comments during debate on the three-Power proposal, it is
apparent that in adopting this new approach the socialist countries were
influenced by two extenuating developments. The first was the progress as
well as the problems of western European economic Integration (see Chapter
Five on the Economic Commission for Europe). The other was the evidence by
1959 that the attempt to establish the OTC would not succeed, due largely
to apprehension on the part of the United States Congress. The decision by
the socialist countries to promote a more incremental plan for an
international trade organization may have been as much an attempt to take
cautious advantage of this situation as it was a response to their own
earlier failures in proposing institutional innovation of a unitary global
conception. The operative word here is "cautious," for while the OTC
project had demonstrated dissatisfaction among leading western trading
3
countries with existing institutional arrangements, its denouement
1
Ibid.
2
UN Document A/C. 2/l . 429»
3
For example, see the French delegate’s discussion of GATT
and the OTC in: UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records
(llth Session), p. 259»
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had also revealed a certain hesitancy regarding a more permanent structure.
It is, therefore, significant that in introducing the proposal in the
Second Committee the Polish delegate declared that, "As they did not want
to put forward ready-made solutions, the sponsors of the draft resolution
had steered clear of any dogmatic approach to the problem of the establishment
1
of an international trade organization." Noting the failure of the OTC,
he further observed:
by adopting the draft resolution, the Committee would not be 
commiting itself to one kind of organization rather than another 
but would merely be giving its approval, in principle, to the 
extension of international cooperation in the field of trade 
through an organization which would act within the framework of 
the United Nations and whose structures, functions and powers 
had still to be determined.2
After the collapse of the OTC, the western states remained steadfast in
their opposition to a broader trade organization outside the scope of
GATT and continued, with renewed vigor, to defend GATT as the most suitable
forum in which the greatest practicable number of countries could promote
their mutual commercial relations.
Whereas in their earlier declarations concerning new trade machinery
a future role for GATT had been in doubt, the socialist countries now
demonstrated a new sensitivity to the support given GATT by a large
number of member countries of the United Nations. For example, one
Czechoslovakian spokesman emphasized that the sponsors of the draft resolution
"considered that in expressing approval of a single world trade organization,
the General Assembly would in no way be prejudicing the existence of GATT,
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(l4th Session), p. 259*
2
Ibid,
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■^Jhich might veil remain in existence independently or become a part of
1
the ne^  ^organization." In characterizing the type of organization
envisioned, the Soviet delegation i/?ent as far as to suggest that a general
trade organization vould be valuable to GA.TT in light of western European
integration, stating that:
...GATT had lost some of its importance through the establishment 
of regional groups [in context, to be read "sub-regional"group^Z 
which...divided the world into several markets. The establishment of 
an international trade organization would be one way to reconcile the 
activities of GATT with those of the regional groups. The central 
organization would seek out the best ways in which to cooperate in 
developing international trade and removing trade barriers. It would 
be able to coordinate the activities of the existing organizations of 
more limited scope, including GATT and regional bodies....It would 
have to be a permanent body, whose functions would be to advise and 
take action with a view to intensifying cooperation in...international 
trade.2
From the western viewpoint, however, such arguments as this did not change 
their perception of the objectives behind the Soviet bloc's institutional 
proposals. And it should be stressed that it was at this time that the 
major western countries were most adament about the impossibility of
3
creating an effective trade organization encompassing all trading systems.
The milder treatment accorded to GATT has an additional explanation 
which is to be found in the changing policies of the Soviet bloc countries. 
Already in 1957 the Polish government had approached GATT seeking a formal 
arrangement for cooperation between Poland and the Contracting Parties other
1
Ibid., p . 276.
2
Ibid., p. 271.
3
It is also worth noting that the Soviet and Czechoslovakian 
delegations made reference to Khrushchev's article in Foreign Affairs, 
which was published while the Assembly was in session, and presented their 
proposals for increased East-West trade in precisely the same terms of the 
policy of peaceful coexistence which the Soviet Premier had used. It was 
in reference to this context that western delegates criticized the Soviet 
bloc's emphasis on western trade controls and on the concept of peaceful 
competition.
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than full membership, since Poland had no tariff structure with which to
negotiate entrance as prescribed in the General Agreement. "The result of
this approach," as related by one close student of GATT, "was tliat Poland
sent an accredited observer to the meeting in November-December the same
year, and at the end of the meeting the Polish observer expressed his belief
that GATT provided a most useful forum for discussions and his hope that
Poland in the future would be able to cooperate in such a way as to make
a useful contribution towards strengthening the principles of the General 
1
Agreement." In 1959 Poland submitted a formal application for accession.
And at the spring session of GATT, the Polish Minister of Foreign Trade
declared that his government would be receptive to some other form of
closer cooperation on a provisional basis if full participation in GATT
P
were not possible. That fall an agreement was reached on a declaration 
providing for consultations between Poland and the Contracting Parties with 
a view to expanding trade "on the basis of mutual advantage in trading 
conditions and opportunities." This followed the rejection of a Polish 
proposal suggesting substituting the negotiation of global quotas on 
traditional imports for tariff concessions in fulfillment of the conditions 
for full membership. Though the declaration did not provide for most-favored- 
nation treatment, it did give Poland the right to participate in the work 
of GATT, It is also noteworthy that in 1953 Hungary, too, had applied for 
observer status, but withdrew its application after meeting with politically 
motivated opposition from certain Contracting Parties.
1
Karin Kqck, International Trade Policy and the GATT 19^7-1967, 
Stockholm Economic Studies, New Series XI (Stockholm: Almqyist and Wiksell, 
19^9), P* 193. (Hereafter referred to as The GATT.)
2
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These Indications of a more independent policy on the part of the 
East European countries contrasted with the relentless hostility of the 
Soviet government toward GATT. Still, the socialist delegations were able 
to reach a common stand on institutional questions in the United Nations.
It is not, after all, unreasonable that Poland and Hungary should take the 
pragmatic decision to seek some form of association with GATT (not to mention 
Czechoslovakia's continued participation in GATT) while also working through 
the United Nations toward the establishment of an international trade 
organization which would have been more to their liking. However, when 
it became certain that GATT would not soon be replaced by new global trade 
machinery of the socialist design, the ideal had to give up some ground.
The regional approach adopted in 1959, with its emphasis on European trade 
cooperation, and the more moderate statements regarding GATT reflected in 
part the growing concern of the USSR and its East European partners with the 
Common Market and the need for taking immediate steps to counteract it.
The creation of the European Economic Community had first led Poland in 1957
(and later Hungary) to seek the advantages of participation in GATT. In 
lieu of an effective U.N, trade organization through which they might take 
care of their interests vis-à-vis the Common Market, the East European countries 
looked with increasing interest upon the possibilities of improving their 
trade relationships with the Common Market countries through GATT. When 
compared with the Soviet attitude, this demonstrated the greater importance 
of the west European market for these countries than for the USSR. This is
not of course to say that the Soviets were not also exercised by the
developments in western Europe, though they were not convinced that their 
interests would be served by changing their policy towards GATT. The result 
of these differing policy approaches and the resolute western support of 
GATT was the proposal for an all-European trade organization which, as it
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was articulated in various U.N. forums, provided for the continued purposeful 
existence of GATT while at the same time providing for a regional European 
institution which would be more closely attuned to Soviet policy and 
agreeable to the bloc as a whole. It is also important (as we will see 
more fully in the next chapter) that the regional approach, conceived as 
it was around the creation of four temporary regional trade organizations, 
was at bottom simply a refinement of previous Soviet bloc prcfposals on 
institutional changes, enabling the socialist countries to stick to their 
common position on matters of principle while postponing further action on 
a universal trade organization to a more propitious occasion.
IV, A "NEW EFFORT"
In the fall of I96O, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland again
co-sponsored a draft resolution on the subject of the "strengthening and
1
development of the world economy," This time, however, reference to the
immediate creation of an international trade organization of any sort was
omitted; and the Polish delegate professed that the purpose of the draft
was "to make a new effort to set the basic problem of the development of
2
international trade in Its correct perspective." In explaining this
"hew effort" he stated that, "As it had proved impossible to set up the
world trade organization...it was the duty of the United Nations to do all
3
it could to study the problems of international trade on a world basis.';'
Thus, with the failure of five years' of effort directed toward major 
institutional changes in the trade field, the socialist countries began
1
UN Document A/c . 2/L. 4V1.
2
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records
(15th Session), p. 257* Italics added.
3
Ibid.
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in i960 to concentrate their attention on upgrading the work of existing
United Nations economic bodies in an attempt to transform these bodies into
a 6^ facto trade organization.
It should be pointed out, however, that this was considered only a
temporary expedient, for they stressed that a world trade organization would
"ultimately" have to be established "if the United Nations was not to ignore
1
the onward march of history," as the Bulgarian delegation affirmed. A 
point of further interest is the fact that in now prescribing a general 
work programme for the United Nations, the Soviet bloc countries emphasized
the same kind of decentralized approach which they had taken the previous
2
year in proposing regional trade organizations. Thus, one delegate
declared that the United Nations
should in particular organize trade cooperation at the regional 
level, in order to lay the groundwork for economic cooperation on 
a world scale. The regional economic commissions should take 
steps without delay to promote the expansion of international 
trade. That was the objective of the draft resolution.3
Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, accordingly, proposed that
the Economic Commission for Europe step up its activities directed toward
improving East-West trade, while the following paragraph expressed the
opinion that the other regional economic commissions should be given the task
of studying the problems of the less developed countries. In the ensuing
discussion of the draft, however, the socialist countries attached
1
Ibid., p. 253
2
The Soviet delegate, Mr. Chernyshev, emphasized that the three-Power 
draft proposal "was extremely important and represented a logical 
continuation of the work in the field of international trade undertaken by 
the General Assembly at its fourteenth session," i.e. a continuation of 
the concepts of the earlier institutional proposal. Ibid., p. 26 .^
Italics added.
3
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preponderant Importance to the work of the ECE. The draft in an amended
1
form became Assembly resolution 1519 (XV),
1
15 December I960.
CHAPTER FIVE
SOVIET B.LOC POLICIES IN THE ECONOMIC COMISSION FOR EUROPE
I. RENEWING PARTICIPATION
The three-Power draft resolution In the General Assembly referred to 
at the end of the previous chapter reflected a quickening of Soviet bloc 
efforts within the Economic Commission for Europe in the early 1960's to 
promote economic cooperation at all levels of the ECE's activities.
Before this, Soviet trade policy had progressed through three distinct 
periods following the USSR's first tentative moves toward reopening trade 
discussions in the ECE just prior to Stalin's death. The first covered 
the years of adjustment of Soviet policy to full participation by 1956; 
it culminated with the submission of a draft "All-European Agreement on 
Economic Cooperation," which was the focal point of the following period, 
while policy during the third period centered on the Soviet proposal for 
an All-European Regional Trade Organization introduced at the ECE's 
fourteenth session in the spring of 1959»
The determination of the ECE Secretariat to retain the all-European 
character of the Commission while exerting a subtle influence on the course 
of East-West economic relations during the bitterest years of the cold war ■ 
eventually led to a series of trade consultations under the good offices 
of the Executive-Secretary in 1953 and 195^  ^which were a significant 
contribution to the re-establishment of bilateral trade negotiations between
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the East European and industrialized countries of the West, The business-like
atmosphere in which the technique of simultaneous bilateral negotiations
employed in these meetings took place and the general satisfaction of all
participants led to the Incorporation of trade consultations as a regular
1
feature of the Commission's yearly operations. But most importantly,
the successful conclusion of the first round in the fall of 1953 marked
the beginning of the new era of active Soviet participation ih the economic
programmes of the United Nations and its subsidiary organs.
The scope of the Commission's activities was further expanded from
195 1^- with the gradually increased participation of the socialist countries
in the work of the ECE's several technical committees which were in part
concerned with trade in various economic sectors. By 1957 proposals had
been submitted for extending the activities of the specialized committees,
particularly relating to exchanges of information and technical experts
among member countries. Moreover, a steady increase in statistical and
other information supplied by Soviet bloc governments facilitated and
2
improved the Commission's operations. However, whereas socialist 
representatives displayed a spirit of constructive cooperation in the annual 
trade consultations and in the Commission's technical committees, they 
continued for a number of years to fill the ECE's plenary sessions with 
persistent, though unproductive, attacks on the western system of trade 
controls.
The Committee on the Development of Trade was revived in 195^ -^  at the 
request of the Soviet Union. And at the ECE's ninth session the Soviet 
delegation proposed that the work of the Committee should be concentrated
1
See Jacobson, p. 197*
2
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on the following subjects:
(a) the removal of obstacles to foreign trade;
(b) the conslusion of long-term and multilateral trade and payments 
agreements;
(c) the convening of meetings of experts on trade questions;
(d) the arranging of meetings of representatives of business circles;
(e) the publication of a special bulletin on foreign trade questions;
(f) the organization of international trade fairs.1
Although the Soviet Union used this suggested agenda as a vehicle for a 
vigorous denunciation of western trade policy, the western countries were 
sufficiently interested in the proposal to agree to a convocation of the
2
Trade Committee, while insisting, however, on a modified work programme.
Since then, the Committee has met regularly on an annual basis.
By 1956 the Soviet stance in the ECE’s plenary meetings had taken
on a new character, evident in a pronounced moderation of the tactics of
confrontation. With this the transformation of Soviet bloc policy to full
participation in the Commission was completed. The pattern of participation
finally, settled upon appears to have been based on a more realistic
assessment of the opportunities afforded by ECE membership, while it was
designed to extract the maximum advantage from them for constructing an
effective campaign against restrictive western export and import policies.
As it developed in subsequent years, this strategy became increasingly
concerned with exerting an influence on western Europe's progressing
economic integration by taking advantage of the problems (real or
3
fabricated) attending this process.
1
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II. THE DRAFT ALL-EUROPEAN AGREEMNT ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION
A series of proposals advanced by the USSR during the eleventh
session of the Commission in the spring of 1956 were indicative of the new
approach. The Soviet delegate offered three draft resolutions concerning
the drafting of an "All-European Agreement on Economic Cooperation," the
development of economic contacts between the countries of eastern and
western Europe, and the establ is liment of an ECE subsidiary organ dealing with
1
the economic aspects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In separate 
resolutions, the Commission members deferred action on the recommendations 
to the twelfth session, calling upon governments to submit their observations 
to the Executive-Secretary as the basis for further discussion. In 
particular, the resolution concerning the All-European Agreement noted the
readiness of the Soviet government to submit supplementary and more definite
3
information about its proposal. In accordance with that resolution the 
USSR submitted a Draft All-European Agreement on Economic Cooperation, which 
was then distributed by the Executive-Secretary in July, 1956, among member 
countries for their comments.
The Explanatory Note which accompanied the Draft Agreement observed 
that it "reflects the viewpoint of the Soviet Government on the possible 
scale and nature of all-European cooperation...and on the basic principles
1
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (22nd Session), Supplement No. 3, 
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1
of such cooperation." The preamble to the operative text of the Draft 
was an exemplary statement of the Soviet approach to economic problems 
within the United Nations framework, and it illustrated several points of 
the trade strategy of peaceful coexistence which we have considered in 
earlier chapters. In these prefatory paragraphs, the Draft Agreement was 
said to rest on the principles of the United Nations Charter and on the 
Charter's provisions concerning international economic cooperation, as 
well as on the specific tasks mandated to the ECE. It was also affirmed 
that in concluding the Agreement, member states would be "aware that the 
strengthening of international economic relations is an important condition 
for the peaceful coexistence of states irrespective of differences in 
their economic and political systems." In accordance with the concepts 
of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Draft also declared that "the impairment 
of the traditional... economic relations between the European states causes 
great harm.,.and that the elimination of all obstacles and restrictions of 
a discriminatory nature in the sphere of trade and other economic contacts 
is a necessary condition for broad economic cooperation between European 
states." And although it was alleged that favorable conditions for 
cooperation had been created by a certain relaxation in international 
tension (apparently a reference to the alleged continuing "spirit" of the 
Geneva summit conference often referred to by the Soviets),.the preamble 
also professed "the belief that broad economic cooperation between all 
European states will promote greater confidence in relations between nations
1
"Soviet Proposals for All-European Economic Cooperation," 
International Affairs (Moscow) no. 5 (May 1957): 157» This documentary 
section of the journal includes the texts of the Explanatory Note attached 
to the Draft itself, and the Memorandum of the Soviet government concerning 
the views of ECE member states submitted to the Executive-Secretary 
concerning it. See pp. I56-63.
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and will be an important step towards ensuring all-European collective 
security and solving the disarmament problem,"
The main body of the Agreement consisted of twenty-one articles 
extensively covering trade, scientific and technical cooperation and 
exchange of production experience. The provisions (Articles 4-12) directly 
related to trade may be summarized as follows:
ECE member countries should aim at the expansion and normalization 
of their international economic relations, and should encourage 
co-operation by means of bilateral and multilateral agreements.
Extra-European trade would be promoted through an international 
trade organization as a special agency of the United Nations.
Member states would, reciprocally extend to each other unconditional 
and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment. Long-term 
agreements on mutual deliveries should be aimed at, on a bilateral 
and multilateral basis. Member states would draft standard 
contracts for the sale and purchase of goods, and standard 
regulations for international goods traffic on European railways.1
A Soviet government Memorandum concerning the views of twenty-seven
member states on the Draft Agreement which had been submitted to the
Executive-Secretary by the beginning of 195T pointed out the main areas
of disagreement between the Soviet bloc and the leading western trading
2
nations over the provisions of the Draft. It should be noted that there 
was a broad spectrum of opinion concerning the idea of such an agreement 
among the non-Soviet bloc members of the ECE, ranging from Sweden and 
Austria's readiness to negotiate an acceptable Agreement to a few countries 
(notably the United States) which flatly rejected the idea of the Soviet 
proposal. In between. Great Britain, France, West Germany and the Benelux 
countries displayed varying degrees of interest in achieving effective 
results through constructive discussions on matters of cooperation, while
1
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discounting the usefulness of the Draft Agreement as conceived by the
socialist countries. The contrast between the USA and the major western
European trading countries in part illustrated the growing disenchantment
among the latter with American trade policy towards the Soviet bloc. There
was, however, a general consensus of critical opinion among western members
on several issues arising from the text of the Draft which were common
points of contention with Soviet bloc policy on trade cooperation
throughout this period.
In response to western criticism that the Draft Agreement ignored the
differences in economic, as well as political, systems embraced by the
countries of eastern and western Europe, the Soviet Union characteristically
replied in the Memorandum that such differences should not be considered
obstacles, contending that "cooperation between states with different...
1
systems depends largely on the desire...to further such cooperation."
With respect to the request by a number of members for a more concrete
exposition of certain provisions— an insistence which reflected the general
concern in the West over the meanings attached by the socialist countries
to general principles— the Soviet Memorandum asserted that "the purpose of
any broad agreement on cooperation is to define the common principles and
objectives that would be a basis for cooperation," adding that "the Draft...
would serve as the basis for constructive discussion at a conference of
experts of all countries convened to make the necessary amplification and
modifications, including such as would present certain propositions in more
2
concrete form.,.." Taking note of the concern expressed by several delegates
1
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over possible duplication under the Draft Agreement’s terms of certain
functions of other international economic bodies, the Soviet Union pointed
out that the Draft did not propose any administrative institution for the
Agreement and explained that it was designed to promote cooperation under
1
the aegis of the ECE. However, the Soviet document did assert that the
expression of support for an international trade organization in Article 4
was valuable and not outside the competence of the regional Commission, as
2
some had maintained.
The Soviet Union agreed to alter the wording of several provisions, 
specifically those pertaining to multilateral compensation and the 
establishment of an all-European body to deal with currency and credit 
matters; arbitration; preferential tariffs for the conveyance of exhibits 
and goods to exhibitions, fairs and so forth; and Article l4 concerning the 
civil uses of atomic energy. Most importantly, the Soviets agreed to 
reword the crucial Article 5 on most-favored-nation treatment. The 
original text had stated:
The Member States shall reciprocally extend to each other 
unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment in 
all matters affecting trade, shipping, and the status of physical 
and juridical persons in carrying out their economic duties on the 
territory of any Member State, in so far as these duties are 
permitted by the legislation of the given country.
None of the Contracting Parties will enforce restrictions, 
prohibitions or formalities with regard to import from the 
territory, or export to the territory, or another Party, which 
are not in this respect being applied to all Member States.
It was revised to read:
In view of the fact that many European countries in their trade 
and shipping relations apply the most-favoured-nation principle, 
which creates the desired premises for international trade, the
1
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Member States shall strive to extend reciprocal application of this 
principle to the trade and shipping of all European nations.
The Member States shall endeavour to eliminate obstacles of 
economic, commercial, political and administrative nature in the 
sphere of foreign trade, and whenever necessary, shall consult in 
order to adopt concerted decisions and recommendations.
Commenting on the negative western responses to the original Draft
phrasing, Domke and Hazard have observed that although all private-enterprise
states concluding commercial agreements with the USSR since the Second
World War had acquiesced to Soviet insistence on inclusion of a most-favored-
nation clause in principle (while some more than others applied it
restrictively in practice), the western European countries were evidently
unprepared to accept the principle in any general treaty where its
1
significance would be more than a simple indication of good will.
Having taken into consideration the comments of other member 
countries, the USSR submitted a revised Draft Agreement at the Commission's 
twelfth session in 1957* A number of the debated provisions, however, 
remained unaltered and were in the view of a majority of delegations 
unacceptable in themselves or allegedly mere repetitions of the principles 
embodied in the Commission's terms of reference. Moreover, they again 
argued that other matters in the Draft were already being considered within 
the ECE's framework or by other inter-governmental bodies. And, finally, 
western delegates tended to argue that it was unlikely that a formal 
multilateral agreement would in the present situation contribute much to 
intra-European economic cooperation. A draft resolution submitted by 
Czechoslovakia in the hope of keeping the proposal alive through continuing 
consultations and studies was defeated. Subsequently, a Belgian draft 
calling upon members to utilize the existing machinery of the Commission for
1
Domke and Hazard, pp. 6l and 67.
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advancing concrete proposals on matters of economic cooperation not being
examined elsewhere in the United Nations system was adopted with the abstention
1
of the Soviet bloc and Finland.
III. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND THE TREATY OF ROME
The Draft Agreement had been submitted and then revised at the same
time that negotiations for the European Economic Community were entering
their final stages. The Treaty of Rome establishing,the Common Market was
signed on March 25, 1957, a little over a month before the USSR offered the
final version of the All-European Economic Agreement for consideration in
the ECE. There was a clear connection between the two events. The various
proposals for an all-European economic agreement, the development of
intra-European contacts, and cooperation in the nuclear energy field were in
part intended as alternatives to the proposed Common Market and the separately
negotiated European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). This became
particularly evident in the discussion of an additional Soviet draft
resolution in the ECE concerning the promotion of all-round cooperation among 
2
European states.
The essentials of the case that the Soviet delegation had presented 
for the three draft resolutions orignially advanced in 1956 were restated 
in the USSR Foreign Ministry Statement on the Common Market issued on 
March l6, 1957, n scant nine days before the formal signing of the west
1
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1
European agreements. On the basis of policy proposals outlined in this
Statement, the Soviet delegation shortly thereafter developed a six-point
programme for the ECE which in effect covered identical subject matters
Intended, mutatis mutandis, for incorporation into the work of the projected
western European institutions. Relevant to our study, point five of this
ambitious programme suggested that the Commission continue its study of
the possibilities and obstacles to developing trade on an all-European
scale, with a view to .a conclusion among interested governments of
2
agreements on measures to facilitate trade. In presenting the draft
proposal setting forth the six recommendations, the Soviet representative
declared tliat the objectives of western Europe's sub-regional integration
efforts were "in blatant contradiction with the idea of developing cooperation
on an all-European basis--in contradiction, in other words, with the aims
3
and tasks of the Economic Commission for Europe." And he dwelt at length 
on what the Foreign Ministry Statement had alleged would be the harmful 
effects of the Common Market and Euratom not only on East-West relations in
1
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Europe generally but also on the economies and political relationships of
the participating western states. It was the Hungarian representative,
however, who cast the Soviet proposal in unmistakable terms as an alternative
to the western European sub-regional plans. He emphasized that, as
summarized in the record:
the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the subjects 
raised by the Soviet proposals would provide a solid basis for the 
solution of the most serious and most important problems "facing 
European economy. The paramount problem of the future was whether 
the countries of Europe, organized as they were at present in various 
sub-regional groupings, would remain opposed to one another or if 
all-European agreements, consolidating cooperation among all 
countries of Europe, could be concluded, expressed the opinion
that the establishment of the Common Market would reinforce existing
antagonisms. He urged the Commission to consider the six constructive
proposals presented by the Soviet Union which contained direct methods
for helping Europe to overcome its economic difficulties.1
The alternative scheme offered by the Soviets was apparently 
thought likely to appeal to excluded governments and influential interests 
both within and outside the nascent economic Community which were not 
satisfied with its arrangements and which might be receptive to a proposal 
for the development of commercial relations on an all-European basis.
However, the representatives of the major western states in the ECE regarded 
the Soviet draft resolution as an extension of an overt political campaign
to disrupt western European plans for closer economic and technological
union. In support of this assessment, they singled out the seminal March 
l6th Foreign Ministry Statement which had included not only the initial 
formulation of the recomnendations later presented by the USSR in the ECE 
but also a pointed, albeit feeble, attempt to rupture the political accord 
that underlay the Treaty of Rome. The signatory countries to the European 
agreements took particular exception to the divisive attempt by socialist
1
Ibid.
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countries to portray the future of the Common Market and Euratom in terms
of an alleged West German drive for economic and military hegemony in
Europe, egged on, so the Statement charged, by "certain quarters in the
United States...working for the speediest rebirth of German militarism" and
seeking to bring western Europe under the control of the USA. They
rejected the Soviet Union's six-point programme accordingly on the grounds
that the proposals "were apparently intended to serve predominantly
political objectives, since they were incorporated in the diplomatic note
which contained a series of unwarranted charges against the western European
countries and in particular the six countries that had acceded to the 'Euratom'
1
and 'Common Market' Treaties." Thus it was argued that the draft resolution
should be considered by the members of the Commission— meaning the western
majority— not in terms of the merit of its several recommendations but
rather in view of the calculated effect it was intended to have on the
pending western treaties. The American representative concurred, observing
that the Soviet Statement of March l6th "contributed nothing to European
cooperation, but rather to an increase in tensions..,." He added that the
Statement "was obviously designed to have an adverse influence on approval
of these European treaties and as such was a flagrant attempt to interfere in
2
the internal affairs of sovereign States." His assertion that the Soviet 
Union's response to the treaties clearly lacked the mutual confidence 
required for genuine cooperation was shared by other western delegations, 
and consequently the Soviet proposal failed to generate sufficient support 
for its passage.
1
Ibid., p. 33.
2
Ibid.
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There is of course no denying that the Soviets were seeking to
increase dissension in the West over the Common Market Treaty. It was also
evident that in pursuing this divisive policy the Soviets were motivated
by an inherent political and military threat perceived in western
integration. The Foreign Ministry Statement, which was the first formal
reaction to the Common Market and Euratom accords, shows that from the
beginning the Soviet Union had treated the European Community'"as if it
were nothing more than an instrument of the cold war--a device, like NATO,
invented by the Americans to mobilize the west European nations in a united
1
front against the East," as Andrew Shonfield has observed. The Soviet
government noted in the Statement that all members of the Common Market and
Euratom were members of NATO and claimed it was "obvious" that the activities
of the two groups "will be subjugated to NATO aims, the aggressive character
of which is (sic) widely known," It added: "The assertions of some west
European leaders that Euratom and the Common Market would deal only with
questions of the peaceful cooperation of its member states are nothing more
than a veil to cloak the real schemes of their organizers and sponsors."
Because these and other bitter attacks prefaced the Soviet proposals for
a11-European cooperation, one scholar has concluded that "Soviet opposition
to the European Community is not so much directed against it as an economic
2
bloc...as against its serving as the nucleus of European political unity."
Yet the Common Market countries' charge in the ECE, repeatedly echoed by
1
Andrew Shonfield, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex,England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973), p. 63. 
This is an expanded version of the BBC Reith Lectures 1972.
2
Gerhard Mally, The European Community in Perspective. The 
New Europe, the United States, and the World (Lexington, Massachusetts : 
Lexington Books, 1973), 55*
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other western observers, that the Soviet delegation’s recommendations "were
apparently intended to serve predominantly political objectives" comes too
close to denying them a reasonable and significant economic rationale as well.
In making this point we do not mean to minify the political,
propagandistic and disruptive elements of the tactics employed in the U.N.
by the Soviet Union and the rest of the bloc against western European union.
In the exceedingly hostile exchanges in the ECE on the various Soviet
counter-proposals, the political recriminations leveled by each side
against the other fully overwhelmed the economic issues raised by the
socialist delegations, issues which in effect seemed to serve more as an
excuse for confrontation than as a basis for discussing the problems of
East-West cooperation. Indeed, the ECE proceedings have often been referred
to in the West in order to specify more exactly the dimensions of the Soviet
response to the Treaty of Rome, with the result that the alternative measures
adumbrated in the March l6th Statement have been as a rule interpreted as
being no more than politically motivated delaying maneuvers. For example,
C.P.G. Ransom has concluded that the Soviet plan as outlined in the ECE
following the 1956 Draft Agreement on All-European Cooperation "seems
(particularly by reason of its timing) to be a defensive response to West
European integration rather than a positive contribution to the European 
1
debate."
The focus of our interest, however, is not (like Ransom’s) what 
Soviet policy in the United Nations can tell us about Soviet Common Market 
policy in general, but instead what the Soviet response in the U.N. to
1
C.F.G. Ransom, "Obstacles to the Liberalization of Relations 
between E.E.G. and Come con," Studies in Comparative Coirarunlsm 2 (July/ 
October I969): 65.
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European economic Integration has to say about the uses to which the Soviets 
have put the Organization in promoting their own economic interests. This 
approach quite naturally tends to emphasize— perhaps over-emphasize--the 
economic motives of Soviet actions in the United Nations and their (at least 
nominally) cooperative intentions. However, it does point up something 
regularly overlooked by those who have examined the U.N. proceedings from 
the other angle: namely, that the trade-related measures offered by the
Soviet Union in the ECE in place of the Common Market Treaty were also 
integrally consistent parts of a more broadly conceived and longer-standing 
Soviet bloc economic programme in the U.N. which was presented as a positive 
contribution to the development of East-West commercial (and hence political) 
relations and which was solidly grounded in the general approach to the 
normalization of economic relations pursued on all diplomatic levels by the 
Soviet government in the post-Stalinist years.
Viewing the Common Market as the economic arm of NATO, the Soviets 
doubted that they stood to benefit commercially from it as its proponents 
claimed. Instead they regarded the Treaty of Rome, and especially its 
provisions on external trade relations, as symtomatic both of western efforts 
to hamper European economic cooperation in general and of the practices of 
trade discrimination and restrictions in western dealings with the socialist 
countries in particular. Like the campaign for an international trade 
organization, the suggested plan for an all-European approach to economic 
problems was part of the continuing efforts to eliminate "artificial" 
obstacles to East-West trade and to reverse western policies which worked 
to the exclusion of the socialist countries from international trading
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1
arrangements and consultations. Indeed, except for the matter of timing, 
there is little about the Soviet alternative in the area of trade relations 
that could not be explained without reference to the Common Market: for 
whatever the particular issue, whether the Common Market or GATT or 
bilateral western trade policies, the basic measures proposed in Soviet 
bloc draft resolutions remained essentially unchanged throughout the 
Khrushchev period. Thus, while Ransom is correct in describing the 
alternative scheme as a "defensive response," he and others have mistakenly 
implied that it was simply a diversionary tactic and the product of a 
particular situation.
8bill, the very fact that the Soviet plan for developing all- 
European cooperation was not received in the West as "a positive contribution 
to the European debate" (as Ransom demonstrates) is a telling commentary on 
the efficacy of the style of Soviet economic diplomacy at the time and 
indicative of the politicization of the Common Market issue and of the 
political sensitivity of East-West economic relations generally. The 
rejection of the six-point programme advanced in 1957 ( as well as the 
three related draft resolutions introduced the previous year) underlined 
the practical inexpediency of the Soviet approach to expanding trade 
relations in this politically charged atmosphere, which in truth the 
Soviet position on the Common Market did much to intensify.
1
Thus D. Andreyev and M. Makov stated in a later article in 
International Affairs (Moscow): "the formation of the CoiTimon Market was 
dictated in the first place by the striving to strengthen capitalism's 
positions in its struggle against the socialist countries and this, in 
fact, is the chief class content of so-called West European integration..., 
The main idea is that the E.E.C. countries will act in a single front in 
economic relations with the socialist countries, which the latter are to 
act each in isolation...." "The Common Market After Eleven Years"
(January 1959)•
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IV. THE QUESTION OF A REGIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPE
The advisability of bearing in mind the broad dimensions of Soviet
trade strategy in the United Nations when examining specific instances of
its implementation--especially when one’s interest in them stems less from
what they meant in terms of what had been going on within the Organization
than from their relevance to immediate events outside it--should be
remembered when considering the efforts of the socialist countries at
institutional innovation through the ECE in the field of trade. As
previously mentioned in the last chapter, at the fourteenth session of
the Commission in the spring of 1959 the Soviet delegation submitted a draft
1
resolution concerning the establishment of a European trade organization.
The proposal was deferred for later consideration and eventually set aside
2
by its sponsors in i960. In an article on the evolution of the USSR's 
policy toward the Common Market in which he refers to this resolution,
David F .P. Forte has analyzed the objectives of Soviet policy during the 
period from June 1959 through I960 as follows:
Diplomatically, the Soviet Union surmised that if it could be 
made privy to the Rome Treaty provisions itself, or if it could 
dissolve the Treaty in the context of a wider all-European economic 
organization, then the reality of the Common Market would disappear, 
as would much of Western integration. Consequently, it suddenly became 
the world champion of the most-favoured-nation principle and it asked 
the EEC to observe this principle in its dealings with the USSR.,..
At the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe the Soviet Union 
proposed anew an all-European trading organization. It even went so 
far as to propose that there be three other trading groups also: Asian,
African and Latin American. It conveniently left out the United States.3
1
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (28th Session), Supplement No. 3> 
"ECE: Annual Report," p. 27.
2
ECE Resolution 1 (XIV), 5 May I959.
3
David F.P. Forte, "The Response of Soviet Foreign Policy to the 
Common Market, 1957-63," Soviet Studies I9 (January 1968): 376-77*
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However, besides the immediately obvious factual errors (the USSR had for a 
number of years supported the most-favored-nation standard; it had never 
before proposed an all-European trade body; the proposed organization would 
have Included all ECE member states, and therefore the United States), this 
statement also conveys an inaccurate impression of the purpose of the 
proposed trade organization.
First of all, Forte indicates but then ignores the fact that the 
all-European trade organization was intended as an integral part of a 
larger plan that was by no means limited in its concerns to the commercial 
problems of Europe. The proposal put forward by the socialist countries 
during the twenty-eighth ECOSOC session in 1959 for four regional trade 
organizations has already been touched upon in the preceding chapter.
There we described it in connection with the frustration of Soviet bloc efforts 
from 1955 to establish a single universal trade organization within the 
United Nations system, and we also conjectured that this new decentralized 
approach reflected the lessons apparent in the failure of the broadly 
conceived OTC Agreement to win sufficient support among the major western 
governments for ratification. Although this later proposal had been 
preceded by the Soviet bloc draft resolution in the ECE for a regional trade 
body for Europe, the central issue in the debate that followed in the 
Economic and Social Council continued to be (as it had been since 1955) the 
institutional adequacy of GATT, and not the Common Market.
This is not, as we pointed out in Chapter Four, to say that the 
growing strength of the Common Market in 1959 after a period of uncertainty 
was not a major incentive behind the redoubled Soviet bloc effort in the 
United Nations. Indeed, the socialist delegations repeatedly affirmed that 
projects for restricted economic groupings in western Europe (the 
negotiations which culminated in the European Free Trade Association had
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recently been undertaken in response to the Common Market) had compounded
the need for new institutional machinery in the trade field. They argued
this position on the ground that only with the creation of an effective
international trade organization could the legitimate commercial interests
of third states be protected as they were not then under existing 
1
arrangements.
This argument was used in the institutional debate in the United
Nations to cut away at GATT's claim of being the most suitable forum for
2
harmonizing such competing economic interests. Soviet bloc spokesmen 
asserted that the importance of GATT, already said to be severely circumscribed 
by its limited membership and previous record on a wide range of other issues, 
had been further diminished by the division of the world into several 
markets with the emergence of the Common Market and EFTA, whose external 
policies were allegedly at odds with both the United Nations Charter and
3
the stated objectives of the General Agreement itself. In fact, the Common 
Market and EFTA were referred to as proof that the industrialized countries 
were not satisfied with GATT. Thus, instead of promoting the development
1
See, for example, UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (23th Session), 
Supplement No. 3, "ECE: Annual Report," p. 27.
2
On the other side of the argument Richard N. Gardner observed in 
196k that the GATT provisions on regional arrangements have enabled the 
Contracting Parties to subject the Common Market and EFTT to close scrutiny. 
Although he recognized that this scrutiny "has not succeeded in giving full 
satisfaction to nonparticipating countries," he argued that "G^TT has provided 
an opportunity for the United States and other countries to influence the 
Common Market and other regional arrangements in an outward-looking direction.' 
In: "GATT and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development," p. 692. 
Earlier, how;ever, Jean Royer, upon recent retirement from the position of 
Deputy Executive-Secretary of GATT, had expressed less optimistic opinions 
concerning the impact of the Common Market and other regional trends on GATT. 
"World Trade: the Dangers of Regionalism," Lloyds Bank Review; no. 66 
(October I962): 1-22.
3
See for example, UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official
Records (lUth Session), p. 259 (USSR).
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of an equitable global trading system (deemed by the socialists to be the 
proper task of an international trade body of the character claimed for GATT 
by its leading member governments), the attrition of GATT’s position in 
international trade was seen as having the opposite effect. This was, 
moreover, a situation which, they maintained, could not be put right as 
long as GATT excluded certain segments of the international community and 
remained in effect under the control of the major western trading states 
which were either members of, or lent their support to, the European 
economic communities.
As elaborated in the Economic and Social Council, the Soviet bloc 
proposal for four regional trade bodies, which were expressly described as 
the first installments of a world trade organization, clearly demonstrated 
that what the socialist countries had in mind was the displacement of GATT 
from center stage, but not its abolishment. And despite the arguments 
against sub-regionalism advanced in support of the plan there appears" to 
be no concrete evidence for Forte’s allegation that this institutional design 
was intended to "dissolve" the Common Market "in the context of a wider 
all-European organization." Instead, the evidence that is available 
indicates that the purpose of the a11-European scheme as far as the Common 
Market issue was concerned was less ambitious, though in the end no more 
acceptable to the West for it: namely, to introduce specialized
institutional machinery coterminous in jurisdiction with the ECE for the 
development of East-West commercial relations under--and in some respects 
in spite of--existing conditions.
In the first place we have the Soviet representative’s 
characterization of what the USSR considered might be the scope and functions 
of the comprehensive trade organization which he set out during debate on the
i6o
proposal in ECOSOC. In it he declared, as previously quoted (see Chapter 
Four, Section III), that a universal trade organization would be able to 
reconcile and coordinate the activities of GATT and the various sub-regional 
economic groupings while pursuing the broad tasks of working out measures for 
the development of cooperation among states and the removal of barriers 
to international trade. However, the idea of first establishing several 
regional trade bodies meant that the realization of this scheme would be 
delayed indefinitely. It seems reasonable to conclude that the socialist 
countries believed that in the meantime an all-European trade organization 
could operate among the members of the ECE to reconcile the trade policies 
of those countries belonging to restricted economic groupings with the 
commercial interests of those remaining outside the respective arrangements. 
If indeed this was the case, then the plan was, quite simply, a straight 
forward application of the institutional approach to the general problems 
of improving East-West trade that the socialist countries had been pursuing 
in the United Nations over a number of years; all that was altered was the 
scenario. Thus, aside from what should be by now the obvious practical 
miscalculations inherent in this approach, the socialist delegations were 
eminently pragmatic in their treatment of the Common Market question in 
elaborating on the relationship between the Common Market, on the one hand, 
and the proposed European trade organization and the designated future global 
agency, on the other. It was here rather than in the vituperative exchanges 
on the merits of the Rome Treaty that the economic rationale of Soviet bloc 
policy was most apparent.
In the second place, unlike the Draft Agreement on All-European 
Economic Cooperation originally submitted by the Soviet Union in the ECE in 
1956, the proposal for a European trade body was not offered as an
l6l
alternative to the Common Market. It is significant that in reply to
■western criticisms of the Draft Agreement the Soviet government Memorandum
which accompanied the revised draft in 1957 stressed that the proposed
Agreement did not envisage the creation of new institutional bodies in Europe
1
for its implementation. At the time, the apparent assumption was that 
as a contractual statement the Agreement could by itself provide a 
sufficient framework for the development of economic relations' among all 
member states of the ECE in the absence of sub-regional tariff unions 
(which would presuitably have been the result of its adoption). By 1959, 
however, things had worked out differently. In view of this, the proposed 
European trade organization may be seen in part as an implicit recognition 
of the established position and growing strength of the Common Market and, 
consequently, of the need for a policy more closely attuned to the new 
realities of Europe. Soviet bloc spokesmen were showing awareness that 
if their campaign for the creation of new machinery for trade cooperation 
was to have any chance of success, it could not be linked to the dissolution 
of either GATT or the Common Market, regardless of their acute dislike of 
both arrangements. Accordingly, they took pains to impress upon the 
western delegations that if they were to agree in principle to the creation 
of such machinery, its terms of reference would then be open for negotiation. 
From an Institutional point of view, therefore, it is difficult to see the 
proposal as an immediate threat to the very existence of the Coimnon Market, 
for presumably the proponents of western economic integration would have 
insisted on sufficient safeguards to protect their interests.
This more conciliatory approach is important. Forte correctly notes
1
"Soviet Proposals for All-European Economic Cooperation,' 
p. l6l, explanation no. 3*
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that the Soviet Union had demanded that the members of the Common Market
(and EFTA, in I960) extend the liberalization of trade among themselves
to the USSR by way of a rigorous application of the most-favored-nation
principle. Referring to the fact that prior to the conclusion of the
Rome Treaty each of the six acceding countries except the Netherlands had
had trade agreements with the USSR which had provided for "maximum benefit,"
the Soviets charged that in subsequently refusing to extend internal
Market tariff reduction to the USSR these countries had violated "one of
the main principles of international law: that the conclusion of new
agreements should not release the signatories from obligations under
1
previous agreements." This complaint is apparently what Forte had in
mind when he stated that the Soviets "became" champions of the most-favored-
nation principle and sought to "dissolve" the Treaty of Rome in a wider
organization. It is true that the socialist countries liad all along affirmed
that any new trade machinery should be established on the standard of
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. Gtill, even had the western
countries believed that genuine and fair free trade between centralized
state-trading countries and modern market economy countries was not
incompatible with both systems and that, consequently, the trade between
them could and should be brought in under the umbrella of a single
organization resting on the principle of non-discrimination, the creation of
such an organization would by no means have ipso facto brought on the
«
dissolution of the Common Market. For evidence of this, one needs to look
1
New Vorld Review, July 196^, p. 3»
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1
no further than GATT and its provisions concerning customs unions.
Given their commitment (despite de Gaulle) to the objectives of the Treaty
of association, before agreeing to any all-European trade machinery the
Common Market members certainly would have insisted, in negotiating its
terms of reference, on a GATT-type acknowledgment of customs unions as
an exception--though not an unrestricted exception--to the principle of
non-discrimination contained in the most-favored-nation clause. Furthermore
it should be remembered that in revising the Draft Agreement on All-
European Economic Cooperation for the 1957 ECE session the Soviets had
been pressured into compromising their maximalist position on most-favored-
nation treatment which had been expressed in Article 5 of the original 
2
draft. In the end they settled upon a formula which would recognize the 
desirableness of most-favored-nation treatment, but which would obligate 
signatories only to "strive to extend reciprocal application of this 
principle" and "endeavor to eliminate" other obstacles in the sphere of 
foreign trade. There is no reason to suppose that they could have hoped 
for more or would have refused a compromise in 1959*
But how else except with the leveling impact of an unconditional 
and unrestricted commitment to the most-favored-nation principle could the 
Soviets have expected to "dissolve" the Common Market within a European 
trade organization? It might be argued that by putting the Six at 
competitive odds with one another the Soviets had hoped to accelerate the 
break-up of the Common Market by intensifying the alleged internal 
contradictions among its capitalist member nations, contradictions which
1
Gardner, "GATT and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, " p. 692.
2
See Section II this chapter.
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Soviet Ideologues perhaps wishfully asserted would inevitably bring about 
the collapse of the Community. However, the connection between ideology 
and foreign policy is less than evident; and even Forte, who tries throughout 
his article to make such a connection in the Soviet response to the Common 
Market, falls to tie a convincing knot.
Stripped of its ideological overtones, the argument is a bit more 
plausible* Perhaps the Soviets believed that an all-European trade 
organization would be so attractive to economic interests in western 
Europe that it would fatally weaken the impulses toward sub-regional 
integration. The evidence which is available neither proves nor disproves 
that they had this in mind when making their proposal in 1959* They could 
not have forgotten, however, that the earlier Draft Agreement on all- 
European cooperation, which had been designed to do precisely this, had 
failed to generate much interest at a time when the final decision on 
establishing the Community, i.e. the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, 
had not yet been taken. Then, too, they must have been aware of the fact 
that the advantages of the OEEC had not deterred the creation of the 
Common Market and that GATT— which offered more concrete advantages for 
trade cooperation than did the Soviet concept of a trade organization--also 
had not dissuaded the Six from their plans for closer economic union. Still, 
we cannot overlook the appeal to Soviet policy makers of the myriad 
opportunities which a European-wide institution would offer the socialist 
countries for expressing their opposition to the Common Market (and EFTA) 
and continuing their efforts to weaken these arrangements.
It might also be that the Soviets believed such an organization 
would promote trade on a bilateral basis, providing opportunities for them 
(and the representatives of other socialist countries) to pursue their 
preferred "traditional method of dealing with the western nations singly.
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1
and if possible in competition with one another"--perhaps in much the same
way as the annual ECE trade consultations were conducted, but in an open 
2
forum. This in turn would possibly inhibit the progress of the Common
Market countries in their moves toward a coiTimon external commercial
3
policy in trade relations with the East. If this could be accomplished, the 
advantages to Soviet policy would be twofold. On the one hand, it would 
at least put off the time when it would be no longer feasible to withhold 
formal recognition from the Community, an act repugnant to the Soviets
A
for its political and economic implications. And on the other hand, 
any time gained by delaying agreement among the Six on a new system for 
the joint conduct of their external commercial relations could be used for 
negotiating better terms of trade with each Common Market country 
Individually, and hence more easily and with a greater likelihood of success. 
So long as the Soviets could maintain trade relations with the members of 
the Community on a bilateral negotiating basis, they could take advantage 
of every opportunity to exert a mitigating influence on the policies of 
each member country in its economic dealings with the Soviet Union, thereby 
in turn influencing the basis of an eventual common external policy if and 
when one were finally agreed upon by the Six.
1
Shonfield, p. 64.
2
The ECE trade consultations "had some similarities with GATT 
negotiations: bilateral contacts, even between countries which had no
diplomatic relations, within a multilateral framework. The meetings were 
private and there were no reports to the press." Kock, p. 194.
3
It is true of course that participation in such an organization could 
have had the opposite effect and driven the Common Market countries toward 
a common negotiating posture more quickly.
1|.
See, John Finder, "EEC and CO?iECON," Survey: A Journal of Soviet 
and East European Studies no. 53 (January I966): 110-12.
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Of particular importance here is the fact that the socialist countries
were not only deprived--as were all outside countries--of the benefits of
trade liberalization and tariff reductions within the Community, but they
were also faced with a higher tariff wall in their commercial dealings
with the Six than were their competitors in those countries which enjoyed
most-favored-nation treatment in the Common Market countries as provided
1
for under the Treaty of Rome. Naturally they wanted to be 6n an equal 
footing with these competitors; and we suggest that this more practical 
concern, rather than the very existence of the Common Market, may have 
been the main consideration behind the Soviet proposal in the ECE for the 
creation of new trade machinery aimed at the elimination of discrimination 
in international trade. Here a GATT-like construction of the most-favored- 
nation principle with reference to customs unions would have sufficed, 
and even a general commitment to strive for the application of non- 
discriminatory treatment in dealings with the third countries similar to 
that offered in the revised Draft Agreement of 1957 may liave been 
acceptable to the Soviets. Of course this objective could have been 
achieved by acceding to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, whose
standard benefits of adherence automatically included most-favored-nation
2
treatment. This was, in fact, what Poland had tried, unsuccessfully.
But for reasons discussed previously, membership in GATT— even if it had 
been possible— was not acceptable to all countries of the Soviet bloc, not 
least the USSR. In addition to the tariff discrepancies, several Common 
Market countries were applying discriminatory quotas on imports from the 
East, and the socialist countries might have thought it would be easier to
1
Kock, p. 19'3*
2
See Chapter Four, Section III.
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get these quotas removed within the framework of a trade organization. In 
the end, however, the western countries rejected the Soviet bloc proposal 
on the same grounds that they had refused similar offers in the past, i.e. 
that under existing circumstances and in lieu of a workable commercial 
code, a trade organization encompassing the two trading systems was 
impra cticable.
V. OTHER INITIATIVES AND BETTER PROSPECTS
The failure of the 1959 proposal led to an attempt by the Soviet
Union the following year to associate itself with the activity undertaken
by the member countries of the OEEC under American pressure to transform
that association into what became the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
1
and Development. The establishment of the Common Market, and EFTA
subsequently, had created certain problems for American foreign policy and
for relations between the sub-regional groupings themselves. Because the
United States believed that the future of western Europe depended on
economic and political unity, it hoped to upgrade the OEEC so as to
provide a competent institution for keeping the lines of communication
between the two groups open. The Americans also hoped this would lay the
2
basis for an Atlantic economic partnership. During the ECE’s fifteenth 
session, the Soviet delegate announced his government’s readiness to
1
See; "OEEC into OECD," The World Today 1'/ (May I961): 132-36.
2
Ibid., pp. 132-8]; and; Aleksandr Bilimovich, "The Common 
Market and COî'iECON," Studies on the Soviet Union 2, no. 2 (I962) : 4l.
In the new organization, the United States and Canada would cooperate with 
the eighteen OEEC member countries as full members on an equal basis; 
previously their status in the OEEC had been that of associates and their 
role that of observers and advisors.
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participate in the elaboration of the principles of the new organization at
the OEEC conference scheduled for May, I96O, in the expectation that a
broadly constituted OEEC would be a step toward an international trade 
1
organization. At the time, no indication was given that the Soviets 
would insist on the organization being brought into the United Nations 
system. Representatives of the OEEC countries sidestepped this offer, as 
they did again in the following year when the USSR stated its interest
in adhering to the OECD convention, which had been concluded and signed
2
by twenty western states.
Two dther courses of action for developing commercial relations which 
were pursued by the socialist countries in the ECE during this period 
centered on inter-regional trade cooperation and special conferences on 
the problems-of trade. As early as 1957, the socialist countries suggested 
that interested member countries of other regional economic commissions 
might participate, under Article 11 of the ECE’s terms of reference, in 
the Commission’s consultations of experts on East-West trade to be held in
3
the autumn of that year. Further discussion of the subject in subsequent 
years elicited a modicum of interest among the members In the general idea 
of increasing inter-regional contacts.
The other tack brought more results. Following the stifling of its 
Draft Agreement on economic cooperation the previous year, the USSR
1
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (30th Session), Supplement No. 3, 
"ECE; Annual Report," p. 31*
2
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (32nd Session), Supplement No. 3, 
"ECE; Annual Report," p. 3^1-. The Convention setting up the OECD was 
signed on l4 December I96O and came into effect in October I96I.
3
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (24th Session), Supplement No. 3,
No. 6, "ECE: Annual Report," pp. 42-43.
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suggested in 195^ that the Commission convene before the end of the year a
1
Conference of Ministers to consider the development of trade. When it 
failed to receive sufficient support, the Soviet delegate withdrew the 
recommendation with the understanding that it could be reconsidered at a 
later date. In the fall of 1953 the Committee on the Development of Trade 
agreed on a bipartisan East-West suggestion to convene the following June 
a "special meeting on organizations and techniques of foreign trade: as a 
contribution to mutual understanding of trade problems. Inter, in an 
address during the Commission’s fifteenth session in I96O on the future 
directions of the ECE, the Executive-Secretary proposed that in order to 
develop further cooperation among member countries "an understanding should 
be reached to convene periodic intergovernmental meetings, which would be 
held in camera and at an appropriately high level, to consider major
3
economic questions of a general policy character...." Pursuant to this,
the Commission adopted a western sponsored resolution calling for a meeting
of "high-level senior economic advisors," which was then scheduled for 
4
March, I96I. Although another Soviet proposal for a Conference of Ministers 
was offered at the same session, it was not put to a vote by the Soviet 
delegate, who instead accepted the western draft’s phrasing of "high-level" 
advisors. The initial meeting was a considerable success, and as a result
1
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (26th Session), Supplement No. 3, 
"ECE: Annucal Report," pp. 34-35*
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UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (28th Session), Supplement No. 3, 
"ECE; Annual Report," p. l3.
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the Commission decided similar meetings should be made an annual feature of 
the ECE’s activities. As former Executive-Secretary Gunnar Myrdal has 
pointed out, the success of the Secretariat’s initiative was a good 
indication of the general success achieved by the Commission at the time 
and of the "greater willingness of governments to use the ECE machinery
1
for joint consideration of economic policies in their broader setting."
In i960, during his introductory remarks to a discussion on the
future tasks of the Commission, the Executive-Secretary endorsed a plan
for beginning work on drafting "a set of multilateral trade principles and
procedures which might be applied in relations between countries with
2
different economic systems." Despite differing positions on the nature of
the obstacles to expanding East-West trade, both groups of countries found
it possible to combine their interests in the Executive-Secretary's
proposal. In a joint draft resolution which was adopted as Commission
3
resolution 6 (XV), they invited the Trade Committee "to examine...the 
problems which need to be resolved and the possibilities which need to 
be explored in order to facilitate the introduction of more multilateral 
methods and any other methods likely to improve the international trade 
and payments relations between ECE countries...."
In the course of general discussion in the Committee at its next 
regular session, the two groups of states were unable to agree, however, 
on the scope of action to be taken pursuant to resolution 6 (XV). The
1
Myrdal, "Twenty Years," p. 623.
2
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (30th Session), Supplement No. 3,
"ECE: Annual Report," p. 30.
3
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socialist countries once again expressed the opinion that,
recommendations be drafted which all member countries... could take 
as a guide in their trading relations, and emphasized that such 
recommendations would be of practical value if based on recognition 
of the following principles: peaceful coexistence of states with
different social and economic systems; non-discrimination; maximum 
mutual advantage; removal of barriers of a non-economlc character; 
and promotion of the development of the economically less developed 
countries.1
Other delegations, however, insisted that
as' long as strictly bilateral trading methods were followed it was 
futile to hope for an optimum expansion of East-West trade. They 
observed that the most useful kind of work which could be undertaken 
by the Committee was to study at a technical level the obstacles
to trade which can be eliminated or at least reduced.2
These differences notwithstanding, the members of the Committee requested the
Executive-Secretary to call a meeting of governmental trade experts to
implement resolution 6 (XV). The requested meeting was eventually held
in May, I96I.
At the ECE’s sixteenth session, the members of the Commission agreed
on the text of resolution 9 (XVl) which called upon the Trade Committee
to give "particular attention...to the preparation of recommendations that
would help towards removing the economic, administrative and trade policy
3
obstacles to the development of trade...." Pursuant to both resolution 
6 (XV) and 9 (XVl) the Committee subsequently undertook a discussion on 
the obstacles to trade at its meeting in September, 1961, and proposed
that the Secretariat prepare a report on the subject in light of previous
discussions in the ECE and in consultation with experts from interested
1
UN, ECOSOC, Official Records (32nd Session), Supplement No. 3, 
"ECE; Annual Report," p. I9.
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governments. The report, which was to provide the basis for future
discussion, was submitted to member governments on the 26th of March, 1962.^
Subsequently, at the Committee's next regular session in the fall of I962,
it was agreed that the next step should be to convene an ad hoc group of
2
governmental experts from all member countries. However, in view of 
sharp conflicts of opinion over the possible subjects to be considered by 
the ab hoc group, a final decision on the matter was deferred to the next 
session of the ECE during which, it was hoped, agreement could be reached 
on an agenda.
Accordingly, the eighteenth session of the Commission decided to 
establish an ad hoc group of seven governmental experts to undertake an 
intensive examination of the following subjects in East-West trade:
(a) The role of customs tariffs in the trade of member countries with 
different economic systems, and the bearing of pricing and taxation 
policies on external trade;
(b) The most-favored-nation principle and nondiscriminatory treatment 
as applied under different economic systems, and the problems 
concerning the effective reciprocity of obligations under the 
different systems; and
(c) The possibility of establishing multilateralization of trade and
payments,3
The ^  hoc group, under the leadership of Swedish Ambassador Carl Henrik 
von Platen continued to meet on a regular basis during the remainder of the 
period under consideration, starting in September I963; and the Executive-
k
Secretary duly reported to member countries on its progress.
1
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The upgrading of the work of the Committee on the Development of Trade
from i960 on was in part a reflection of the increased emphasis given to the
regional economic commissions by the socialist countries in following up
the "new effort" which they had proclaimed in the General Assembly that year.
The scope of this effort in the ECE, however, was most pronounced in the
annual plenary discussion on the work of the Commission as a whole. Thus,
during the ECE's sixteenth session in April, I96I, Soviet bloc delegates
drew attention to the resolutions of the General Assembly relevant to
the Commission’s activities and affirmed that the ECE, "as the sole
all-European international governmental organization, could do much to
1
normalize international economic relations." Subsequent debate at that
and the following year's session about what should be done to increase the
effectiveness of the ECE in intra-European trade proceeded along familiar
lines: the socialist delegates argued against limiting the Commission's
work to "narrow technical questions" at the expense of considering
"fundamental problems bearing on the principles of cooperation;" and their
western colleagues asserted Instead that the Commission "should concentrate
on its work-a-day, functional and continuing activities" concerning matters
2
of a "practical" character.
On the occasion of fifteenth anniversary of the ECE in I963, the 
Soviet Union and France made extensive statements on what their associated 
delegations determined to be the desirable directions for the future work
1
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1
of the Commission. Speaking on behalf of the socialist countries, the
Soviet spokesman outlined their approach to economic cooperation within
the ECE and affirmed that the Commission "should aim at mutually acceptable
decisions on basic questions concerning the economic relations between
States participating in its work." The French delegate, representing the
western delegations, optimistically observed that the discussions of the
current session "had, more than ever before, taken place in an atmosphere
of compromise and conciliation which augured well for the Commission's 
2
future work." This more promising situation was again noted the following 
year. The annual report of the ECE to ECOSOC recorded that during 
discussions on the Commission's activities the delegates "generally felt 
that the recent lessening of world tensions" during the year following 
the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis "could not fail to have 
beneficial effects on the work of the Commission, whose tasks would thereby 
be facilitated and rendered more effective."^ At the same time, the Soviet 
representative prefaced the Commission's general discussion of the work of 
the ECE's subsidiary bodies with a number of observations concerning the 
strengthening of the institutional machinery of the Commission. Referring 
to various General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions on decentralizing the 
functional activities of the United Nations and strengthening the regional 
commissions, he stated that, in view of Improved interstate relations, it 
was thus "possible for the Commission to concentrate on solving the most
1
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complex and important problems affecting modern sectors of the economy in
the interests of the further development of all-European cooperation...."
To do this, he asserted, the ECE's existing structure, which had been
"designed to meet the requirements of the immediate postwar years and had
since undergone little change," would have to be up-dated and its work
programme reconstituted through a major over-hauling of the subsidiary
bodies, which were, he observed, "the basis of the Commission's 
1
activities." Thus, by the last year of the Khrushchev era, it appeared 
Soviet policy had assumed certain specific and constructive directions in 
the ECE which had a greater likelihood of success than had theretofore 
been possible within the United Nations.
1
Ibid., p. 4l.
CHAPTER SIX
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
When in I960 the socialist countries announced the policy of the
"new effort," which centered on upgrading the work of the regional
commissions, they predicted that although current circumstances prevented
the creation of new institutional machinery for trade cooperation, the
United Nations would eventually have to establish an international trade
organization to meet the requirements of the changing world economy. It
was not long, however, before the series of negotiations initiated by the
developing countries in the General Assembly and ECOSOC which led to the
first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (held in Geneva
from March 23rd to June l6th, 1964) provided the Soviet bloc with a fresh
opportunity for renewing the campaign for a worldwide economic conference
1
and a general trade organization.
1
Two extensive accounts of the events and negotiations that led 
to the establishment of UNCTAD have appeared to date. The more detailed 
account is that by Diego Cordovez, "The Making of UNCTAD," The Journal 
of World Trade Law 1 (May/June I967): 243-323, which was then followed by 
his UNCTAD and Development Diplomacy, From Confrontation to Strategy 
(Tivickenham, England: The Vincent Pre^s, 1972), issued as a "special 
publication" by The Journal of World Trade law. The other is in Chapters 
One and Two of Branislav Gosovic's book, UNCTAD: Conflict and Compromise, 
The Third World's Quest for an Equitable World Economic Order through the 
United Nations (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), p. 3. (hereafter referred to 
as UNCTAD.) For a critical comparative review of these accounts see the 
Review Article by this writer in Coexistence, 10 (March 1973): 30-35.
176
-177
This development appears to have taken the socialist countries as 
much by suprise as it did the industrialized western states. Contrary 
to the numerous assertions of Soviet statesmen and journalists (and of a 
surprising number of western commentators), UNCTAD was not the end result 
of the rather belated call’ for an international trade conference voiced
]
by Khrushchev at a Moscow reception for the President of Mali in May, I962.
Nor was it in any direct sense an outgrowth of the Soviet led efforts
beginning in the mid-1950's to revitalize United Nations activities in the
trade field. Where the focus of Soviet bloc policy had been on the
normalization and expansion of East-West trade with obligatory nods in the
direction of the developing countries, the main thrust of the efforts of
the Third World delegations in the early I96O's was directed toward the
trade problems of their own economic development. The relation, and
distinction, between the two policies has been succinctly noted by UNCTAD's
first Secretary-General, Raoul Prebisch:
The idea of calling a trade conference originated in the 50s and 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were persistently 
pressing for it. Later on, developii^ countries followed this 
idea and it culminated in the first /otcTAd/ conference. This 
was due to a growing consciousness that the moment had arrived 
for a new international trade policy geared to the needs of the 
developing countries.2
The sustained efforts of the developing countries which preceded 
the Geneva Conference generated from their earlier attempts singly and
1
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International Affairs (Moscow) no. 5 (May 1964): 26; M. lavrichenko and 
I. Ornatsky, "Barometer of Interstate Relations, " International Affairs 
(Moscow) no. 1 (January 1964): 5; "Importance of Geneva Conference" 
(interview with N.S. Patolichev), East European Trade no. 12 (March 1964); 
11; Rubinstein, p. l44; and Forte, pp. 379-30.
2
"Interview: Raoul Prebisch," The Banker 11? (September 1967):
748.
178
collectively to improve their commercial position vis-a-vis the more
economically advanced states. Repeated frustrations in their bilateral
trade relations and with existing economic bodies, particularly GATT, led
the disadvantaged states to seek redress through the United Nations, where
their coalescing unity and increasing voting strength seemed to promise
a chance for a dramatic break with past international economic policies to
which they felt they had been unfairly subjected. With the General Assembly's
1
declaration in I96I of the United Nations Development Decade, the 
movement among the developing countries toward a united posture on trade 
issues gained momentum; and the sharpening definition of Third World 
policy became increasingly linked with the demand for .a major international 
meeting on the commercial aspects of economic development. For the less 
developed nations, then, UNCTAD assumed importance beyond a simple proposal 
for an exchange of views and discussion of possible alternative policies: 
UNCTAD became the expression of their frustrations, the embodiment of their 
expectations and the symbol of their determination to effect a major 
restructuring of the international economic system. As such, it seems in 
retrospect all but inevitable that a permanent and central place would be 
sought for UNCTAD in the landscape of international economic organizations.
Thus prior to the Geneva Conference there were two essentially 
separate trade programmes being pursued in the United Nations which 
involved an increasing role for the Organization: one pursued by the
socialist countries and concentrating on the traditional, subject of postwar 
economic cooperation, i.e. the freeing of trade relations; and the other^ 
promoted by the developing countries and directed toward a pattern of 
commercial relations tailored to meet the unique needs of economic
1
General Assembly Resolution I7IO (XVl), I9 December I96I.
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development in the Third World. The ultimate origin of the developing
countries' demand for the creation of international machinery in the field
of trade and development, to which they were to attach a singular importance 
1
at Geneva, can be traced to the institutional gap left in the United 
Nations system by the failure of the Havana Charter and the resulting 
proliferation of limited economic bodies outside the Organization, such as 
GATT and the OEEC-cum-OECD. Insofar as the proposed structural changes 
envisaged a central place for the United Nations in the formulation and 
conduct of'international trade policy in fulfillment of its original 
institutional design and at the expense of the other organizations, the 
policy of the developing countries shared a certain similarity with that of 
the Soviet bloc. However, in light of the pronounced differences in the 
substantive objectives of the two groups of countries, the similarity at 
this level did not reflect a deeper identity of views.
I. THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
The immediate source of the UNCTAD initiative was the September 196I 
Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned States, which had recommended that a 
broadly representational conference be convened by the United Nations to 
work out measures for promoting economic development. From the outset of 
subsequent discussions in the United Nations, the socialist countries 
welcomed the growing interest among the developing states in the idea of an 
international economic conference(whose tasks were as yet officially 
undefined) and their increasingly evident mood of dissatisfaction with 
existing institutional arrangements. But throughout these preliminary talks.
1
Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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and then later during the preparations for Geneva and at the Conference
itself, the objective of normalizing East-West trade remained the basic
rationale of their active participation. Accordingly, the response of
the socialist countries to the new course of action being laid out by
Third World delegations was to reintroduce essentially the same proposals
and concepts which they had promoted with little success in earlier United
Nations sessions and which, as they were once again elaborated, had only
incidental significance for what the developing countries hoped to 
1
achieve. This effort to direct the debate in directions other than economic
development was in the beginning aided by disagreements among the developing
countries over the scope and organizational character of the trade
2
programme desired.
Pursuant to the Belgrade recommendation, two groups of developing
countries submitted separate draft resolutions to the Second Committee of
the General Assembly during its sixteenth session in I961. Both drafts,
3
one sponsored by Latin American countries and the other by delegations
k
from Africa and Asia, called for action in the trade field and emphasized 
the need for International meetings and conferences on commercial problems. 
Whereas the former draft referred simply to international negotiations 
related to the problems of economic development alone, the Afro-Asian draft 
specifically requested the Secretary-General to prepare "a provisional 
agenda for an international conference on world trade problems, including
1
See, for example, Kiirushchev's message to the president of 
the Geneva Conference, Proceedings I, pp. 92-93*
2
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those relating to the primary commodity market..,." In offering
support for this broader formulation, the Soviet delegation asserted that
"all viewpoints" would have to "be put forward if the conference was to 
1
prove fruitful." Thus while the socialist delegations acknowledged in 
their replies that the main purpose of the conference proposed in the 
Afro-Asian draft was to assist the less developed nations, they insisted 
on a broader agenda.
The crux of their argument was the position they have persistently 
advanced over the years in discussions on the commodity trade of the 
developing countries, namely that world trade problems are indivisible and 
that favorable conditions for economic development in the Third World, 
especially through increased trade with the socialist countries, depends 
greatly on concrete and satisfactory solutions leading to expanding trade 
between the industrial export-oriented countries of the East and West.
As one Polish representative put it during the continued debate the 
following year:
In view of the underlying interdependence of all markets, an 
expansion of world trade was not possible unless due account 
was taken of all flows of trade. In that respect, the UNCTAD... 
should be an instrument for the liquidation of the economic 
remnants of the cold war and the promotion of economic cooperation 
among states, regardless of their level of development and their 
political and social systems,2
This concept and its policy implications remained a subject of contention
in UNCTAD for a number of years after the permanent establishment of the
1
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(l6th Session), pp. I8O-81,
2
UN, General Assembly, Second Committee, Official Records 
(18th Session), p. 14-7. Thus, in his opening policy speech at the Geneva 
Conference, N.S. Patolichev stated that "the USSR delegation is convinced 
that the radical solution of the problems of the developing countries is 
inseparable from the normalization of the international economic life as 
a whole." See Volume II of the Proceedings, p. 333.
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organization* To some extent, of course, the issue concerned an Important
question of fact of potentially great importance to the Third World, and
1
as such was often held to merit serious investigation. It was also,
however, recognized as a key part of the socialist countries' efforts to
carve out a larger place for East-West trade in UNCTAD and was most often
treated as such, hut not lightly in view of the fact that the Soviet Union
in effect conditioned its participation in UNCTAD on the liberalization of
East-West commercial relations.
During debate on the initial proposals in I961, the developing
countries remained divided on the matter of the conference's scope, with
a number of African delegations expressing sympathy with the Soviet bloc's
position. On the other hand, the representative of Yugoslavia, whose
government was becoming an effective leader in the development of Third
World policy, was adamant in maintaining that, quite to the contrary, "the
idea was that the conference should discuss not trade in general but the
2
primary commodity (sic) of the underdeveloped countries." The issue 
remained unresolved, and the relevant portion of the text finally settled 
upon simply requested the Secretary-General to consult member states 
regarding their views on the advisability of holding a "conference on 
international trade problems relating especially to primary commodity
markets and, if they deem such a conference advisable, the topics that
3
might be considered for a provisional agenda," The vote on the resolution
1
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vjas ^5 to 36; vith 10 abstentions; those abstaining or voting against vere
the western and Latin American countries, excepting Cuba. And it was the
following May that IChrushchev made his much over-publicized appeal in the
presence of the Mali head of state for an international economic conference.
In July, 1962, the Cairo Conference on the Problems of Economic
Development, sponsored by a number of developing countries, strongly
recommended the early convening of an international conference on trade
and development under the aegis of the United Uations and proposed "that
the agenda of the international economic conference should Include all
vital questions relating to international trade, primary commodity trade,
1
economic relations between developing and developed countries."
Subsequently at ECOSOC's thirty-fourth session in August the decision was
2
formally taken in resolution 917 (XXXIV) to convene a United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development when it at last became impossible for
the leading western trading nations to resist pressures from the less
developed countries. However, no mention was made of East-West trade or
of new institutional machinery. Specifics of the character and agenda of
the Conference were then debated during the seventeenth and eighteenth
sessions of the General Assembly in I962 and I963, and it was eventually
decided that the Conference should be convened not later than the spring 
3
of 196 .^
Prior to the finalization of the Geneva Conference's terms of 
reference, however, the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the 
1962 General Assembly on the "question of holding an international conference
1
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on trade problems," accompanied by an explanatory memorandum from the Soviet
1
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko. The draft proposed a world
trade conference to consider the following basic subjects: "the establishment
of an international trade organization; the elimination of discrimination
in matters of foreign trade; fair prices for raw materials and manufactured
goods." This embraced an idea of a conference considerably different from
the one imagined by many of the delegations which had shortly before
supported ECOSOC resolution 917 (XXXIV). In presenting his draft to the
Second Committee, the Soviet representative stated clearly his government's
viewpoint, implying that the ECOSOC decision had not been based on a tacit
understanding defining the focus of the Conference despite its designation
as a conference on trade and development. He observed:
There were some who wanted that conference to deal with problems 
of both trade and development. The Soviet Union considered it 
more logical first of all to hold a conference on trade which 
could, moreover, deal with a certain number of economic problems 
or with some of the trade aspects of economic development.2
He explained, furthermore, that the draft was not proposing that the
conference be directed to undertake the immediate establishment of an
international trade organization, but simply asking that the subject be
included on the agenda. In connection with this proposal, the
Czechoslovakian delegation introduced another perennial subject of Soviet
bloc interest, declaring that it was imperative for the Conference "to
elaborate principles for the development of trade among all countries...
and to give those principles a solid basis by creating an international
3
trade organization."
1
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At the same session, a draft resolution eventually cosponsored by
twenty-eight developing countries proclaimed that among the fundamental
points that the Conference's Preparatory Committee should consider in
drawing up a draft agenda was "methods and machinery to implement measures
1
relating to the expansion of international trade/' Explaining this
provision, one of the sponsors pointed out that the draft resolution was
not calling for new machinery, but instead for an examination of the
effectiveness of existing arrangements and consideration of such
"organizational improvements and Initiatives as may be needed," as the text
stated. It appears, nonetheless, that the absence of a specific reference
to a new trade body only indicated a desire not to prejudge the issue, while
at the same time believing that some sort of continuing machinery ought to
be established following the Conference. A number of developing countries
explicitly stated an interest in an international trade organization
competent to deal with all trade matters relating to economic development.
But, as before, the question remained as to where to draw the line. Several
delegates opined that, as far as UNCTAD was concerned, any conference on
the problems of commodity trade and development would by necessity have
2
to cover a wider field, including matters relating to East-West trade.
And it is significant that the twenty-eight nation draft resolution 
included as a major agenda item "measures leading to the gradual removal 
of tariff, non-tariff or other trade barriers by industrialized countries... 
which have an adverse effect on the exports of the developing countries 
and on the expansion of international trade in general" However, both the
1
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question of Institutional machinery and that of trade flows were, in
context, given a definite development slant.
The western countries objected to the references to institutional
adjustement and rejected out of hand the suggestion that East-West trade
problems might be aired at UNCTAD. One student of the proceedings,
Branislav Gosovic, has described their position as follows:
They felt that this was not in the spirit of the original ECOSOC 
resolution /res. 917 (XXXIV/J Actually, when they agreed that 
the conference be held, the major western powers were informally 
assured by some cosponsors of this resolution [k/c .2/L,,6hQj that 
neither the institutional question nor the question of East-West 
trade would be discussed there.1
Despite their objections, the draft resolution was adopted by the General
2
Assembly with near unanimity in resolution I785 (XVIl), As Gosovic 
concluded, the western countries "were gradually outraaneuvered by the 
developing countries, which by then seemed to have grasped the tactic 
of step-by-step negotiation," and, we might add, the complementary stratagem
3
of playing the East off against the West. Thus although the western 
delegations had acquiesced in ECOSOC's I962 resolution to convene the 
Conference, UNCTAD "was born against the wishes of most western countries 
and plunged into an environment unfavorable for its growth."
II. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
Following the failure of their initial efforts to restrict the scope 
of the Conference mainly to general trade Issues, the Soviet bloc countries
1
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generally supported the developing countries in the deliberations of the
1
Preparatory Committee's three sessions, though they continued to argue for 
a representative place in UNCTAD for East-West trade and for the 
establishment of a world trade organization based on a set of general 
principles. In pressing these positions, however, the socialist countries 
encountered two largely insurmountable obstacles. The first was the 
persistent refusal of most western delegations seriously to entertain any 
matters they believed were not directly relevant to the problems of the 
developing countries. The other was the determination of the developing 
countries, in spite of their practice of capitalizing on East-West 
competition, not to allow the Conference to be jeopardized by an interminable 
and debilitating debate between the two major world power blocs. In this, 
the Third World delegations were guided by their past experience in the 
United Nations' economic forums. While the developing countries had most 
often taken exception to the leading western countries' use of the 
Organization's functional activities as an extension of the anti-communist 
programme, their resentment had come in time to reflect foremost a desire 
to shift the United Nations away from its preoccupation with cold war 
concerns and to Involve it more in the problems of economic development*
The development orientation of the developing countries during this 
period formed the basis of what those countries themselves have termed 
"the outstanding feature of the Conference and an event of historical 
significance"; the unity of the developing countries and the consequent 
division of the Conference delegations along North-South lines--"North" 
denoting the rich countries, economically advanced whether capitalist or
See Franges, p. 6. The sessions were respectively held from 
22 January to 5 February I963, from 21 May to 29 June I963, and from 
3 to 15 February I96U.
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socialist, and "South" the poorer countries of the Third World, In their 
self-proclaimed role as the champions of the developing nations' struggle 
to achieve full economic and political independence, the Soviets have held 
as utterly untenable this division of the world according to the North- 
South confrontation formula.
Allegedly founded upon and guided by the principle of proletarian
internationalism, the presumed cooperation between the Soviet bloc and the
developing countries is, for the Soviets, objectively based on their common
struggle against imperialism, as set forth in the I961 Party Programme.
According to one Soviet article that appeared during the second WTCTAD
Conference in I968, "to divide the countries in 'haves' and 'have-nots’
without taking into account their social nature is to deprive the whole
1
issue of its class content," In the Soviet perspective, this class content 
characterizes all economic and political relations; the economic division 
of a non-socialist society into classes of exploiting owners and exploited 
workers is seen to be transferred, mutatis mutandis, to the international 
arena in the form of the capitalist countries' economic (and political) 
imperialism repressing the advancement of the Third World through an unjust 
international division of labor. The socialist countries, however, 
maintaining that they have eliminated exploiting classes within their own 
societies, claim to apply their ideology and anti-capitalist strength to 
the international class struggle to the benefit of the developing countries. 
Thus, to link the capitalist and socialist countries together in 
opposition to the Third World is, according to them, to misunderstand the 
true nature of international economic relations. For the socialist states.
1
A, Zakharov and L. Lobanov, "The UN and the Urgent Problems 
of the Developing Countries," International Affairs (Moscow) no. 5
(May 1968); 31* Also see Patolichev’s objections in his opening address in 
Volume II of the Proceedings, p. 386.
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the question is not one of who is rich, but one of who is progressive. 
However, their pursuit of more favorable economic relations with the West 
has produced a certain tension between rhetoric and national interest, 
for as the economic cold war was gradually eased in the 1950*s it became 
evident that the socialist states were emerging as increasingly substantial 
participants in and beneficiaries of the existing international economic 
order. This fact did not escape the delegates of the developing countries 
at the Geneva Conference* That the developing countries continued by and 
large to ignore these protestations and to lump socialists and capitalists 
together under the "rich North" rubric was a source of continuing 
frustration for the Soviet bloc delegations at Geneva.
The position adopted by the developing countries vis-à-vis the 
socialist countries belied earlier Soviet expectations that in concert 
with the growing number of developing countries in the United Nations it 
would soon become possible to wrest the Organization from the West, thereby
strengthening the position of the Soviet bloc in the international
2
decision-making process. In particular, in view of the establishment of
GATT without Soviet participation, of Soviet non-participation In the IBRD
and IMF, and of the negligible Soviet role in the administration of United
Nations economic programmes, "the launching of new trade machinery in
partnership with the less developed countries seemed a way of breaking
3
traditional western hegemony in international economic institutions,"
1
S. Mikoyan, p. U6.
2
See, for example^ "On World Trade Parley," New World Review,
July 198)4-, p. 27. This is an interview with the deputy head of the Soviet 
delegation to the Geneva Conference.
3
Richard N. Gardner, "The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development," International Organization 22 (Winter I968): IO3,
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According to Richard Gardner, it also seemed a way "to expand Soviet trade
and political influence with the uncommitted countries and bring pressure
to bear on western economic policies regarded inimical to Soviet interests."
Moreover, George A. Brinkley has surmised in his thorough article, "The
Soviet Union and the United Nations: the Changing Role of the Developing
Countries," that as "the period from I960 was marked by increasing
difficulties for Soviet policy outside the UN (failure of the I98O summit,
another Berlin crisis and erection of the wall, eruption of the Sino-Sovlet
split into the open, the Cuban missile crisis to mention a few) it
undoubtedly became all the more important to Khrushchev to consummate a
2
victory inside the United Nations,"
I. The Geneva Conference, however, pointed out that Khrushchev had 
seriously miscalculated in his assumptions about the developing countries 
and therconsequences of his position in the United Nations. Although at 
the Conference the developing countries showed deference to the socialist 
delegations, they felt in no way obligated to the Soviet bloc countries for 
the support offered by them. Soviet bloc proposals on the major issues of 
the Conference, while formulated largely in accordance with the demands of 
the Thipd World, often aroused incredulity among the delegates from the 
developing countries. And the predominant concern of the less developed 
countries with improving their trade relations with the western industrialize 
states served to force the socialist states into the background.
i Yet it should be recognized that the socialist countries did much 
from the start to exclude themselves from the mainstream deliberations of 
the Conference. While endorsing most of the developing countries’ demands
1
Ibid.
2
Brinkley, p. 101.
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and proposals for special treatment and for various unilateral concessions, 
the socialist countries both before and during the Conference contended 
that these demands should be directed only to the states which were 
"historically responsible" for the plight of the Third World, i.e., the
1
leading western countries with histories of imperialism and neo-colonialism.
More to the point, the socialist countries asserted that world commodity
markets were largely governed by the international capitalist monopolies
and it was, therefore, against them that action should be concentrated.
Thus, in a review of the Conference, Reginald Green observed that the
Soviet bloc delegations "took a position fairly typical of the industrial
world, endorsing all changes which would adversely affect only other
industrial countries, and opposing those which would place significant
2
burdens on themselves." Also, supporting their "tested" use of bilateral 
negotiations and agreements, the socialist countries exhibited a distinct 
unwillingness to participate in across the board commodity agreements or 
compensatory finance systems.
But perhaps the most important indication of the Soviet bloc’s 
attitude toward the Geneva proceedings was their declaration, noted 
previously, that given the rather less developed state of their younger
1
This was linked to the issue of the developing countries' lumping 
of the socialist and capitalist countries together as comprising the "rich 
North." Thus Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev, who headed the 
Soviet delegation, told an interviewer: "...we do not bear any responsibility 
for the grievous economic legacy left over to the developing countries and 
resulting from the long colonial rule or the neocolonialist policy.
Therefore, the attempts to approach the developed capitalist and the 
developed socialist countries in the same way in discussing questions 
pertaining to the compensation of the damage inflicted by colonialism and 
the activities of-capitalist monopolies are unnatural and unrealistic."
"USSR and the UN Conference" (interview with N.S. Patolichev), East European 
Trade no. 15 (June 1984): 4.
2
Reginald H. Green, "UNCTAD and After: Anatomy of a Failure,"
The Journal of Modern African Studies 5 (198?): 249-50.
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economies in comparison with the United States and others it would he
difficult for the socialist countries to increase greatly their economic
relations with the developing countries unless major changes were made in
East-West trade and economic relations. Although for political reasons,
hut also because of lack of time, the Conference failed to take a position
on a draft recommendation submitted by Czechoslovakia "concerning the
1
question of trade among countries having different economic systems"
(i.e. East-West trade), the socialist delegations realized at last, however,
that the developing countries expected positive action from them as well;
and consequently the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland assumed
certain commitments towards the close of the Conference, pledging an
eventual increase of trade turnover between themselves and the developing 
2
countries. In return, the socialist delegations had to be content with
the decision of the Conference to transmit the Czechoslovakian draft "to
the continuing United Nations trade machinery which it is proposed to
3
establish, for further consideration and action."
A. THE INSTrrUTIOWALIZATIOW CONTROVERSY AT GENEVA
The continuing machinery of UNCTAD that emerged from the Geneva 
Conference was an institutional compromise between those countries which 
promoted and those which reluctantly accepted the idea of an organization 
within the United Nations linking trade with development and devoted in 
the main to the economic problems of the Third World. Walter Kotschnig has 
called this machinery the developing countries’ "greatest achievement in
1
See Volume VIII of the Proceedings, p. -86.
2
e/cONF. 46/l . 17 (12 June 1964).
3
Ibid.
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1
institution building within the UN." Yet this institution was the result 
of difficult, often bitter, negotiations concluded only in the final hours 
of the Conference, and it bore the marks of the confrontation of the 
developed and developing countries over the kind of Institutional machinery, 
if any, that should be created.
The establishment of any organization is always a complex business, 
involving questions of structural framework, membership, voting, 
arrangements, purposes, functions, and so forth. We do not intend to 
examine the deliberations of the UNCTAD delegations on all these matters 
since in most respects they are relevant only in terms of the continuing 
work of UNCTAD after 1984 and are therefore beyond the scope of this 
study. Furthermore, it is not our intention to review the Conference's 
reappraisal of the effectiveness of existing arrangements, which centered 
on the role of GATT. To a large extent, this discussion took place 
between the western and developing countries and is therefore of only 
tangential interest to us. As far as the immediate interests of our study 
are concerned, the basic positions of the socialist and western countries on 
this matter have been outlined previously; and it should suffice to 
observe that the developing countries considered existing institutions 
inadequate and ill-equipped to promote their economic interests.
The inability of the other Conference committees to make real 
progress on substantive problems of trade and development convinced 
the developing countries at an early stage in the proceedings that little 
would be accomplished at the single convocation, making it apparent to 
them that the success of the Conference depended on their efforts in the
1
Walter M. Kotschnig, "The United Nations as an Instrument 
of Economic and Social Development," International Organization 12 
(winter I968): 33*
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Fourth Committee ("Institutional Arrangements, Methods and Machinery To
Implement Measures Relating to the Expansion of International Trade")
to negotiate some sort of institutional framework for continuing the work
begun at Geneva. Similarly, the failure of the socialist countries to
secure Conference consideration of the issues most important to them
placed particular urgency on their proposal for the establishment of an
international trade organization.
The preliminary debate in the Fourth Committee indicated that by
the opening of the Conference most all participants, including the
western countries, "had reached the conclusion that the establishment of
a new institutional framework within the United Nations was required in
order to promote international trade cooperation and to implement
effectively the principles and policies of the Conference," as stated in
1
the summary record. Notwithstanding this elemental agreement, serious
differences existed over the kind of arrangements desired.
In his report to the Conference, "Towards a New Trade Policy for
Development," UNCTAD Secretary-General Prebisch endorsed the idea of a
"new trade organization," based on periodic UNCTAD conferences, a standing
committee and "an intellectually independent secretariat with the authority
and ability to submit proposals to Governments within the framework of the 
2
United Nations." Initially the Fourth Committee liad before it four formal
draft proposals on institutional arrangements that to differing degrees 
corresponded to this formula. The three proposals that can be respectively
1
Proceedings I, p. 233.
2
Prebisch, p. 100.
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1 2  3 
identified as the socialist, Afro-Asian and Latin American drafts called
for the establishment of an international trade organization. Two of these,
the Afro-Asian and Latin American proposals, suggested the setting up of
transitional arrangements--consisting of periodic conferences on trade and
development, a standing committee and a specialized secretariat--"which
would be vested with appropriate powers and functions in the field of
international trade and which would also be entrusted with the task of
preparing the legal instruments required for the establishment of the
4
trade organization." The former draft designated the projected institution
as the "United Nations Organization for Trade and Development," while the
latter referred to an "International Trade Organization within the United
Nations system to deal with the problems of international trade, with
special reference to the needs of development."
The socialist draft differed from these in that it called upon the
Geneva delegates to establish forthwith a universal International Trade
Organization and offered for the first time a detailed design for such
an institution. Moreover, the proposal did not include any exceptional
reference to the trade problems of the developing countries and omitted
the subject of a continuing role for UNCTAD following the first Conference.
5
The fourth draft proposal, which was sponsored by a number of
1
UN Document E/CONF. 46/50. Romania was not a cosponsor,
2
UPT Document e /CONF. 46/c , 4/L. 3.
3
UN Document E/CONF, 46/c . 4/l . 5/Rev, 1.
4
Proceedings I, p. 233 « The idea of a standing conference was 
first put forward, prior to Geneva, by Yugoslavia. See, "Memorandum of 
the Government of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia" of April I963, 
in answer to a questionaire of the UN Secretary-General, as cited by 
Franges, pp. 5 & 7.
5
UN Document E/cONF. 46/c. 4/l. 9.
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western delegations, provided for new institutional arrangements on a
permanent basis“-also in the form of periodic conferences, a standing
committee and appropriate secretariat services--as an integral part of the
United Nations economic machinery under the Economic and Social Council.
Except for the fact that the developing countries wanted UNCTAD as an organ
of the General Assembly, the western proposal was in line with the minimal
demands of the developing countries concerning continuing Conference
machinery. In seeking to protect the competence and operation of GATT, the
western countries maintained that the United Nations should be informed
about and should discuss trade and development problems, but that GATT, as
a contractual agreement, was the appropriate instrument for the implementation
of any international trade policies. By advocating a permanent place for
UNCTAD in the United Nations structure but not an international trade
organization as a specialized agency, the western delegations were following
a strategy that would least disturb the status quo in the institutional
field. Furthermore, they shored up their position of total opposition
to a new trade agency by pointing out that the Conference--not being a
conference of plenipotentiaries--could not approve the legal instruments
that were required for the creation of such an organization, as intended in
1
the Soviet bloc draft. While there was broad agreement on this point,
the western delegations also argued that it was necessary to define the
legal basis of an international trade organization before passing
judgement on its establishment as the developing countries desired in
2
proposing transitional arrangements. On this there was no agreement.
The developing countries, however, took a pragmatic view of the
1
Proceedings I, p. 233
2
Ibid.
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opposition of the major western trading states to an international trade
organization in acknowledgment of the fact that the effectiveness of
continuing arrangements would depend on their acceptability to those states,
and accordingly offered no support to the socialist countries' plan.
Nonetheless, they refused to discard the idea of transitional arrangements
embodied in their draft proposals. For the developing countries it was
important to get the process started and to build the organizational
structure in stages; they therefore concentrated on defining the status
and functions of a permanent Conference on Trade and Development. Thus,
as the Committee report observes, "while the majority of delegations
expressed their support for the establishment of such an /international
trade/ organization, a broad measure of agreement emerged regarding the
advisability of recommending...at that stage that the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development should be maintained as a continuing
1
institution which would be convened periodically."
Following the general consideration of the four proposals, and
after several informal discussions among the delegations, three revised
proposals were submitted: a draft resolution concerning the establishment of
2
an international trade organization submitted by the socialist countries,
a draft recommendation submitted jointly by seventy Afro-Asian and Latin
3
American countries and Yugoslavia, and a draft recommendation submitted
4
by an expanded number of western delegations.
The rapporteur of the Fourth Committee noted that in introducing the
1
Ibid.
2
UN Document e /CONF. 46/50/Rev. 1 and Add 1 and 2*
3
UN Document e /CONF* 46/c . 4/l . 12 and Add 1 and 2.
4
UN Document e/CONF. 46/C. 4/l. 9/Rev* 1 and Add 1.
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revised texts, spokesmen in behalf of the respective drafts stressed that
an effort had been made to harmonize proposals and to promote conciliation
in order to reach a solution acceptable to all. In this connection, the
socialist countries pointed out that, with a view to facilitating the
position of those delegations which had opposed or had had difficulty-
accepting the previous text that provided for the immediate creation of
an international trade organization, the revised version of their proposal
included transitional arrangements which, pending the establishment of
such an organization, would perform the functions required for implementing
1
the decisions of the Conference. Although the western countries claimed that 
their revised draft gave particular attention to the views of the 
developing countries (no mention was made of the Soviet bloc proposal), 
disagreement was apparent on a number of issues, one of which remained the 
provision concerning the establishment of an international trade organization.
Delegations among the western states persisted in the opinion that 
"the new institutional arrangement should be set up on a permanent basis 
and that no reference should be made to the creation of a new international
2
trade organization since a case had not been made out for its establishment."
Nonetheless, in a joint position statement presented toward the conclusion 
3
of negotiations, they declared that while they felt it would be premature 
to take a decision on further institutional arrangements, the question 
of a comprehensive trade organization could be left open for study at 
a later time; this was assured, they stated, by paragraph 6 (f) of their 
draft proposal, which provided that the standing committee of the permanent
1
Proceedings I, pp. 235-38.
2
Ibid,, p. 238.
3
UN Document e/cONF. 48/c. 4/h. I9.
199
Conference would "keep under continuing review the effectiveness and further 
evolution of organizational arrangements and to recommend such organizationa' 
improvements as may appear feasible so as to maximize the beneficial 
results I of trade for the promotion of economic development." In a 
parallel statement, however, the developing countries replied that they 
were "not satisfied with this assurance," and wished "to make a more 
specifi| reference" to the need for setting up a comprehensive international 
trade organization. In the end, no agreement was reached on this issue, 
and the||draft resolution of the developing countries was adopted as a whole
Ij
by 80 v8tes to 20, with three abstentions.
PQuite some time before the final vote was taken, however, the 
socialist delegations had moved into the background in the Committee's
Pdeliberations. By modifying their original draft proposal to include 
transitional machinery they had brought their position closer to that 
of the developing countries while remaining at irreconcilable odds with
P
the western delegations on the issue of a world trade organization. Even
with thèse changes, there was no reason for the developing countries, who
;
were in|,a strong voting position, to switch their support to the socialist 
draft; indeed, in their position statement, the developing countries
I
asserted that there was a considerable measure of agreement between 
their t^p revised proposals, but also stressed that the main difference 
betweenithem was the degree of emphasis placed on the establishment of
r 2
a comprehensive trade organization. On the other hand, the vote in the 
Fourth Qommittee, and the pressure it generated, made the developed
Ir UN Document e/cONF. 46/c. 4/L. 13. 
12
! Ibid.
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1
western countries more willing to reach a conciliation. Consequently,
during the debate on the remaining three draft proposals the socialist
delegations had to be content with supporting the positions taken by the
developing countries. In a statement following the vote in the Fourth
Committee, the socialist countries explained they had voted with the
developing countries because they were satisfied with the transitional
arrangements; however, they also stated that, as reported, "they had
hoped the Committee would reach unanimous agreement, but since that had
not been possible, they had decided to cooperate as fully as possible with
the developing countries, although the draft recommendation just approved
2
did not take account of all of their own ideas."
The peripheral role of the socialist delegations remained unchanged 
during the final dramatic round of behind the scene negotiations that took 
place under Prebisch's leadership after the Fourth Committee reported out. 
By this time, the dearth of substantive achievements was a matter of record; 
and it put pressure on the developing countries to put aside the 
confrontation tactics followed in the Committee in order to negotiate a 
viable compromise with the major western trading states on the Final Act's 
provisions for continuing machinery.
UNCTAD's continuing machinery could be either important or it could 
be futile. The Conference suffered a joke at the hands of not only the 
western delegates. The Swiss national exposition was going on at Lausanne 
concurrently with the Conference, and one of the exhibits at the exposition 
was a kinetic sculpture that moved its parts a lot, made lots of noise, 
but served no other purpose. It was thus referred to by some delegates
1
See Gosovic, UNCTAD, pp. 42-43.
2
Proceedings I, p. 239*
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as the "continuing machinery." Whether the machinery that emerged from 
the Conference would mimic the purposeless sculpture depended, or course, 
on its effectiveness.
The western countries understood effectiveness in restrictive
terms of the machinery fitting in well with existing international economic
institutions, especially GATT. The developing countries, on the other
hand, understood it in terms of their ability to establish control over
international economic policy that concerned them; this involved by-passing
those institutions which traditionally had been in the control of the
developed states, and this meant GATT in particular. In their interest in
relegating GATT to a position of lesser importance in the international
economic system the developing countries shared a common institutional
objective with the socialist states; and it was in consideration of this
that the two groups of countries advanced their respective proposals for
an autonomous trade organization. The Geneva Conference had been, however,
at least a beginning, if not a very promising one, in securring a more
advantageous position for the developing countries in world trade; it was
far more important for them to ensure that the work begun at Geneva would
not end there than to stick to an inflexible position on the transitional
nature of the continuing machinery that could jeopardize constructive
western participation in UNCTAD. Accordingly, the negotiated provision in 
1
the Final Act concerning future insitutional arrangements, adopted without 
dissent, combined essential elements of the positions taken by the western 
and Third World delegations in the Fourth Committee:
1
The Final Act was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly 
as Resolution 1995 (XIX) and UNCTAD came into being as a permanent organ 
of the Assembly on 30 December 1964.
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The Conference should review, in the light of experience, the 
effectiveness and further evolution of institutional arrangements 
with R view to recommending such changes and improvements as might 
be necessary. To this end it should study all relevant subjects 
including matters relating to the establishment of a comprehensive 
organization based on the entire membership of the United Nations 
system of organizations to deal with trade and with trade in 
relation to development,1
Thus in the end the developing countries backed off from their 
earlier demand for a specific reference to the need for setting up a 
comprehensive international trade organization, though the Preamble to the 
Pinal Act took note of the "widespread desire among developing countries" 
for such an organization. Despite the above provision, in the years since 
the Geneva Conference the developing countries have been so preoccupied with 
making the existing UNCTAD structure work that very seldomly has the 
question been raised of further insitutional evolution in the direction 
of a world trade body. After a decade of Soviet bloc efforts at 
institutional innovation, the Geneva Conference, in which the socialist 
countries had placed such high hopes initially, effectively buried the 
prospect of a United Nations international trade organization for the 
indefinite future.
B. A STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRINCIPLES
Likewise, the socialist countries had little justifiable cause for 
satisfaction over the related matter of a statement of principles to govern 
international trade relations. In keeping with the position adopted by 
the USSR in the General Assembly the previous fall, representatives of the 
Soviet bloc countries went to Geneva determined that the Conference 
should complete the work of the ad hoc Working Group established by
1
Final Act, Second Part, Section V, para. 73 (g): Proceedings I,
p. 15.
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ECOSOC in I983 to consider the question of a declaration on international
1
economic cooperation. In his opening policy address, the head of the Soviet
delegation, Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev, drew attention to the
2
draft "Principles of International Trade Relations and Trade Policy"
which had been submitted to the Conference by the USSR, Poland and
Czechoslovakia. It is clear from his comments that the Soviet's main
objective in proposing a set of general norms remained for them the
3
normalization of East-West commercial relations. The developing countries, 
for their part, were anxious for the Conference to adopt a set of both 
"general" and "special" principles that would "define the common concern of 
the whole international community for the economic development of the 
developing countries...and spell out...the policies required to obtain
k
these ends."
As a result of this interest, the Fifth Committee, within whose 
competence the subject fell, had before it more than a score of draft 
proposals and related documents concerning the question of principles,
5
including the report of the ECOSOC ad hoc committee. The proceedings of 
the Working Group established by the Fifth Committee to prepare draft 
principles for consideration by the Committee as a whole showed that
1
See Volume II of the Proceedings, p. 338*
2
UN Document E/CONF. 46/49*
3
In a concurrent article for East European Trade, S. Borisov,
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, wrote of the three- 
Power draft that the "new principles of international trade proceed from 
the need of its universal normalization." "Main Tasks of Geneva Conference,' 
East European Trade no. 12 (March 1964): 18.
4
Evgeny M. Chossudovsky, "UNCTAD and Coexistence : part one— From 
Geneva to New Delhi," Coexistence 6, no. 2 (1969): IO7.
5
UN Document E/3725 * For the report of the Fifth Committee, see 
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agreement on universally acceptable principles was no easier to attain 
at Geneva than it had been earlier in the General Assembly and ECOSOC.
The Working Group took as the basis of its deliberations a draft 
set of principles submitted by seventy-five developing countries. This 
proposal included, with some important conflicts in wording, most of the 
points covered in the three-part draft prepared by the socialist countries; 
most, but not all, of these differences were later ironed out-in negotiations. 
The final compendium of general and special principles subsequently 
approved by the Fifth Committee had no pretentions of being a definitive 
enumeration of all possibly relevant principles nor was the text of the 
principles listed accepted unanimously by the Committee’s members.
As with the institutional question, a final effort was made after 
the Fifth Committee finished its business to reach a greater measure of 
agreement on a number of principles. Little additional progress was made, 
however, and the final vote of the Conference in plenary session repeated 
the pattern in the Committee : of the "General and Special Principles to 
govern international trade relations and trade policies conducive to 
development" adopted by the Conference, the United States, most often 
joined by the other principal western trading nations, voted against or 
abstained on eleven of fifteen "General" and eleven of thirteen "Special" 
principles. A final defeat for the western countries was their unsuccessful 
attempt to place the statement of principles as an annex to the Final Act; 
as a result, it appears in Section I of the Second Part of the Final Act, 
foremost among the decisions of the Conference.
The socialist countries attached much importance to this Conference 
decision in spite of the fact they had hoped a declaration of principles 
would be made the cornerstone of an international trade organization. The
205
propositions included In the general principles most often singled out by 
Soviet commentators on UNCTAD--and those having the greatest bearing on 
East-West trade--are the following four:
(a) International trade should be conducted to mutual advantage 
on the basis of the most-favored-nation treatment and should 
be free from measures detrimental to the trading interests of 
other countries.1
(b) Economic relations between countries, including trade relations, 
shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality 
of States, self-determination of peoples, and non-interference
in the internal affairs of other countries.2
(c) There shall be no discrimination of the basis of differences in 
socio-economic systems. Adaptation of trading methods shall
be consistent with this principle.3
(d) Every country has the sovereign right freely to trade with other 
countries....4
These and the other UNCTAD principles were viewed by the socialist 
countries at the time as, in the words of one Soviet correspondent,
"a guide to normal economic relations and the foundation of international
5
law,...part of the legal texture of our time." This followed precisely 
the pre-Geneva position concerning a declaration of principles on 
economic cooperation taken by Soviet bloc representatives in the central 
economic forums of the United Nations. However, the major western trading 
states did not support the general principle incorporating the raost- 
favored-nation provisions, and with infrequent defections, did not vote for 
the other principles relevant to trade as between the industrially
1
From General Principle Eight.
2
General Principle One.
3
General Principle Two.
4
From General Principle Three.
5
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developed countries. Despite the encomiums In the Soviet press, the
Soviets were well aware of the limitations of those principles which
recommended changes in the commercial policies of nations not part of
the majority which had written them into the Final Act.
In view of the lack of unanimity, the success of UNCTAD’s principles
as a guide to action in promoting change in the long run depended on two
factors. The first of these, their eventual acceptance hy the West,
has not been achieved even though the Conference recommended that the
proposed insitutional machinery should continue efforts "to achieve the
broadest possible measure of agreement at the earliest moment on a set of 
1
Principles." The second may be termed their "political fallout" or
"atmospheric effect": whether the advanced western countries would be
able to sustain existing trade and economic policies--those allegedly
conflicting with the general and special principles--in the face of
concerted efforts by other UNCTAD member states acting on the basis of the
principles to bring about changes in national and international policies
through the Conference's continuing machinery. In this respect, Soviet
spokesmen have warned that "attempts to ignore the broad response to UN
2
decisions are fraught with serious political implications/ Nonetheless, 
it must have been obvious to them by the close of the Geneva session that 
the UNCTAD machinery would be used in the foreseeable future by the 
developing countries not for the purpose of normalizing Fast-West trade 
but for bringing pressure to bear on all developed countries, both 
socialist and western, to promote the interests of economic development 
in the Third World.
1
Final Act, Annex A. I. 3 * : Proceedings I, p. 26.
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III. CONCLUSION
In a sense, the Geneva Conference marked a culmination and a final 
turning point in Soviet bloc economic policy in the United Nations. 
Outwardly, Soviet observers lauded the developing countries' vigorous 
prosecution of their case against western economic policies and greeted 
the promulgation of the Final Act with enthusiasm. Yet when placed against 
their stated expectations, the Conference must have been a bitter 
disappointment for those policy makers who had hoped that the now elusive 
united front with the Third World would bring their own decade-long efforts 
within the Organization closer to fruition.
It should be pointed out, however, that throughout the period 
beginning with Stalin's death, except during the debates surrounding the 
Geneva Conference, the socialist countries had not unduly relied on the 
voting support of the Third World delegations to pass the various trade- 
directed proposals we have examined. Indeed, they followed the same basic 
strategy and advanced the same kinds of proposals within both the General 
Assembly and ECOSOC, where the developing countries' influence was 
significant, and the Economic Commission for Europe, in which the developing 
countries did not participate, except most infrequently and in a limited 
capacity. It is true that in recognition of the political realities of the 
negotiating process in those bodies, the socialist delegations regularly 
formulated their draft resolutions in the Organization's central forums to 
include matters of interest to the developing countries. But the presence 
of a growing number of independent, disadvantaged countries in the United 
Nations was employed before UNCTAD mainly for hortatory purposes, that is, 
to support the Soviet bloc contention that the composition and character 
of international relations had changed and that the conduct of world trade
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was increasingly less the sole prerogative of the industrialized West. 
Regardless of their efforts to bring a wider spectrum of international 
opinion to bear on western trading policies, it is evident that the 
socialist countries understood that whatever numerical majority might be 
mustered for their recommendations, ultimately their implementation 
depended on the concurrence of the western countries: hence their emphasis
on the question of the West's "political will" to improve economic relations, 
on the mutual economic advantages of expanded trade, and on the affirmed 
imperatives of peaceful coexistence and the complementary obligations of 
United Nations membership as they interpreted them. Yet the 
ineffectiveness of this approach to the problems of East-West trade as it 
was pressed inside the United Nations had already been a matter of record 
prior to the developing countries* call for a conference on trade and 
development. The Geneva Conference merely served to underscore it once 
again.
Set in this historical perspective, then, the frustration of Soviet 
bloc efforts at Geneva is only partly attributable to the vain attempt 
to enlist the support of the developing countries. Nonetheless, the 
significance of the Conference for our study lies in the fact that the 
bafflement of the united front strategy exhausted for all practical purposes 
the options open to the socialist countries for securing an acceptance-- 
whatever the consensus— of the policies which they had pursued without 
success from the mid-1950's.
Branislav Gosovic, in his commendable study of the developing 
countries in UNCTAD, observes that when, after several years of western 
opposition, "East-West trade finally found its place in UNCTAD, it remained 
essentially a marginal issue and not a priority topic as the socialist
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countries had hoped for." He concludes, "Consequently, their expectations
were diminished'and they gradually lost some of their original interest in
1
the organization." It appears more likely, however, that any diminution
of their interest in the organization as a diplomatic instrument was due
not to the marginal position allocated to East-West trade at this late
date, but mainly to improvements in trade relations achieved outside
UNCTAD in the interim.
Even as they were playing out their hand at Geneva, there were
indications that the socialist countries were revising their approach to
trade problems in the Economic Commission for Europe, as we saw at the end
of Chapter Five. And it was not long after the conclusion of the UNCTAD
Conference that it became clear that Soviet bloc diplomacy was taking a
decidedly new direction in pursuing better economic relations with the West
through the United Nations.
East-West trade in Europe had continued to expand until by the early
1960’s it had reached healthy proportions. In America, too, there were
growing pressures for a change in trade policy with the East, spurred on by
an awakening realization that at a time when the United States was
experiencing balance of trade difficulties, the rest of the western world was
deriving considerable economic advantages from trade with communist 
2
countries. At the White House Trade Expansion Conference of September 
1963 a large representative group of American businessmen called for a 
reappraisal of the U.S. policy. And in April 1964, the annual meeting of 
the United States Chamber of Commerce unanimously passed an unprecedented
1
Gosovic, UNCTAD, p. I69.
2
See Berman, "A Reappraisal of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Policy," pp. 139*
4l.
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resolution urging the Government to liberalize its regulations on 
non-strategic exports so that American businesses might compete in Eastern 
markets on equal terms with the western Europeans. The emerging modus 
vivendi between the USSR and the United States that followed the peaceful 
settlement of the Cuban crisis of October I962 also had a salutory effect 
on their mutual economic relations, and on the attitude of the American 
Administration in particular even though the crisis itself had spawned 
opposite reactions in Congress and among certain emotional sectors of the 
American public. In March 196^ 1 Averell Harriman, who was then Ambassador 
at Large, proposed that trade in peaceful goods with the socialist countries 
be expanded; and at about the same time, Soviet Deputy Premier Kosygin 
renewed Klirushchev's 195^ offer of a trade agreement with the United States.
A few weeks later, The New York Times reported that President Johnson had
1
indicated he would welcome proposals for more trade with the Soviet bloc.
This in turn was soon followed by Under-Secretary of Commerce Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Jr.’s statement that:
A new look is being given at the wisdom of the restrictive practices in 
trade. Obviously, the situation that existed when our restrictions were 
imposed on trade with these Communist countries has changed. The 
political climate of the world has changed. The ability of the Soviets 
to pay for imports from the West has clianged. Therefore trade policies 
must also change.2
Despite this thaw in the official American attitude, practical
results were slow in coming. Nonetheless, as the prospects for trade
improved and as the political restrictions on trade--particularly on East-
West trade in Europe--faded and commerce significantly increased, the
socialist delegations in the United Nations grew more attentive to the
1
The New York Times, 26 April 1964.
2
As quoted in The New World Review, July 196)1-, p. 30.
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problems stemming from the differences in trading systems and practices. In
this respect, it is interesting to observe the comments of one Hungarian
scholar, Jozsef Bognar, on the proceedings of the first UTiCTAD Conference.
In contrast to, but not in direct repudiation of, the course of action taken
by the socialist countries at Geneva, he stated:
The various■ socio-economic systems represent different economic 
methods and mechanisms....From the existence of different economic 
mechanisms it follows that what world economy and trade require 
today is not universal and general principles in the first place. 
Certain general principles demonstrating our intentions and goodwill 
without prescribing a sequence of action can, of course, be formulated. 
(Most of these can be summed up in a negative form, stating what to 
refrain from.) However, it is impossible to adopt universal rules 
determining the order and mode of economic action, because the 
introduction of one and the same impulse into different economic 
mechanisms will lead to different results'». W__/orld trade needs 
few general principles and many concrete common aims attainable by 
means of coordinated action.1
This in effect called for a new approach, a new attitude, in pursuing better
trade relations through the United Nations. While past diplomatic failures
undoubtedly figured in this reassessment, the improved political climate
and trading situation highlighted these systemic problems and put them in
better perspective. As a result, though the socialist countries continued
to use the Organization's economic forums for attacking remaining western
restrictions and discriminatory practices, in the ensuing years both sides
came closer to a consensual understanding of the need for finding pragmatic
measures which would facilitate trade between the two trading groups to the
mutual satisfaction of the trading partners.
Early practical experience in this direction was gained from the 
participation of Poland in the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations after 
March 196 ,^ and the pragmatic approach adopted there was further developed
Jozsef Bognar, "Coexistence and the World Trade Conference," 
New Hungarian Quarterly 5 (Winter 1964): 101 and 104.
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by the special ad hoc group on East-West trade which had been established
by the ECE back in 1963» Another example of the commitment of the socialist
countries to this low-level, step-by-step approach to problem solving was
also to be seen in their support of the original Hungarian resolution which
resulted in the creation of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law in I966. Expressing the conviction "that divergencies arising
from the laws of different States in matters relating to international
trade constitute one of the obstacles to the development of world trade,"
the resolution defining UNCITRA.L's terms of reference declared its
objective to be "the promotion of the progressive harmonization and
1
unification of the law of international trade."
The influence of these and other related developments in the United 
Nations on East-West trade has not been dramatic, but it has been important, 
both as an aid to expanding that trade and in defining a more effective place 
for the Organization in it. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the 
improvement of the socialist countries’ trading position with the West over 
that which existed in the mid-1950's brought with it a declining interest 
in the United Nations as a supplementary arm of foreign economic policy. 
Soviet bloc activities in the Organization over the preceding decade, 
however, had not been entirely without beneficial results: for instance, the
areas of disagreement with the West over the obstacles to expansive 
commercial and economic relations had been clarified by debate; research 
studies undertaken by the Secretariat had promoted better understanding of 
the problems presented by the existence of differing economic systems, which 
were in themselves heterogeneous; concrete advances had been made in reviving
1
UN, General Assembly, l497th Plenary Meeting, Official Records
(21st Session), pp. 1-2.
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and extending East-West trade through the consultations held under the 
auspices of the ECE; and some progress had been made toward defining the 
bases of trade and economic cooperation. The more pragmatic and 
conciliatory policy first adopted by the Soviet bloc delegations in the 19^3 
session of the ECE indicated that the multiple advantages of continued 
participation, and of the United Nations as the only existing international 
forum in which the socialist and western countries could meet on a 
regular basis to discuss economic matters, had not been lost on the 
socialist countries. In light of this, the economic policies pursued in 
the United Nations by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies 
during the Khrushchev years may be tentatively seen as part of a long-term 
process of readjusting their attitudes toward the Organization's functional 
programme from the aloofness and hostility that had characterized the 
Soviet position under Stalin.
Thus, if the United Nations did not loom largely in the future 
development of East-West commercial relations, it was atleast apparent at 
the end of the Khrushchev era that it would continue to play a role. And 
it promised to be a more meaningful role for the United Nations in promoting 
the economic objectives of the Charter than the Organization had enjoyed at 
any time since the great expectations of its founders had disintegrated 
in the bitter political aftermath of the Second World War.
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